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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is an examination of the relationships and conflicts between franchisors and 
franchisees in the Taiwan retail franchise market. Two examples, convenience stores 
and estate agencies, are compared as these typify the retail and service sectors. The 
method adopted in this research is a form of exploratory qualitative research, since the 
purpose is to provide insights and understanding of the nature of marketing. 
In this research, there are many points, which conflict with previous research, such as 
the performance between multi-unit and single franchising, monitoring issues, buying 
back franchisees, the resource constraints of management talent and financial capital, 
brand transference and so on. From the empirical findings, the author suggests this is 
related to local culture and operational customs. Further, in international franchising, 
the author's results show that there is no relationship between internationalisation and 
company scale. What is important is whether any two businesses have the same 
commercial objective. Some interviewees offer valuable insights, which have never 
been discussed before, for example, most of the previous researches on financial 
constraints focus on whether it is cheaper to obtain capital from franchisees as 
compared to stockholders or financial institutions. However, a valuable point 
interviewees have suggested is that the question should be related to whether the power 
of the brand is strong as compared with other factors. In other words, if the brand 
power is strong, then other constraints will be minimized. 
Based on the above findings, relationships and conflicts between franchisors and 
franchisees are then explored. Based on the nature of industry and ownership patterns, 
what the franchisees care about is autonomy in the convenience store sector, whereas 
ix 
brand power is highlighted in the estate agency sector. The common point is that both 
industries stress the importance of communication, but this function fails in this 
research for different reasons and these reasons can be traced back to the difference of 
ownership patterns. Therefore, aside from the contribution to theories, three models are 
developed for practical application from the perspective of communication. In 
conclusion, with smooth organizational communication and constructive interactions, 
both parties will benefit from each other and enjoy the synergy of increased brand 
power. 
x 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
Franchising as a business format has attracted lots of attention because of its lower risk 
of market entry and failure rate and it has developed for over 200 years. Today, many 
businesses adopt franchising as a growth strategy because of its basic characteristics 
such as the high motivation of franchisees, resource constraint and so on. Therefore, 
franchising has become a world trend, not only well developed in industrialised 
countries like the US and the UK but also penetmting into developing countries like 
Taiwan. In Taiwan, with the progress of internationalisation and its strong purchasing 
power, many foreign franchisors and local franchisors have discerned this opportunity 
and entered this market. Hence, one can see many franchised outlets in the Taiwanese 
retail market such as 7-Eleven, Body Shop, 21st Century Estate Agency, and 
McDonald's. Due to the flourishing nature of franchising in the local market, many 
problems have occurred at the same time as this industry is in the growth stage of the 
life cycle. One of most important issues is the relationship between franchisors and 
franchisees. Conflicts are often aroused from the conceptual gaps between franchisors 
and franchisees and this can weaken the power of franchising. Therefore, this thesis 
will examine the relationships and conflicts between franchisors and franchisees in the 
Taiwanese retail market. Two different industries, the convenience store and estate 
agency will be examined. Most of the existing theories are examined from the 
perspective of western culture but in this thesis, the author tries to draw out 
contributions from the franchise ownership patterns in Chinese business culture. For 
this reason, the research was undertaken in Taiwan. Deliberately, two different 
industries, which typify the different faces of industry and different ownership pattern, 
namely, convenience store (product based) and estate agency (service based) are 
closely examined and compared. By comparative research, the core issues-
2 
relationships and conflict will be uncovered to frod the critical factors leading to 
success in the interaction between franchisors and franchisees. It will be shown that 
with a stable relationship between franchisors and franchisees, both parties benefit from 
the franchise organisation 
In chapter two, general issues about franchising will be explored to establish the 
importance of franchising and to justifY its choice as a subject for study. Although 
franchising has become the fastest growing form of business in the global economic 
system (Justis and Judd, 1989; Knight, 1984; Sanghav~ 1991), the failure rate of 
franchise organisations is often higher than average (Price, 1998). This chapter will talk 
about how the franchise organisation plays a part in a vertical marketing system. 
Generally speaking, the franchise organisation has a better operational efficiency 
compared with businesses in a conventional channel, because channel members share 
some channel functions. As far as the franchise organisation is concerned, it is a kind of 
hybrid organisational form that incorporates elements of both markets and hierarchies 
(Norton, 1988; Larson, 1992, Williamson, 1991). The relationship between channel 
members is built on the contract between the franchisors and franchisees, and is a kind 
of relational exchange between them. Franchisees have to pay initial fees and royalties 
to get the 'know-how' or to use the brand name of the franchisor. In a franchise 
organisation, there are different formats based on the pattern of ownership. Dahlstrom 
and Nygaard (1994) suggest that ownership comes in three forms: corporate ownership 
and operation; corporate ownership but management by franchisee; and ownership and 
operations by franchisee. Another kind of phenomenon in franchising is the prevalence 
of multi-unit franchising. However, the academic literature on franchising has largely 
ignored the true distinguishing feature: the ownership of multiple units by an individual 
3 
franchisee (Bradach, 1995). This is because most researchers think that the efficiency 
of a single unit is better than that of a multi-unit franchisee. Therefore, it is interesting 
to explore whether multi-unit franchising outperforms single franchising. Besides the 
growth of multi-unit franchising, franchisors can also expand into international markets, 
and Petersen and Welch (2000) suggest that there are four options for international 
franchising: private label products, own brand products, concept sales, and the business 
format franchising package. At the end of this chapter, the author adopts Elango and 
Fried's (1997) work and from the study of their article, one can see which forms of 
franchising have been researched. 
Kedia, Ackerman and Justis (1995) suggest that the emphasis on franchising has 
increasingly moved from the source of resources to the relationship between the 
partners in the enterprise. Therefore, this core feature, namely, the relationship between 
franchisors and franchisees, is the central topic of study for chapter three. The 
relationship between franchisors and franchisees is based on a long-term relational 
exchange (Kaufmann and Stern, 1988). Therefore, how to motivate each other and 
maintain a good relationship becomes important from the perspectives of 
organisational stability and franchise power. Key theories like motivation will be 
discussed from three aspects: agency theory; resource constraint and transaction cost 
analysis. In agency theory, both parties are self-interested: hence, the challenge of how 
to satisfy franchisees is a key issue because the contract is fundamentally written to 
benefit the franchisor. Generally speaking, franchisors use both coercive and 
non-coercive power to maintain the relationship. Regarding resource constraints, 
Oxenfeldt and Kelly (1968-69) suggest that franchisors use franchising to obtain 
resources from franchisees. Resources include ftnancial capitaL human capital, 
4 
management talent and local market expertise (Oxenfeldt and Kelly, 1968-69; Minkler, 
1990 and Lafontaine, 1992). The other explanation for motivation is found in 
transactional cost analysis (TeA), where Williamson (1985) suggests that transaction 
costs include both the direct costs of managing relationships and the possible 
opportunity costs of making inferior governance decisions. In franchising, both 
franchisors and franchisees are self-interested parties; therefore, if one party damages 
the other party's benefits, the relationship wil1 become fragile. However, as TeA also 
suggests that the prime asset in franchising is the shared trademark (Rindfleisch and 
Heide, 1997), once the trademark is devalued and uncertainty grows due to extemal 
pressures or behavioural defects, the relationship will deteriorate. Hence, franchisors 
have to encourage franchisees to undertake some specific investment in the transaction 
to maintain a stable relationship and make it difficult to transfer to other franchisors. 
Another key managerial dimension is whether franchisors and franchisees are 
entrepreneurs. Most researchers agree that franchisors are entrepreneurs, however, 
opinions on whether franchisees are entrepreneurs differ widely. For example, Rubin 
(1978) argues that the franchised enterprise is, in reality, simply a 'managed' outlet 
following the corporate marketing strategy of another truly independent business, i.e., 
that of the franchisor. Knight (1984) placed the franchisee 'exactly mid-way' on a 
continuum of independence from 'solo independent entrepreneurs' and 'large corporate 
managers'. However, Bradach and Kaufinann (1988), in their own research found that 
'franchising and starting an independent business are part of the same decision process' . 
There is still no universal viewpoint on whether franchisees are entrepreneurs. 
Further, concerning the management of relationships and conflict between :franchisors 
and :franchisees, Brown (1980) suggests that power and performance wilJ influence the 
quality of the relationship. As conflicts occur, leadership and power wilJ have direct 
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influences on the quality of the interactions and thus, many researches highlight the 
importance of communication. A good and effective communication mechanism 
minimises dissatisfaction and conflicts. Finally, Kaufmann and Stem (1988) view 
franchising as the prototype relational exchange. In franchising, the alliance between 
the franchisee and the franchisor is established and maintained to promote the 
trademark, because the trademark embodies commercial value for both parties in the 
licence agreement. If the franchisee perceives the relationship as inadequate, and 
therefore the value of the trademark as not having long-term potential to fulfil his return 
requirements, then the franchisee will have a short-tenn view of the relationship, and 
move toward a discrete transactional relationship, or even seek to end the relationship 
(Pondyand Huff, 1985; Macneil, 1978). We shall see that the franchise relationship 
between the parties is quite complicated and is presented essentially to promote the 
brand benefit for each other. 
Chapter four introduces the retail franchise market in Taiwan. First of all, the emphasis 
is placed upon why Taiwan is chosen for this research. In 2000, reflecting innovation 
and change in the retail environment, the Taiwan Chain Store Association (TCSA) 
changed its name to be Taiwan Chain Stores and Franchise Association (TCFA). Now, 
its membership stands at over 200 enterprises, with 19,724 store outlets, 170,908 
employees and $NT6, 221 hundred million annual output value. The renaming of the 
association suggests that the franchise chain is becoming more important in the retail 
market. In Taiw~ the convenience store (CVS) and the estate agency (EA) industries 
are selected to typify retail and service sectors. Four franchise chains are selected from 
each industry. The backgrounds of these companies and general information gathered 
from the interviews about internationalisation are introduced in this section. Finally, the 
6 
future development of franchising in Taiwan is introduced'. 
Chapter five presents the methodology followed, in order to provide an understanding 
of how the research was conducted. The method adopted in this research is a form of 
exploratory qualitative research, because the purpose is to provide insights and 
understanding of the nature of this marketing phenomena (Malhotra and Birks, 2000). 
First, research questions, research objectives, the conceptual framework and 
pre-assumptions are fonned from the previous literature review. The details of the 
research strategies are then introduced. The sample frame is comprised of eight 
franchise brands in the Taiwanese retail market; four of them from the CVS sector and 
the other four from the EA industry. Within each brand, three interviews in the 
franchisors' head offices and ten franchisees from each system were selected to 
minimise the bias that may arise from just using one or two interviews. Selection was 
based on stratified and random purposeful sampling methods. Owing to difficulties 0 f 
access, only 84 interviews were conducted, in other words, a success rate of 82% was 
achieved. Regarding the analysis, cross case and with-in case analysis are adopted to 
compare the cases and to uncover the natural interactions and relationships between 
franchisors and franchisees. All the interviews were recorded and transcribed. 
Chapter six presents the fIrst part of the discussion and analysis. Following the structure 
of the literature review, motivational issues like agency theory, resource constraint and 
transaction cost analysis are discussed and analysed. Chapter seven is the second part of 
the discussion and analysis. In this chapter, the characteristics of decision-makers and 
relational exchange theory are explored in order to have an understanding of the natural 
interactions between franchisors and franchisees. 
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Finally, in chapter eight, the research fmdings and conclusions are presented. In this 
chapter, only those fmdings that conflict with established theories are presented. From 
these findings, the author identifies the gaps between theory and practice. In addition, 
models are built to uncover the complexity of the interactions between franchisors and 
franchisees. Finally, the limitations of the study, avenues for future research and a 
summary of key contributions to knowledge are presented. 
The following conceptual framework illustrates the structure of this research. 
Retail Franchising in Taiwan: Convenience Store (retail) and Estate Agency (service) as Illustrations 
of Contrasting Systems 
International Franchise 
Path 
• Private label products 
• Own brand products 
• Concept sales 
• Business format 
franchising 
Inward Internationalisation 
Figure 1.1 Conceptual Framework 
Relationship 
and 
Conflict 
Motivations for franchising 
• Agency Theory 
• Resource Constraint 
• Transaction Cost Analysis 
Decision Maker 
• Knowledge and experience 
• Leadership 
International Franchising 
Retail Franchise 
Dimensions 
• Regular chain vs. 
franchise chain 
• Single vs. multi-unit 
franchisee 
• Local vs. 
international system 
• Internal vs. external 
franchisee 
• . Original vs. 
transferred franchisee 
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CHAPTER TWO: FRANCHISING 
2.0 Introduction 
Some 200 years on from its inception, little has changed and the popular perception is 
that franchisors invariably reap rich rewards. Some franchise systems have grown into 
enormous organisations and franchising'S permeation of countries (e.g., Chan and 
Justis, 1992; Preble, 1995) and business sectors (Curran and Stanworth, 1983) has been 
extraordinary. In particular, franchising now accounts for over one-third of all retail 
sales in the USA, and approximately 20 percent of the US gross national product results 
from franchise operations. According to Tikoo (1996), by 2005, franchising will 
account for nearly 50 percent of U.S. retail sales. In addition, the 1994 NatWestlBFA 
survey estimated there to be around 26,400 franchised units operating in the UK, or 
19,400 excluding dairy milk roundsmen. The valuable contribution of franchising to 
the economy was estimated to be around £ 5.5 billion. The employment generated by 
franchising is also an important part of its contribution to the economy. The figures in 
the 1994 Survey indicate that 175,900 people are employed directly through franchise 
outlets, with a further 16,400 being employed at franchisor head offices and other 
locations. Furthermore, it is estimated that 25,000 additional jobs are dependent upon 
the franchising industry. Therefore, the impression of rapid growth continues to be 
strongly fostered as part of the industry's marketing and self-promotion effort 
(Stanworth and Purdy, 1998). From these facts, we can see that the importance of 
franchising is increasing and franchising also plays an important role in international 
expansion because it has been developing into the fastest growing form of business in 
the global economic system (Justis and Judd, 1989; Knight, 1984; Sanghavi, 1991). 
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However, others perceive a less optimistic future for franchising. Bates (1995) believes 
that some franchising niches appear sutured. Shane (1996) claims that three-quarters of 
all new franchise systems failed within ten years. Further, new evidence from 
Lafontaine and Shaw (1998) indicates that many firms starting as franchises fail despite 
franchising, and that many others choose to stop franchising within a few years. Most 
recently, Stanworth, Purdy, Price and Safrris (1998) confirmed Shane's (1996) findings 
and believe that, although franchise business failure rates are similar to conventional 
small businesses, franchising may be more risky during the first four to five years of a 
system's life. 
Even so, some consider franchising to be the world's fastest growing method of doing 
business (Justis, Castro giovanni, and Chan, 1994). This may be because of its lower 
failure rate and the obvious shortcut to success for many entrepreneurs. For example, 
Williams (1994) suggests that the more risk-averse person will prefer franchises as the 
franchisor services are presumed to facilitate spreading the risk between a franchisee 
and the franchisor. 
As far as failure rate is concerned, the statistics most frequently cited by industry 
sources concern franchisee survival rate, although academics have shown an increasing 
interest in franchisor survival rate (English and Willems, 1994; Lafontaine and Shaw, 
1997; Shane, 1996; Stanworth, Purdy, and Price, 1997; Bates 1998). Stanworth, Purdy 
and Price concluded their examination of all the above with the comment that: 
" ... a growing body of evidence now suggests the need for a radical reappraisal of 
the risks and challenges associated with franchise system development. The gap 
between rhetoric and reality in the field of franchising can be substantial. This 
appears generalizable internationally, albeit under us. influence. Only recently 
II 
have academics assembled the necessary critical mass of relevant data sufficient 
to put popular conceptions ... to the test. How these data are used in the years to 
come, and the industry S response to them, will be interesting to observe" (1997, 
pp.92-93). 
The overall picture of franchise survival rates is one of considerable complexity. For 
instance, Bates has demonstrated that franchised outlets can both under-perform and 
out-perform comparable independent businesses, not only in the same sector but also in 
the very same franchise system, depending on factors such as whether franchisees are 
newcomers or entrenched, multi-establishment franchisees taking on additional outlets. 
In addition, a substantial body of theoretical and empirical analysis shows that better 
established, larger firms are more likely to remain in operation than younger, smaller 
businesses (Jovanovic, 1982; Evans, 1987; Bates, 1990; and Bruder!, Preisendorfer and 
Ziegler, 1992). 
According to the Commerce Department attrition studies, by the end of the ftrst year, 97 
per cent of the franchises are still in business versus only 62 per cent of the 
independents. At the end oftive years, 92 per cent of the franchises are stilI in business 
versus only 23 per cent of the independents. At the end often years, 90 per cent of the 
franchises are still in business versus only 18 per cent of the independents (Ashman, 
1988). Given these figures, it appears that operating as a franchise definitely offers the 
entrepreneur a better chance at survival. Dun and Bradstreet (1989) also reported that 
franchises have a lower annual failure rate than other forms of business, ranging from 
0.4 percent for personal services firms to 3.8 percent for business services ftrms. These 
figures however pertain only to fuilures involving losses to creditors, not to total 
closings. However, it appears that there has been a gross under-estimation of the risks 
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associated :franchise system development and operation. Failure rates amongst 
franchise systems are now known to be much higher than commonly was realised until 
fairly recently. 
In short, after comparing US and UK data, Storey (1994) concludes that the broad 
pattern which emerges is that the young are more likely to fail than the old, the very 
small are more likely to fail than their larger counterparts, and that, for young firms, 
probably the most powerful influence on their survival is whether or not they grow 
within a short period after start-up. Therefore, we can suggest that the failure rate is 
closely linked with the age and the scale of the franchise system. 
From the above arguments ofthe failure rate of franchising, we know that there must be 
both advantages and disadvantages to the franchise system (see Appendix 1), as it is so 
attractive and yet has a high failure rate. This chapter will discuss various aspects of 
franchising to provide a clear overview of this topic. 
2.1 Definitions and History of Franchising 
There is no universal definition of franchising. The general defmition adopted by the 
International Franchise Association (IF A), founded in 1960, is: 
"A franchise operation is a contractual relationship between the franchisor and 
the franchisee in which the franchisor offers, or is obliged to maintain, a 
continuing interest in the business of the franchisee in such areas as know-how 
and training: wherein the franchisees operate under a common trade name, 
format and procedure owned or controlled by the franchisor, and in which the 
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franchisee has or will make a substantial capital investment in his business from 
his own resources. " 
From this definition, we can see that the franchise relationship is based on a contractual 
relationship between franchisors and franchisees and something is exchanged between 
both parties. Aside from the above defmition, there are many different defmitions of 
franchising. For example, Curran and Stanworth (1983) defined franchising as: 
"A business form essentially consisting of an organization (the franchisor) with a 
market-tested business package centered on a product or service, entering into a 
continuing contractual relationship with franchisees, typically self-financed and 
independently owner-managed small firms, operating under the franchisor s trade 
name to produce and/or market goods or services according to aformat specified 
by thejranchisor" (1983, p.ll). 
This definition was seen as covering most modern varieties of franchising, and in 
principle, no barriers appeared to exist to incorporating quasi-forms. In retrospect, this 
should be stressed as ideal-typical in approach. For instance, in practice, market testing 
can be perfunctory. Franchisee self-financing is often supported significantly by loan 
fmance from banks or other sources, including franchisors. Also, multi-unit 
franchisees and corporate franchisees that are found in some areas of franchising such 
as fast food are clearly not always owned by small firm owner-managers. Indeed, some 
corporate franchises may be larger than their franchisors measured by value of 
corporate assets, but in many areas small-scale ownership remains typical. Also, 
although the relationship is defined as a continuous one, the actual period covered, of 
course, is variable. Some reference ought also to be made to the payment of fees or 
royalties of various kinds by franchisees to franchisors. But otherwise, the defmition 
embodies a gradually evolved consensus as the study of franchising has developed. 
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Occasionally, the definitional debate re-emerges (see, for instance, Spinelli and Birley, 
1996), but otherwise is largely a feature of earlier research. 
The relationship between franchisors and franchisees is based on the franchise contract. 
However, the franchise contract is difficult to balance between the two parties because 
it at most just defines general powers and responsibilities but cannot address how the 
parties are to exercise those powers (Hadfield, 1991). So, franchisors can sue 
franchisees for different reasons if franchisors think that the franchisees' operations are 
illegal. Hadfield suggests that any Court should adopt a relational approach to the 
interpretation of franchise contracts and the resolution of franchise disputes. This is 
because the highly incomplete franchise contract requires analysis in a manner distinct 
from the ordinary, complete contracting approach of classical contract law. As a 
consequence, to interpret the franchise contract is to read it in the context of this 
relationship, to test the written tenns against the basic sense of the relationship, and the 
commitment problems facing both franchisee and franchisor. In the UK, the most 
detailed comparative work on franchise contracts is that undertaken by F elstead (1993). 
He compared 83 different franchise contracts. His analysis compared contracts on six 
main component elements: guarantees granted to franchisees of territorial exclusivity; 
franchisors' rights to unilaterally impose changes to their operating manuals; 
post-termination restrictions on competition; franchisors' stakes in franchisees' 
businesses via ownership of sites, telephone lines or equipment; franchisors' rights to 
police the quality of the franchisees' output; and, finally, the franchisors' imposition of 
output targets. Felstead (1993: 116) finds that franchisees occupy an ambiguous 
position of being neither fully in control of 'their' business nor fully controlled. 
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Therefore, most issues in franchising are linked to the contract; and how to keep a fair 
contract benefiting each party is an important issue. This is because the contract will 
influence the futw-e development of the franchisor and franchisee. However, most 
franchise contracts are still beneficial to franchisors, and therefore, conflicts take place. 
Stanworth (1984) suggests that franchise relationships may appear to render 
franchisees highly dependent at a contractual level, at an operational level more 
independence may be manifest than appears likely at the first sight. 
As far as its history is concerned, generally, there are three generations recognised in 
the development of franchising. Originally, franchising can be traced back to the 
eighteenth century, through the first generation of business franchises, known as 
tied-house systems among German brewers, who contracted with taverns to sell their 
brand of beer exclusively. The second generation appeared in the nineteenth century, 
when the Singer Sewing Machine Company sold its products to its sales force, who in 
turn had to find markets for them. This type of arrangement, known as 
product-tradename franchising, involves using franchisees to distribute a product under 
a franchisor's trademark. Today this form is prevalent in automobile sales, retail 
gasoline, and soft-drink distribution. The third generation of franchising, known as the 
business format or 'package' franchise, was developed in the twentieth century by 
A& W Restaurant. This type of franchise seeks to replicate in a local community an 
entire business concept, including product or service, tradename, and methods of 
operation. This form has accounted for most of the unit growth of franchising 
worldwide since 1950. Third generation franchises exceeded product-tradename 
franchises in the total number of units during the 1980s. In the UK, the tenanted public 
houses are often categorised as 'first-generation' franchises and almost totally sidelined 
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from most mainstream debates on modern franchising. The terms 'franchising' and 
'business fonnat franchising' are now used practically interchangeably in the franchise 
industry generally. The franchise industry bas been strongly influenced by 
developments from the USA. In the mid 1970s, the British Franchise Association was 
formed by eight franchise companies: 
• Budget Rent-a-Car (vehicle rentals) 
• Dyno-Rod (drain cleaning and hygiene services) 
• Holiday Inn (hotels and motels) 
• Kentucky Fried Chicken (fast foods) 
• Prontaprint (fast print services) 
• ServiceMaster (carpet and furniture upholstery cleaners) 
• Wimpy International (fast foods) 
• Ziebart (vehicle rust-proofing services) 
Only two of the above (Prontaprint and Wunpy) were distinctly British and even the 
latter was based upon an imported American idea, albeit developed by a British 
company. The dominant representation of American involvement in franchising has 
continued, with US companies exporting to Britain largely via the medium of granting 
'master licenses' for an individual or company in Britain to develop their fonnat 
nationwide. 
From the above introduction, we have an idea of what franchising is, and the 
fundamental importance of the contract. The next section will discuss related issues in 
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franchising and first of all, how franchising fits into the retail distribution channel will 
be explored. 
2.2 Channels of Retail Distribution 
In a traditional distribution channel, the institutions with which end consumers have 
everyday contact are final retailers. However, it is impossible for retailers to perform 
all the functions from manufacturing to selling by themselves. Therefore, there are 
many participants within a distribution channel each of which serves a different 
function to maximize the efficiency of the total channel and to create customer 
satisfaction. 
The channel is defmed as "a term of merchant and agent business institutions that 
combine physical movement and title movement of products in order to create useful 
assortments for specified markets" (Walters, 1977, PA). The function of distribution 
channels is to deliver either products or services to markets where customers can access 
them. As a result, no modem economic system can exist without channels because of 
the separation of production and consumption as a result of specialisation. A channel of 
distribution is necessary to bridge the gap in any society (Breyer, 1966) and it can be 
demonstrated that channels of distribution contribute to the overall efficiency of the 
system. Marketing channels are universal to all economic systems other than the very 
simplest. The following section will discuss two different systems, conventional and 
vertical marketing systems, in the form of marketing channels. 
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2.2.1 Conventional versus Vertical Marketing Systems 
As far as the marketing or distribution channel is concerned, generally speaking, there 
are two systems, which are the conventional channel and the vertical marketing system 
(VMS). Traditionally, the channel of distribution is from manufacturer to wholesaler to 
retailer to consumer; the emphasis is from one channel member to the next one and each 
channel member has its own role and functions. This is called a conventional channel. 
However, in this system, some of the functions which members perform are similar or 
the same. This causes inefficiency in the allocation of resources. Rather, in the vertical 
marketing system, which is defmed by McCammon (1970) as "rationalized and capital 
intensive networks designed to achieve technological, managerial and promotional 
economies through the integration, co-ordination of synchronisation of marketingjlows 
from points of production to points of ultimate use", different channel members are 
connected to form a network and share common functions to achieve a more efficient 
operating system. This can not only save unnecessary cost but also improve efficiency. 
Figure 2.1 provides a comparison of a conventional channel and a vertical marketing 
system. 
A conventional channel A vertical marketing system 
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Figure 2.1 The shifting of functions within the channel 
Source: Walters (1979, p.215) 
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From this figure, we see the difference between a conventional channel and a vertical 
marketing system. In the VMS, the different stages are combined through ownership or 
management control. This occurs when the management of one stage purchases a 
business operating at another stage, but it also takes place when the management of one 
stage simply begins performing the duties or functions of another stage through 
expansion (Rubuke, 1966). 
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The most obvious difference is in the efficiency of the operations. This is because VMS 
members share channel functions. In contrast, the conventional channel members 
operate independently. Therefore, as far as efficiency is concerned, the VMS is much 
better than the conventional marketing channel. Other reasons for moving to a VMS 
may be to reduce the cost of operations, to stabilise activities and performance, to 
assure sources of supply, and to provide better control over operations (Sturdivant, 
1966). However, as something is shared in the vertical marketing system, so the 
exchange behaviour between parties becomes important because it will influence the 
quality of interactions between channel members. Table 2.1 offers a comparison of the 
differences between these two types of channel. 
Table 2.] Characteristics of ConventJOna and Vertical Marketing Channel Systems 
IJYpe of Vertical Marketing System'" ,~, , :~ , '>, " 
Ch . . Conventional Contractual aractenstIc Ch 1 " Admini' t d ~'-'l-t --d-,---------.Corporate anne 'c' sere vO un ary an F his 
". .~I",~ Co-o .... erative ranc e 
, .. -,,- >.~ . -:.;.-; 'P' 
System wide None 
Igoals 
Limited and Limited and Extensive Pervasive and 
informal formal and formal formal 
Mechanism Bargaining 
for and 
co-ordination negotiation 
Locus of 
decision 
'making 
Individual 
organisation 
Channel Unstable 
commitment 
Opportunities 
for scale Infrequent 
economies 
FleXIbility 
Investment 
needed 
Very high 
Very low 
Marketing Contract programs 
Informal Wholesaler 
collaboration with 
ratification 
Minimal Moderate 
Possible Good 
High Moderate 
Moderate High 
Source: Stern, El-Ansary, and Brown (1989) 
Contract Corporate policy 
Franchisor Decentralized 
with 
/ centralized 
ratification 
Very high Very high 
Very good Excellent 
Low Very low 
High Very high 
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From the above table, four different kinds of approach to vertical marketing systems are 
introduced; each of which has a different operating style. Within the contractual group, 
there are three different kinds of organisations - voluntary, co-operative and franchise. 
In a comparISon between conventional and vertical systems, we fInd that the 
conventional system still follows the old transactional fonns of behaviour, which are 
based on personal relationships to adapt its operations. This may be still useful in some 
regions or countries. However, in more modem business environments, the vertical 
marketing system is a more efficient mechanism because it is "a professionally 
managed and centrally programmed network, pre-engineered to achieve operating 
economies and maximum market impacf' (McCammon, 1970). A vertical marketing 
system can be established using pervasive administrative powers, legally binding 
contractual agreements, and partial or total ownership of channel members. In a 
vertical marketing system, each channel member assumes the functions and tasks that 
will best support the entire channel system. As a team member, the retailer operates 
within the retail level of distribution and provides most of the teamwork at that level 
and some engage in operations at the wholesale and even the production levels of the 
marketing channels (Lewison, 1997). 
In order to clarifY the differences among the organisational forms in a vertical 
marketing system, Lin (1996) proposes that chain stores can be divided into four types, 
which are regular chain (also called company-owned outlets), franchise chain. 
voluntary chain and co-operate chain (Table 2.2). From the previous table 2.1, we have 
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established that three of them (franchise chain, voluntary chain and co-operate chain) 
are based on contracts. 
Table 2.2 The Comparison of Four Kinds of Chain Stores 
Source 
The relationship 
between 
franchisor and 
franchisee 
Competition 
The source of 
roduct 
evenue of 
franchisor 
Decision maker 
The source of 
ca ita! 
The source of 
management 
ower 
The 
management of 
outlets 
Pricin 
The termination 
franchisor 
Promotion 
Franchise Chain Voluntary Chain 
.C .C 
Manufacturer, or R ail 
et er 
wholesaler 
com etition 
Some are from 
the franchisor 
Sales from 
wholesale 
Weak 
Share/contract 
Price competition 
Some are from the 
franchisor and 
some are from 
other sources 
Service revenue 
The franchisees 
can participate in 
the decision 
makin 
Franchisee 
Franchisee 
Franchisees 
Franchisee 
Free 
Nothing 
Very weak 
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the franchisor , the franchisor 
The domain of . The whole Some of the Some of the 
the contract No 
\ . 
op"erations 
-
operations operations 
Control 
Very strong Strong %~ mechanism Weak Very weak: 
S0l!rce: Lm (1996) 
From tbe above table, we can see that each option has different advantages and 
disadvantages. In the retail market, they exist in different kinds of businesses, 
especially the regular chain and franchise chain. The main difference between these 
options is ownership. In addition, from the table, we can see that there is an obvious 
advantage for the franchise chain, which is the speed of expansion; in other words, 
businesses can adopt a franchise format for the purpose of qwck expansion. With 
regular chains, their advantage is mainly in the ability to exploit a unified corporate 
image because of the high level control exercised by head office. In order to have a 
deeper understanding of the franchise organisation, the following section will discuss 
this from various perspectives. 
2.2.2 Franchising in the Vertical Marketing System 
As discussed earlier, in the vertical marketing system (VMS), there are three forms of 
organisation, which are corporate VMS, contractual VMS and administrative VMS (see 
Figure 2.2). Here, the emphasis will be on the contractual VMS. This is because 
franchising is basically built on the contract between franchisor and franchisee. 
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Figure 2.2 Major types of vertical marketing systems 
Source: Kotler and Annstrong, (1996) 
As far as a franchise organisation is concerned, it is a kind of hybrid organisational form 
that incorporates elements of both markets and hierarchies (Norton, 1988; Larson, 1992, 
Williamson, 1991). In a comparison between hierarchy, hybrid and market 
mechanisms, the managers in the market-based outlets have some contractual 
obligations, but they also have strong entrepreneurial incentives. Hybrids have some 
incentive to increase performance, but they gain less and have less at stake than their 
market counterparts. The managers in hierarchical arrangements have minimal 
entrepreneurial drive but are motivated through behavioural-based contracting. 
Therefore, the three mechanisms provide different levels of incentive and risk. 
Franchising is a hybrid alternative since the franchisor both retains a degree of 
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ownership and authority over the use of the trade name, operating procedures, and the 
locations of outlets but contracts with independent entrepreneurs to operate the units 
(Child, 1987). 
The advantage of this kind of organisational form is in the growth of the fum. This is 
because there are many restraints on growth, such as capital, human resource, local 
knowledge and so on. Penrose's (1959) observation is that a firm's growth is 
constrained by the speed at which it can expand its managerial capacity. This constraint 
holds because a relationship exists between asset size and the amount of monitoring 
required by a fIrm. However, research has suggested that fIrms may be able to 
overcome managerial limits to ftrm growth through the use of a contractual 
organisational form, such as franchising. Larson (1992) found that new and growing 
fIrms, in genera~ tend to have a disproportionate preference for hybrid organisational 
forms. In addition, Teece (1986) showed that hybrid organisational forms allow 
resource limited firms to gain control over co-specialised assets. Therefore. compared 
to other organisational forms, franchising is a better mechanism for firms with resource 
restraints during the growth stage. 
From the above section, we can see that franchising is a good mechanism for the growth 
of a firm. As to how to apply this kind of mechanism, Vaughn (1979) suggests that 
there are four options, they are: 
The manufacturer-retailer franchise: a manufacturer grants the right to a retailer to sell 
the product to the final consumer. The franchisee may operate the franchise as his sole 
business activity or, alternatively, as an activity within an existing business. 
Automobile dealerships and petrol service stations are examples. 
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The manufacturer-wholesaler franchise: a manufacturer grants the right to a wholesaler 
to distribute a product. The main examples of this form of franchising are the soft 
drinks industry where companies such as Coca-Cola and PepsiCo, sell franchises to 
independent bottlers who, in turn, distribute to retailers. 
The wholesaler-retailer franchise: a wholesaler grants the right to a retailer to trade 
under a certain name. Perhaps the best-known examples here are the 'voluntary' groups 
in grocery retailing where the wholesaler (the franchisor) supplies products to the 
retailer (the franchisee) who is signed up on a voluntary basis. 
The retailer-retailer franchise: a retailer grants the right to another retailer to trade 
under the same name. Usually called' business format franchising', the franchisor has 
a product or service to be marketed under a common trade name by standardised outlets. 
These types of franchises include fast food outlets, car hire, and hotel franchising. 
Arthur Andersen (1992) simplifies franchising and distinguishes between 
product-tradename and business format franchising. Product-tradename franchising, 
which is prevalent in automobile sales, retail gasoline, and soft-drink distribution, uses 
franchisees to distribute a product under a franchisor's trademark. Business format 
franchising is a more popular option in the business world and appears in a wide range 
of sectors such as restaurants, hotels, real estate agents, business aids and educational 
services. This kind offranchising is also called a package franchise. 
In the UK, the pioneering Bolton Committee researchers positioned small firms along a 
typology of reliance upon large firms. 'Marketers' are those firms, which actually 
compete in the same or similar markets as large firms. 'Specialists' are those firms, 
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which carry out functions that large firms do not find it economic to perfonn at all, 
though they may include large firms amongst their customers. Finally, and crucially, 
are small ftrms performing the role of 'Satellites'. Here the small frrm is highly 
dependent upon a single larger business for the majority of its trade. The degree of 
dependence may be even greater if the large customer actually designs the product or 
service and sub-contracts its manufacture or supply, as appears the case with a franchise. 
Franchisees would appear to fall under the third category above. The clearest 
illustrations of franchise satellite relationships in the UK involve the relatively recently 
developed areas of franchised (domestic) milk distribution (Boyle, E., 1994) and parcel 
despatch and delivery. Both of these, in some ways, could be said to be close to 
'product' franchises with franchisees simply distributing locally a product delivered to 
them by their franchisors. 'Business format franchising', by way of contrast, involves 
the 'cloning' and support of a full business system as a channel for the delivery of a 
service or service-related business. 
Franchising is an organisational form based on a legal agreement between a parent 
organisation (the franchisor) and a local outlet (the franchisee) to sell a product or 
service using a brand name developed and owned by the franchisor. The franchisor 
typically sells the franchisee a right to use this intellectual property in return for a lump 
sum payment (initial fee) and a monthly fee based on sales for a specified period of time 
(Miller & Grossman, 1990). Usually, the monthly fee is composed of two items - a 
royalty fee and a contribution for advertising. In addition, the franchisee usually agrees 
to adhere to franchisor requirements for product mix, operating procedures, and quality. 
In return, the franchisor typically agrees to provide managerial assistance, training, 
advertising assistance, operating procedures, site selection and other continuous 
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services (Rubin, 1978). Thus, the mix of initial and continuous services provided by 
the franchisor should influence the payment design. 
As far as the initial fee and royalty are concerned, there are two key issues. The first 
one is any change to initial fee and royalties. Lafontaine and Kaufinann (1994) 
suggested that changes in the rates are related to market demand, the cost of running the 
system and the value of the trademark. Also, they observed that younger and less 
powerful franchisors are more likely to engage in this type of negotiation. The second 
issue is the relationship between the initial fee and the royalty. Lafontaine (1992); 
Baucus and Human (1993); Lafontaine and Kaufmann (1994) all observe that the initial 
fee and royalty are positively related to franchise performance, the age of franchisor, 
the value of franchises, number of retail outlets and national representation. However, 
Sen (1993) suggests that new entrants into franchising charge higher initial fees than 
more experienced ones. This may reflect the more severe capital constraints faced by 
these franchisors. The author suggests that the initial fee and royalty are related to 
market competition and the relationship between supply and demand. 
Rubin's (1978) viewpoint is that royalty rates should have the opposite effect on initial 
fees. His argument is based on the premise that the initial fee is the difference between 
the present values of the profits of the franchise and the salaries of downstream 
managers. As royalties are imposed on monthly sales rather than profits, a reduction in 
royalty rates should increase the initial fees that are charged up-front. Rubin also 
suggests that the initial fee and royalties are related to risk. This is because the 
franchisor has discretion over how they are defmed. For example, franchisees might be 
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required to purchase rather than lease equipment from the franchisor. As for royalties, 
they reflect risk because they are used to capture the proportion of rents due to the 
franchisor that are unpredictable and thus cannot be included in franchise fees. Another 
perspective is provided by lnaba (1980) who observes that when demand is certain, 
franchisors tend to use royalty more than tie-in sales to earn monopoly profits. 
Conversely, when demand is unstable, franchisors rely more heavily on tie-in sales 
rather than royalties. 
Regarding setting the level of fees, Mendelsohn and Acheson (1989) believes that most 
companies in the UK are: "Setting their fees by what they can get away with rather than 
on any meaningful costing system and in light of what the competition are charging." 
Provided the competition has set the figure at the right level to reflect demand for the 
franchise, clearly this is a legitimate way of setting the fee. However, if it is a drain on 
resources, then this matter needs to be urgently reviewed to prevent the franchisor 
going out of business. 
From the above details, we see that the initial fee and royalty are positively related to 
the age of the franchisor and its reputation and related to the franchisors' resources. 
Take McDonald's in Taiwan for example, the initial fee is quite high, which is ten 
million NT dollars (about £200,000). This is because McDonalds not only has a strong 
international brand reputation but also an excellent sales record in Taiwan (9th out of 
110 countries in the world). The sales of Taiwan McDonald's have grown over 50 
times within 15 years. 
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The following section will discuss the development of the franchise organisation. Two 
key characteristics will be referred to, which are the co-existence of company-owned 
and franchised outlets and multi-unit franchisees in franchise systems. 
2.3 The Development of Franchise Systems 
In the development of a franchise system, the franchisors usually concentrate on how to 
maximize their efficiency and profit through an effective franchise mechanism. They 
could run company-owned outlets if they have sufficient resources, otherwise, they 
could franchise the business. There are three kinds of business systems coexisting: 
purely company-owned outlets; plural system (combination of company-owned and 
franchised outlets); and purely franchised outlets. The difference between them is 
found in outlet ownership. Hence, the following section will begin with a discussion on 
ownership followed by the issues ofmulti-unit franchising. 
2.3.1 Ownership Patterns in Franchise Systems 
As far as the franchise organisation is concerned, there are two systems - the fully 
franchised system and the mixed system. The fully franchised system is a business 
concept that has been developed and tested successfully. Therefore, at least in the 
initial stages, it is not possible for a firm to have a fully franchised system. Once the 
fmn is successful in designing its business concept, the franchisor can sell its 
company-owned outlets to franchisees and become fully franchised. A fully franchised 
system allows a firm access to franchisee capital and labour, allows the transfer of 
business risk to its franchisees, reduces monitoring costs, generates promotion 
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efficiencies, and focuses its efforts on specializing in national promotion and product 
development (Tikoo, 1996). This approach happens when the franchisor is young. In 
order to expand quickly, they may prefer to lower standards to sell the franchise, even 
though this may damage its brand value. 
The second system is the mixed system There are three ways to establish it. First, a 
firm can start by franchising aU locations, then take over some of the stores later. This 
route allows a firm to gain the initial benefits of franchising while discovering which 
stores are worth bringing under company ownership in terms of monitoring costs, 
profitability and risk. This approach is related to the life cycle of a franchise first put 
forward by Oxenfeldt and Kelly (1968-69), which will be mentioned later in the chapter 
on resource constraints. The second method is by initially opening only 
company-owned stores, then franchising some new locations at a later stage. This is 
suitable for a firm willing to grow gradually, and which has strengths in identifYing the 
profitability of potential store locations, and wants to pre-empt those sites under 
company ownership. The other motive is that the franchisor may want to pre-test the 
business know-how in the company-owned outlets in order to prevent conflict with 
franchisees afterwards. Third, a :firm can establish franchised and company-owned 
outlets simultaneously. This option provides a means to combine the advantages of the 
other two options (Tikoo, 1996). Dahlstrom and Nygaard (1994) took petrol service 
station as an example to analyse ownership structures. They suggest that ownership 
comes in three forms: corporate ownership and operation, corporate ownership but 
management by franchisee, and ownership and operations by franchisee. Ownership 
patterns can vary from industry to industry and even in the same industry, there may be 
different structures. 
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In general, most franchising systems will start with company-owned outlets to test the 
product or service in the period of experimentation. After a period of successful 
operation, in order to expand quickly, the franchisor starts to use franchising to increase 
market share. Many franchisors believe they need only a few company-owned units to 
test new products or operating system changes (Hoffinan and Proble, 1993). Also, 
Martin (1988), Norton (1988), and Lafontaine (1992) noted that franchisors rely more 
heavily on franchised outlets than company-owned outlets in high-risk industries. 
Hunt (1973) suggests that franchisors prefer to buy back franchisees when they have 
enough resources. This is because he observed that company-owned outlets 
out-performed franchised outlets. He also points out several powerful reasons for 
franchisors preferring corporate-owned and managed units: (1) greater profits per unit; 
(2) greater control over the units; and (3) fewer legal problems. These arguments are 
based on the flexibility and capacity to react more swiftly to the need for change, and as 
franchisees are from different backgrounds they cannot promise to maintain the service 
quality. Therefore, franchisors will just leave those physically isolated or low 
profitability outlets franchised. However, Shelton (1967) found that franchised outlets 
in the restaurant industry outperformed company-owned outlets even though higher 
incentives are paid to company managers. Dant, Paswan, and Stanworth (1996) also 
suggest that despite well-documented buying back in particular franchises, no trend 
towards a general increase in direct ownership by franchisors appears possible to 
establish. Therefore, we cannot say categorically that company-owned outlets 
outperform franchised outlets because there are too many variables involved such as the 
franchisee's personality, the location and the organisational atmosphere. Pirkul, 
Narasimban and De (1987) developed a mathematical model allowing the possibility of 
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opening both company-owned and franchised outlets to solve the problem of firm 
expansion through franchising. 
If we enlarge the concept to an international context, Aydin and K.acker (1989) suggest 
that those companies that rely more heavily on franchisee-owned operations are more 
ready to go international than those who own a relatively greater percentage of units in 
their network. Therefore, we cannot infer that a franchisor will buy back most of its 
franchisees at a mature stage; this kind of situation may be more applicable in the 
domestic market. However, from the perspective of international expansion, those 
franchisors that have fewer company-owned outlets may be more able to shift the risk, 
the financing and the burden of operations. So, keeping a suitable proportion between 
franchised and company-owned outlets is not only important in the domestic market but 
also in the international market. 
As far as the balance between franchised and company-owned outlets is concerned, a 
number of studies have examined changes in franchising using the aggregate industry 
level data published for the years 1972-1986 by the Department of Commerce (U.S. 
Department of Commerce, 1988). However, empirical evidence at the firm level, the 
appropriate level of analysis to address the Oxenfeldt and Kelly (1968-69) hypothesis, 
remains quite sparse. According to Lafontaine and Kaufinann's (1994) observation, 
only Oznne and Hunt (1971), Hunt (1972), Lillis et al. (1976), Martin (1988), Carney 
and Gedajlovic (1991) and Lafontaine (1992) have examined the contractual mix of 
individual franchisors. Using cross sectional data, these researchers relied on a 
comparison of the proportion of company-owned units between old and new franchised 
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businesses at a particular point in time to assess the effect of franchisor maturity on the 
ownership mix. Take Martin (1988) for example, he suggests that risk avoidance would 
imply that urban locations will be retained as company-owned outlets, just as lower 
monitoring costs would imply that these locations will be retained by the franchisor. 
Lafontaine and Kaufinann (1994) argue that the effect of franchisor characteristics on 
the use of company ownership and franchising to control agency problems is linear 
across franchise systems. By focusing on linear effects, agency theory research has not 
successfully explained the variation in the proportion of franchised outlets in franchised 
systems. Therefore, Shane (1998) adapted agency theory to suggest that several 
franchisor characteristics found to have linear effects on franchising in previous studies 
- geographic dispersion, system size, royalty rates, initial investment, franchisee fee, 
and system growth rates - should actually have curvilinear effects on the proportion of 
franchised outlets. Finally, the study provides empirical evidence that the effects of size, 
rate of growth and geographic dispersion on the proportion of outlets franchised are 
curvilinear, reconciling conflicting findings on the direction of these variables (e.g., 
Brickley & Dark, 1987; Hunt, 1973; Kaufmann & Rangan, 1990; Martin, 1988; 
Oxenfeldt & Kelly, 1968-69; Shane, 1996). The results show that the correct question 
for franchising scholars is not to ask why do firms franchise (or why are they not 
completely company-owned), but what is the optimal proportion of franchised outlets? 
Caves and Murphy (1976) suggest that direct ownership will increase as the franchise 
system matures, probably testimony to the franchisor's declining opportunity cost of 
capital. However, Lafontaine and Kaufmann (1994) observe that franchisors tend to 
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operate a mix of company-owned and franchised outlets, with the proportion of 
company-owned units sought being relatively small to achieve a synergistic effect. 
This kind of argument suggeSts that franchising is indeed the generally preferred mode 
of operation for these firms, presumably because of its incentive properties. In other 
words, as heavily franchised systems experience a relaxation in their resource 
constraints and become more able to expand through company-ownership, they may do 
so only to take advantage of the plural form benefits and not at all in an attempt to reach 
the near complete ownership envisioned by Oxenfeldt and Kelly (1968-69). 
In short, from the above arguments, we see that there are many factors related to 
ownership patterns in the franchise system and these arguments are not consistent. 
Aside from ownership, another key issue in franchising is the role of multi-unit 
franchisees, which happens quite often in the franchise distribution channel. As far as 
the franchisee is concerned, two roles are played. First, the role of franchisee to the 
master franchisor who creates the brand and 'second, the role of sub-franchisor for the 
multi-unit franchisees. Therefore, the next section will discuss multi-unit franchisees 
in detail. 
2.3.2 The Role of the Multi-Unit Franchisee 
Multi-unit franchising is where a franchisee owns more than two outlets and this kind 
of phenomenon is quite common in the retail market (Kaufmann and Dant, 1996). In 
the USA, it is not uncommon for 50% of a franchise company's outlets to be owned by 
Jess than 20% of its franchisees. A single large franchisee may own several hundred 
outlets (Bradac~ 1995). However, multiple-ownership in UK appears less common 
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and it is estimated that 82% of franchisees operate just a single unit (The Nat West 
BanklBritish Franchise Association Franchise Survey, 1993). The academic literature 
on franchising has largely ignored the distinguishing feature of ownership of multiple 
units by an individual franchisee (Bradach, 1995). This is because most researchers 
think that the efficiency of a single unit is greater than that of a multi-unit franchisee. 
However, Kaufinann and Kim (1994) found that 57% of franchise systems use 
multi-unit franchisees. In another survey, Robicheaux, Dant, and Kaufinann (1994) 
reported that 87% of franchise systems contained at least one franchisee that owned 
multiple units, and on average 33% of the franchisees in a system operated more than 
one unit. Therefore, it could be argued that there is still a misunderstanding of 
multi-unit franchising. This may be because of the assumption that multi-unit 
franchising is inefficient as it separates ownership from local decision-making, creating 
in essence a hierarchical structure much like that found in company units (Brickly and 
Dark, 1987; Hadfield, 1991; Kaufmann, 1992; Rubin, 1978). However, the extant 
empirical evidence suggests that multi-unit franchisees enjoy systemic advantages over 
their single-unit counterparts and are associated with higher system growth rates 
(Kaufmann and Kim, 1995; Kaufinann and Dant, 1996; Shane, 1996). Also, 
franchisors prefer looking at existing franchisees rather than finding new franchisees to 
reduce the risk of uncertainty (Kaufinann, 1992). 
One possible explanation for the existence of the multi-unit franchisee is based on the 
level of efficiency between input and output. All else being equal, monitoring is the 
preferred method of controlling an agent's behaviour because it addresses both 
suboptimal and misdirected eifort, whereas residual claimancy only serves to control 
suboptimal effort (Shane, 1996). In the case of widely dispersed outlets, therefore, 
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output controls, such as the residual claimancy rights in franchising agreements, are 
used to control agents only when input controls, such as monitoring, are too costly 
(Brickley and Dark, 1987; Brickley, Dark, and Weisbach, 1991; Bergen, Dutta, and 
Walker, 1992). 
In most retail chains, there are numbers or clusters of units for which monitoring is the 
more efficient method of controlling agents. In other words, there are a finite number 
of outlets that can be efficiently monitored, and there is some level of geographic 
proximity of retail locations that permits efficient monitoring (Brickley and Dark, 
1987). The ability offirms to effectively monitor at least some units is evidenced by the 
prevalence of dual distribution, i.e., the coexistence of franchised and company-owned 
outlets within the same system (Lafontaine and Kaufmann, 1994). When the system 
expands to a point where the entrepreneur's span of control is stretched beyond the 
number or proximity of units that can be efficiently monitored, subsequent units are 
franchised. 
However, in many case~ of multi-unit franchising, it is difficult to identify the designed 
combinations of input and output controls. Unfettered franchisee expansion produces 
wide spans of contro~ too wide to assume that franchisee monitoring can efficiently 
solve store level incentive problems. In those cases, franchise holdings take on all of 
the trappings of company-owned chains. The only reasonable explanation for these 
franchised mini-chains is the access to capital that they afford (Kaufmann and Dant, 
1996). 
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Here, we cite empirical research; Bradach (1995) compares single and multi-unit 
franchising within four management challenges. They are (1) adding new units 
(Oxenfeldt and Kelly, 1968-69), (2) maintaining uniformity (Brickley and Dark, 1987; 
Rubin, 1978), (3) adapting individual units to local conditions (Brickley and Dark, 
1987, Caves and Murphy, 1976), and (4) adapting the system as a whole to the threats 
and opportunities of a competitive environment (Oxenfeldt and Kelly, 1968-69). 
The following Table 2.3 is the resuh of the comparison, which was based on an 
exploratory study of five major restaurant chains. 
Table 2.3 Performances of Multi-Unit ISing Ie-Unit Franchises 
Single Unit Franchise Multi-Unit Franchise 
Unit Growth 0 ++ 
Uniformity + + 
Local Responsiveness ++ + 
System Wide Adaptation 0 ++ 
o = low performance; + =medium performance; + + - high perfonnance 
Source: Bradach (1995) 
The table shows that multi-unit franchising has distinct advantages over single unit 
franchising in all areas other than local responsiveness. Therefore, franchisors 
interested in expansion often look to existing franchisees to reduce the risk associated 
with placing their concept in the hands of an unknown prospective franchisee 
(Kaufinann, 1992), and to take advantage of the local market expertise of operating 
retailers (Bradach, 1995). Based on the findings ofBradach's study, one may argue that 
multi-unit franchisees outperfonn single unit franchisees in several important 
management areas, which helps to explain the prevalence of this fonn of franchising. 
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The above arguments directly cast doubt on Oxenfeldt and Kelly's (1968-69) argument. 
They suggest that all but marginal outlets ultimately will be company owned. 
Obviously, this seems to require a reappraisal of Oxenfeldt and Kelly's capital 
acquisition argument. Therefore, this may suggest that franchisors can expand by their 
own resources to occupy the advantageous locations at a slower speed in the initial 
stage. After that, they start to franchise to realise a quick expansion. 
Finally, another operational issue is how to realise multi-unit ownership. Generally, 
there are two ways; the first one being that some franchisees begin as single-unit 
operators and gradually obtain the rights to operate more franchises in what is termed as 
incremental or sequential expansion (Kaufmann, 1992). The other way is known as 
master or area franchisees, where businesses are granted the rights to sell or develop 
mUltiple franchised units within an exclusive territory on a pre-specified schedule 
(Kaufinann and Kim, 1995). No matter which way is adopted, the use of multi-unit 
franchising is positively related to growth rates, and contributes to the flrm's overall 
franchising strategy in explaining growth. Aside from the development of multi-unit 
franchising in the domestic market, franchisors can also expand its operations to 
foreign markets. The following section will discuss how international franchising is 
operated and the related issues of international operations. 
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2.4 International Franchising 
As far as the development of international franchising is concerned, it began in the US 
and grew rapidly in the 1950s and 1960s. In the 1980s, there was a period of rapid 
international expansion during which some 400 U.S. franchisors increased their 
overseas units by more than 70 percent, to almost 39,000. The majority of these 
overseas units were located in developed countries, such as Canada, the United 
Kingdom, Australia and Japan (Preble and Hoffinan, 1995). To date, this kind of 
expansion is still ongoing. Many other countries follow such successful international 
expansion activities, but every country is in a different stage of the industrial life cycle. 
International franchising will now be detailed to see how it operates in international 
retailing. According to WIlliams (1994), there are two forms of international 
franchising: (1) franchising by domestic firms abroad; and (2) franchising by foreign 
firms within a host country. In other words, one is outward internationalisation and the 
other one is inward intemationalisation. In general, the inward and outward sides of 
internationalisation may develop and affect each other in a variety of ways. There are 
varieties of possible forms that a linked move in the reverse direction might take over 
time, depending on the outcome of the initial inward process (Welch and Luostarinen, 
1993). Before internationalisation, franchisors usually experience successful 
operations in the home country. Based on the internal push and external pull 
motivations, franchisors start to think seriously about international operations. 
Research on the application of franchising in international operations has tended to 
concentrate on companies that have built franchising activities first within their 
domestic market before utilising that experience and the associated tried and tested 
franchising systems in the international arena (Walker & Etzel, 1973, Hackett, 1976, 
41 
Walker, 1989, McCosker & Walker, 1992, McIntyre & Huszagh, 1995, Doherty, 2000). 
This is because franchisors have to test the know·how successfully in the domestic 
market before exporting. If the resulting system can be transferred easily and cheaply, 
then it will be helpful for international expansion. 
As to whether there is a positive relationship between the scale of business and the 
degree of intemationalisation, many researches suggest that larger fIrms can absorb 
more risk from international expansion and devote more resources to the activity. In 
other words, they will be more inclined to expand internationally. Walker and Etzel 
(1973) and Huszagh, Huszagh and McIntyre (1992) agree with the argument that 
franchisors are more likely to operate internationally with well established and older 
businesses or have a large number of units. However, Aydin and Kacker (1989) found 
that smaller franchisors had a greater willingness to go international than larger ones, 
and that the percentage of franchisors planning to go international decreased as their 
sales volume increased. They suggest that this phenomenon arises as the small 
franchisors were less concerned with the legal and regulatory restrictions abroad. 
When franchisors are ready to operation internationally, Petersen and Welch (2000) 
propose there are different path for international franchising (see Figure 2.3). Their 
research is based on empirical research of 60 retailers in the Danish clothing and 
footwear industries. 
Figure 2.3 Paths to International Franchising 
International Operation 
Mode 
International 
Franchising 
Downstream FDI 
(Foreign 
Company-Owned 
Retail Outlets) 
Upstream FDI 
(Foreign 
\Vholesale or 
Subcontracting 
FDI) 
Export via 
Intermediary 
Domestic Sales 
Only 
Private Label Own Brand 
Products Products 
Source: Petersen and Welch (2000) 
Business 
Fonnat Concept Sales Franchising 
Package 
Product Development 
From the above figure, we can see that retailers can be categorised into twenty options 
from a cross analysis of product development activities and international operation 
mode. In this research, they found that the product development of the international 
franchisors appeared to pass through several stages before business format franchising 
was reached. Most of the franchisors started operations using their own brands but 
some began as suppliers to private label retailers. In these cases the product 
development transformation of the company had gone through all the stages. Over a 
period of time, all of the companies developed concept sales - 'concept' in this case 
referring to something broader than the brand, including an expression of style and 
lifestyle appeal, reinforced through a product range, in-store presentation and 
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promotional material. From the above information, we see that both international 
operation modes and product development are introduced step by step, and these are 
both based on experience and risk. Therefore, we can infer that the move into 
international franchising from other forms ofintemational operations would seem to be 
a potentially important phase in the overall development of international franchising 
(Welch and Luostarinen, 1988). If companies can handle this transition, and it becomes 
a more widely used path, it might provide further impetus to the growth of international 
franchising. Besides, Pellegrini (1994) suggests that there are two paths for growth, 
either product diversification or geographical diversification. This is basically 
developed from familiarity to unfamiliarity as well as reducing the risk of expansion. 
Therefore, the author suggests that contractual mode is the most efficient expansion 
mode and franchising can be a typical mode used in the quick expansion of 
international operations. 
2.5 Related Research in Franchising 
From the above discussion, we see that franchising is not only a common business 
format but it also arouses many scholars' attention from the perspectives of domestic 
and international operations. The academic research in franchising is enormous in both 
its quantity and quality. Elango and Fried (1997) summarised research on franchising 
in a table, shown in Appendix 2. Although the table does not include all the articles on 
franchising it covers a wide range of franchising topics and offers a direction for future 
research. The author attempted to link these articles to different parts of the literature 
review to enhance the arguments. For example, in this chapter, Castro giovanni, Justis 
and Julian (1993) were also mentioned, and in the next chapter, Hadfield (1991) will be 
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cited. Based on the appendix, the author formulated a topic summary, shown below in 
Table 2.4. 
Table 2.4 Classification of Research in Frequency by Topic 
·:~l~\f~~', • TORics . 
,~r 
' £'!!;~~"!' ,'~r1 ,Frequency " I~f, M Ii .. ,,; ~ ; , , .,',' " '~'j.'~""';;"~ i, 
Internationalisation of Franchising 15 
Ownership Patterns: the Comparison between Company Owned and 
15 
Franchised Outlets 
Contract Issues 9 
Advantages and Disadvantages in Franchising 8 
Franchising vs. Independent Store 7 
Royalty and Initial Fee 6 
Conflict Issues 5 
Law Issues 5 
Control (power) Issues 3 
Organisational Form 3 
Failure Rate of Franchising 3 
Motivational Issues 3 
Types of Franchising 2 
Franchisors buy back Franchisee 2 
History of Franchising 2 
How to Be a Successful Franchise System 2 
Source: the author (based on Elango and Fned (1997» 
Using table 2.4, one can see the focus of research interests. Among this research, the 
most popular topics are international franchising and ownership patterns in the 
franchise organisation. As far as international franchising is concerned, in the ] 980s 
and 1990s, the literature on international retailing grew considerably. As mentioned in 
the previous chapter, franchising is a preferred entry mode from the perspective of risk 
considerations. Consequently, franchising has been adopted by many fums for 
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international expansion. Regarding ownership patterns, the most popular form in the 
market is either company ownership or franchised outlets. Based on this difference, 
many management issues will arise. Therefore, in franchising, contract issues will 
receive more emphasis than others. The details of the contract will influence the 
interactions between both parties afterwards. Once one party thinks that there is 
unequal give and take, then the relationship will become fragile and conflict may occur. 
From these ana1yses, we can not only see franchise operations from the perspective of 
international activities, but also Wlderstand the key issues aroWld the franchise 
organisations and the interactions between parties. The author combines Table 2.4 with 
the literature review topics, franchising and management issues in franchising, to link 
past areas of study with the framework used in this thesis. 
Table 2.5 Classification of Research in Frequency by Topics of literature review 
Topics 
Franchising ,,'Y, . 
,\ . "A . ~ .,.if' ~. 
Internationalisation of Franchising 
Ownership Patterns: the Comparison between Company Owned and 
Franchised Outlets 
Advantages and Disadvantages in Franchising 
Franchising vs. Independent Store 
Royalty and Initial Fee 
Organisational Fonn 
Failure Rate of Franchising 
Types of Franchising 
History of Franchising 
How to Be a Successful Franchise System 
,,Managem.ent Issues in Franchising 
"!"" ' • .I ~ ! ", '.,.. or- '....... .. .:: .. : 
Frequency 
15 
8 
7 
6 
3 
3 
2 
2 
2 
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Contract Issues 9 
Conflict Issues 5 
Law Issues 5 
Motivational Issues 3 
Control (power) Issues 3 
Franchisors buy back Franchisee 2 
Source: the author (based on Elango and Fried (1997» 
One can see the importance of each topic within the two themes. Some topics have 
been discussed previously and the others will be discussed in later sections. Based on 
the above table, the author develops his research aims and objectives from these two 
perspectives - franchising and management issues in franchising. Figure 2.4 is the 
visualisation of these perspectives. 
International Franchising 
Ownership patterns 
Relationships 
and Conflict 
Figure 2.4 The visualisation of research aims and objectives 
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Figure 2.4 looks like the solar system, the sun, in the middle, is the most important part 
of the system and the other planets surround it. On each orbit, there are the main planets, 
such as Mercury, Earth, Venus and so on. In tenns of the research presented in this 
study, the core part of the franchise system, the relationships and conflicts, is 
represented by the centre or sun as the most important element of this research. The 
second level represents the characteristics of franchising as planets, there are many 
issues in this orbit, however, ownership patterns will be emphasised on this level. 
Finally, international franchising is the most external level. Based on the interaction 
between franchisors and franchisees, the author tried to combine these themes together 
to uncover the issues of relationship and conflict in the franchise organisation. The 
details of research objectives are specified in Chapter 5. 
2.6 Summary 
In this chapter, we have discussed what franchising is, and what part it plays in the 
distribution channel. Basically, the relationship between franchisors and franchisees is 
based on the franchise contract. This chapter explains why franchising is a popular 
retail format compared with traditional channels. In tenns of the development of a 
franchise system, it can be divided roughly into company-owned and franchised 
systems; each of them has its advantages and limitations. As to the optimal proportion 
of these two systems, there is still no universal agreement; it will depend upon the 
franchisors' characteristics and policies. In addition, there is a special phenomenon in 
the franchise system, which is the multi-unit franchisee. In general, this will not only 
help the franchisor in the expansion of activities but will also realize franchisees' 
entrepreneurship. The empirical research also evidenced that the multi-unit franchisees 
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outperfonned the single unit. In the section of international franchising, based on 
inward and outward internationalisation, franchisors have four options for international 
operations. Finally, Table 2.4 and Table 2.5 provides a summary of key articles in 
franchising. The tables uncover themes and topics that have been researched and from 
this the author tries to find a route to form another contribution to franchising. 
In summary, after discussing the key characteristics of franchising, the following 
chapter will explore the core management issues in franchising to explore the intangible 
factors behind franchising. 
CHAPTER THREE: MANAGEMENT ISSUES IN 
FRANCHISING 
3.0 Introduction 
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In franchising, aside from the operational issues explored in the previous chapter, the 
other key foci for research are the managerial issues. These issues play an invisible role 
in the workings of the distribution channel. Ifwe compare the distribution channel to 
our bodies, the bones and muscles can be deemed as the retail structure and operational 
issues. However, the most important element is our soul. In franchising, management 
issues can be assumed to be the soul because they affect the development and behaviour 
of a distribution channel. Here, three managerial issues will be considered to offer a 
clear perspective on how channel members behave and interact to the benefit of each 
other. The first topic is the motivations for franchising, which will include analysis of 
three explanatory theories: agency theory, resource constraint theories and transaction 
cost analysis. Second, the characteristics of decision makers will be taken into 
consideration, especially research on the view of whether franchisors and franchisees 
are entrepreneurs. Finally, relationships and conflict in franchise organisation will be 
explored from the explanation of relational exchange theory. 
3.1 The Motivations for Franchising 
From the previous chapter, we know that franchising is a widespread organizational 
form in business operations. Aside from a lower failure rate and a better mechanism for 
business growth, there must also be some intangible factors, which explain its 
prevalence. As far as the motivations for franchising are concerned, they can be 
explained from two perspectives, which are the management incentives for franchisees 
so 
and the resource restraints facing the franchisors. Explanations of the management 
incentives for franchisees are found in research related to agency theory and transaction 
cost analysis, while motivations for the franchisor, are related to resource constraint 
theory. 
3.1.1 Agency Theory 
The most widely accepted explanation of agency theory is based on Rubin's argument 
of 1978. According to this theory, managers of company-owned unrts do not bear the 
full costs nor receive the full benefits of their efforts because there is a weak link 
between their compensation (salary) and the performance of their outlets (profits). 
They may therefore shirk the responsibility of the job. In contrast, franchisees bear 
more of the costs of their shirking because they are compensated from the residual 
claims of their individual units. Thus, franchisee-owners tend to minimize shirking. 
This explanation receives strong empirical support (Brickley and Dark, 1987; Martin, 
1988; Lafontaine, 1991). Bates (1998) suggests that agency problems happen not only 
in the franchisor-owned outlets but also within the franchisee-owned outlets when the 
franchisee is a muhi-unit franchisee. 
The focus of agency theory is on determining the most efficient contract for both 
principal and agent, though there are many variables to take into account, for example, 
environmental uncertainty and the cost of monitoring. Therefore, an agency 
relationship occurs whenever one party (the principal) depends on another party (the 
agent) to undertake some action on the principal's behalf(Mark, Shantanu, Orville and 
Walker, 1992). In other words, any employment relationship can be an agency 
relationship. 
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The agency perspective relates to the perception that franchising is an effective solution 
to the problems of employee motivation and low levels of productivity, without 
incurring the costs associated with monitoring and supervising employees. The 
simplest way to motivate the franchisee is to give him a share of the profits of the 
franchise (Rubin, 1978). Then he will work hard to be efficient, as any leisure he takes 
will cost him as an individual. Thus, Rubin suggested that the franchise contract should 
be written in such a way as to give the franchisee most of the profits of the operation. 
Regarding the contract, the receipts of the franchisor depend on the revenue (not profits) 
of the franchise. In some cases, there is a payment of a percentage of sales to the 
franchisor; in other cases, the franchisee is required to buy inputs from the franchisor at 
above market prices. Ozanne and Hunt (1971) claim that this type of contract is 
inefficient, in that it would be more efficient for the franchisor to share in profits rather 
than revenues. They claim that the reason sales, rather than profits, are used is because 
monitoring of sales is easier than monitoring of profits. But in fact, most contracts give 
the franchisor the right to order audits of the franchise, and it is not clear monitoring 
would be that difficult. Rather, it seems likely that the element of control of the 
franchisor - the policing of franchises - is more closely related to sales than the profits; 
thus, the contracts seem to be written in such a way as to give the franchisor the correct 
incentives. 
Those adopting the agency perspective argue that franchising is cost effective when the 
marginal costs of monitoring company-owned units are higher than those associated 
with franchise contracts. These costs are lower because the franchisee has a similar 
perspective to the franchisor: revenue growth. According to the theory (Brickley and 
Dark, 1987; Carney and Gedajlovic, 1991), the costs associated with supervising 
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company-owned operations are dependent upon: 
• Availability of managerial talent; 
• Importance of local knowledge; 
• Geographic distance of units from headquarters; 
• Local population density; and 
• The relative proximity of the brand's locations to one another. 
Each of these factors affects the cost and efficiency of communications, travel and 
effective decision-making between unit managers and head office. Franchising can 
reduce many of these costs. This is because the franchisee is motivated to realize a 
return on his/her initial investment. Also because of the franchisor's power to refuse to 
renew franchise contracts without cause (Klein, 1980), the franchisee is less likely to 
shirk. However, there are three weaknesses in this theory. First is the suggestion that 
franchisors weigh the cost drivers associated with monitoring company-owned units 
against the supervisory issues inherent in franchising, such as lack of investment and 
behaviour which is damaging to brand equity (Combs and Castrogiovanni, 1994). The 
second weakness is the characteristic of geographically dispersed franchisees. The 
approach does not wholly explain the tendency for the use of multi-unit franchisees 
(Kaufinann and Dant, 1996). As the costs of monitoring multi-unit franchisees should 
be cheaper, and the revenues accruing from them higher, it is possible that franchisors 
are attempting to reconcile capital accumulation motives along with motivational ones. 
Finally, with the improvement in telecommunication, the advantages of scale in 
monitoring will be reduced. Therefore, geographic distance will not be so important. 
53 
The fo Howing section will discuss agency theory from different perspectives: including 
delivering which kind of problems will occur; how to explain and solve the problems; 
and how to apply agency theory to marketing and franchising. 
There are three common kinds of agency problems. They are 'information imbalance', 
'environment uncertainty' and 'performance assessment difficulties'. All of the 
problems are viewed from the principal's standpoint because the principal is in the 
dominant position in the relationship. The principal has to think how to prevent or 
solve these problems; otherwise the principal has to stand the potential cost. Here, the 
agency issue is categorised as pre-contractual and post-contractual problems (Mark, 
Shantanu, Orville and Walker, 1992). Much of the agency literature refers to 
pre-contractual problems as problems of "adverse selection" and to post-contractual 
issues as problems of "moral hazanf'. 
As far as the pre-contractual problem is concerned, this arises before the principal 
decides to offer an agent a contract. The key issue here is whether a particular agent has 
the characteristics the principal is seeking and what kind of strategy the principal 
should employ to find out. The pre-contractual problem is also called 'hidden 
information' (Arrow, 1985), and arises mainly from information asymmetries. Before 
forming a relationship, the agent may know more about the principal than the principal 
knows about the agent. Therefore, there are three strategies a principal can adopt to 
address this problem. The fIrst one is 'screening', which means employing different 
screening skills to sort out the best agent. Many screening skills can be used, for 
example, interviews, pen and paper tests and so on. The second one is 'examining 
signals from potential agents'. For example, when the principal wants to hire a local 
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manager, if a candidate is from that location, then it means that he has the potential to 
qualify for the job. Through this approach, the principal can save a lot of time in 
fmding the right person at the right time. Thirdly, the principal can adopt a policy of 
'providing opportunities for self-selection'. This means that if potential agents want to 
be considered they must have some qualifications. For example, when a franchisor 
looks for potential franchisees, there must be some limits, such as working experience, 
age limitation, capital requirement and so on. When the potential agent sees the basic 
requirements, he/she will know whether he/she is qualified or not. By employing these 
three policies, the principal can save a lot of time and money in choosing the right agent 
and preventing possible problems occurring in the post-contractual period. 
In the post-contractual period, or 'hidden action' period, attention focuses on the 
problems after both parties have signed a contract. In the model, there are three 
assumptions. The first one is that' both parties are motivated and self-interested'. So, 
under this circumstance, both parties would try their best to achieve the best 
performance and then get the rewards from the other party. Lafontaine (1992) suggests 
that franchisees are more highly motivated than hired managers and that this is a major 
advantage of franchising. The second assumption is that the 'principal s labour is 
under conditions of incomplete information'. Basically, the principal is assumed to 
know something about an agent's characteristics and abilities. However, the agent 
sometimes has information that the principal does not know and would like to know. 
This kind of situation is called information asymmetry, when one party has information 
the other desires but does not possess. This also links to the first assumption -
self-interest, it can make the agent reluctant to share the information with the principal. 
The third assumption is 'the risk of environment factors', such as economic and 
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technical conditions in the market. However, this kind of risk is difficuh to measure 
and forecast, therefore, both parties have to face the potential risk. Risk preference can 
be thought of as the degree of an individual's or firm's performance for adventure rather 
than security (Arrow, 1974; Pratt, 1964). Generally speaking, the principal tends to be 
risk neutral and the agent tends to be risk-averse. This may be because the principal has 
more power and resources to react to the external changes. 
Identification of the above two problem areas can help to prevent the agency problem 
from the principal's standpoint. The principal has to consider how to use monitoring 
and reward systems to satisfy both parties with the goal and risk preferences to reach a 
win-win status. Lal (1990) suggests that royahy payments provide the necessary 
incentives for the franchisor while monitoring systems are used to ensure that 
franchisees also behave in the best interest of the channel. The resuh is consistent with 
the findings of Brickley, Dark (1987) and Norton (1988), who conclude that franchising 
is affected by principal-agent problems. Also, Agrawal and Lal (1995) found a 
negative and significant relationship between service level and monitoring costs, and a 
positive relationship between monitoring frequency and royalty. This means that the 
royalty rate is inversely related to a franchisee's service, however, it is directly related 
to the investment and brand name for franchisors. 
Aside from the above arguments, Klein et al (1978) proposed another agency problem, 
which is the potential for quasi-rent appropriation A quasi-rent is the value of an asset 
over its salvage value. If quasi-rents are high, the franchisee risks appropriation by the 
franchisor. In other words, franchisees would like to demand a higher rate of return that 
pennits them to fully depreciate the value of their franchisee specific assets over the 
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duration of a contract. BrickJey and Dark (1987) suggest the risk of quasi-rent 
appropriation is likely to be greatest when there is high initial investment required to 
establish a franchise. Therefore, when all other things are equa~ high initial 
investments will lead to greater company ownership of retail outlets. Take 
supermarkets (Tesco) and convenience stores (7-Eleven) for example, as supermarkets 
need a higher initial investment than convenience stores, company ownership is the 
preferred mode. In contrast, convenience stores will choose franchising because the 
initial investment is more viable for franchisees. 
Summarising the above arguments, we can see that 'prevention is better than a cure'. If 
fIrms seek to adopt an organisational form to avoid costs, then becoming a franchising 
organisation is a good mechanism to reduce agency problems of firm growth (Shane, 
1996). Also, Norton (1988) indicates that a hybrid organisational form, like franchising 
can reduce the problems of adverse selection and moral hazard and it can provide 
residual claimancy. By replacing a salaried outlet manager with a residual claimant on 
the profits of a retail outlet, franchising reduces agency problems in monitoring new 
employees and lowering initial investment costs per unit (Brickley & Dark, 1987). The 
following points show how the establishment of a hybrid organisational form like 
franchising can reduce agency problems. Spence (1973) proposes that there are three 
ways in which hybrid organisations can reduce the agency problem. Most of the 
arguments are consistent with the above. 
• Hybrid organisations can reduce adverse selection as firms grOli! Spence (1973) 
argued that individuals with above-average capabilities have an incentive to signal 
those capabilities to others. In franchising, qualified individuals can signal their 
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capabilities by buying outlets. By buying a franchised outlet, an individual agrees 
to be compensated by the uncertain residual claim on the profits of that outlet. If the 
individual is qualified, this residual c1aimancy will provide a better return than the 
average wage rate paid to an employee. However, if the individual is not qualified, 
the compensation from residual claimancy will fall below that of the average wage 
rate. Therefore, qualified individuals will tend to see buying a franchise as more 
worthwhile than unqualified individuals. 
• Hybrid organisations are a better mechanism for establishing residual claimancy, 
compared with the mechanism of paying salaried managers low salaries and large 
bonuses based on outlet profit. The purchase of a franchise outlet puts the 
franchisee's capital at risk ifhe or she chooses to shirk, creating a downside risk that 
performance bonuses do not provide. Therefore, the purchase of a franchised outlet 
provides an individual with an incentive to provide information about activities that 
fit with their abilities, lessening the need for franchisors to incur costs through 
gathering this information through other means. This provision of information 
lowers the cost of assigning new managers to jobs in the organisation. 
• Hybrid organisations can reduce the cost of dete"ing moral hazard Agents can 
engage in two types of moral hazard: sub-optimal effort and misdirected effort. 
Since employees are paid a fixed wage, they have an incentive to put forth only as 
much effort as is necessary to ensure that they get paid. They also have an incentive 
to misdirect effort toward personal goals like obtaining perks or leisure time. 
Franchisees focus on unit profits at the expense of company sales or free ride off the 
quality maintenance efforts of others. However, by turning individuals into residual 
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claimants on the profits of their franchised outlets, franchising reduces the incentive 
to put forth a sub-optimal effort level (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972). Franchisees do 
not need to be monitored as carefully as employees since the latter need to be 
monitored for both sub-optimal and misdirected effort (Krueger, 1991; Martin, 
1988; Norton, 1988). 
So, from the above discussion of agency theory, it is clear that a hybrid organisation like 
franchising can minimise the problems and offer a better mechanism for the two parties. 
After the discussions of agency theory, the following section will explore another 
explanation for franchising - resource constraint theory. 
3.1.2 Resource Constraint Theory 
The second perspective from which franchising is viewed by researchers is that of 
resource constraint. This is based on logic derived from the product life cycle 
suggesting that young, small franchisors use franchising to access the resources needed 
for growth. Lafontaine (1992) observed that firms use franchising as a mechanism to 
grow faster. This implies that franchising allows franchisors to relax some types of 
constraint on their growth. The early papers on this topic [Oxenfeldt and Kelly 
(1968-69), Hunt (1974) and Lillis et al. (1976)] tend to discuss the advantages of rapid 
market penetration which encourages franchising during the early life cycle stages and 
which will drive growth in the future. Lillis, Narayana and Gilman (1976) use the 
franchise life cycle to test competitive advantage and their findings suggest that 
franchisee motivation is perceived as the most important issue among the three other 
factors (market penetratio~ risk sharing and entry capital) in the life cycle. Thompson 
(1992, 1994) found that the life cycle effect on franchising could be due to both the lack 
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of management capabilities and capital while the firm is in a growth stage. Therefore, it 
probably does not apply at the level of the very large chain. 
Thomas, O'Hara and Musgrave (1990) reject the life cycle theory of franchise 
development; they observe that company-owned chains are not the future trend within 
franchise systems. However, in the research on franchise versus company ownership, 
Combs and Castrogiovanni (1994) suggest that resource scarcity can explain the life 
cycle. They also found that larger firms used franchising more than older firms, this 
may be because they choose franchising as a growth strategy which then leads to their 
larger size. 
Summarizing the life cycle point, the argument is still open because there are too many 
variables to consider. Just as Porter (1985) says, the life cycle is simply a useful 
descriptive tool with too many variations to be generalized. This kind of interpretation 
is consistent with some authors who recommend examining configurations of resource 
exchange rather than life cycle stage analysis (Connor, 1991; Norton, 1988). Also, 
there is a limitation on the life cycle first forwarded by Oxenfeldt and KeIIy (1968-69), 
that franchising is too early in its own stage to reliably forecast future trends. Therefore, 
the contribution of the life cycle may change as time goes by. 
As far as the resource constraint argument is concerned, Oxenfeldt and Kelly (1968-69) 
suggest that franchisors use franchising to obtain access to some resources which 
franchisees own. Underlying this resource constraint argument is the assumption that 
retailers prefer to own their outlets; it is only because the option is unavailable to them 
that they choose to franchise. They suggested that the resource provided by franchisees 
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might be financial capitaL human capital, or management talent. Similarly, Norton 
(1988) emphasized the franchisor's need for human capital and managerial talent as a 
reason for franchising, while Minkler (1990) focuses on the franchisee's capacity to 
provide local market expertise. So, it can be concluded that the resource restraints are 
from capital, human resource, managerial talent, and local knowledge. However, 
Felstead (1993) finds an interesting case involved a Prontaprint franchisee in the UK, 
which suggests that franchisors prefer franchisees without prior experience in the 
operational line of the franchise. This viewpoint may be because franchisors think that 
it is easier to train those without related experience. The above argument of resource 
constraint is also in line with international franchising. Contractor (1981) suggests that 
small franchise systems can succeed internationally when significant financial, 
managerial and marketing expertise is contributed by the local franchisee. 
However. as the firm grows, it may buy back franchisees in accordance with the 
franchising contract. The reasons for this action may include the release of a scarce 
resource, maintenance of service quality and quick/flexible response to meet changing 
circumstances. Such repurchases provide the firm with additional control and by 
repurchasing the largest and most profitable franchisees first, the firm captures 
additional rents previously allocated to the franchisee. Therefore, the large, profitable 
franchisees and those outlets in urban or higher population densities will be 
transfonned into company-owned outlets. The only franchisees remaining are those in 
less profitable or rural areas (Oxenfeldt and Kelly, 1968-69). Thomas, O'Hara and 
Musgrave (1990) also make the same suggestion that high unit sales cause the 
franchisor to convert a franchised unit into a company owned unit. Anderson (1984) 
concludes that although the percentage of units owned by franchisors has 
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systematically increased over a period of ten years, there is no evidence that 
comprehensive ownership and/or perfonnance differentials have emerged that favour 
company·owned establishments. Further, Dant, Paswan and Stanworth (1996) use 
meta·analysis to test 17 US-based empirical studies on the subject of ownership 
redirection phenomenon. They suggest that ownership redirection may not be 
universally valid across business sectors. Therefore, we cannot say that 
company-owned outlets perform better than franchised outlets. 
As far as the source of capital is concerned, several researchers (e.g., Brickley & Dark, 
1987; Norton, 1995; Rubin, 1990) do not think that capital scarcity should be 
considered as a potential explanation of the decision to franchise because franchisees 
are a costly source of capital although the capital scarcity hypothesis was among the 
early explanations offered for franchising (Oxenfeldt & Kelly, 1968-69). Indeed, their 
arguments are mainly from two perspectives, which are on the capital issue and the 
agency theory issue. On the capital issue, when a firm needs funds, it is more efficient 
to obtain capital from passive investors such as lenders and stockholders who, by 
investing in an entire chain, diversify their risk among the outlets. Unable to similarly 
diversify, rational franchisees will demand a greater return on their capital (Norton, 
1995; Rubin, 1990). Unless there are imperfections in debt and equity markets that 
might increase the cost of capital from passive investors, using franchisee capital to 
delimit capital scarcity would be inefficient and irrational (Combs and Ketchen, 1999). 
However, Lafontaine (1992) pointed out that franchising might be a less expensive 
source of capital if there are incentive issues at the outlet level. She argues that if 
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managers lack incentives to exert effort, investors with a portfolio of shares in all 
outlets are likely to demand higher rates of return than they would on the capital 
invested in a single store that they manage themselves. Hence, capital may after all be 
more efficiently obtained from franchisees than from investors (Lafontaine and 
Kaufinann, 1994). 
In practice, resource constraint does not seem to be a suitable explanation for the 
phenomenon of franchising in Taiwan. For example, MacDonald's in Taiwan started 
operating by company ownership rather than franchise. After a successful period of 
running over 400 company-owned outlets, they started to franchise. The reasons 
behind this change include realizing entrepreneurship for employees and attracting 
business partners who identify with McDonald's spirit, rather than a lack of capital. 
3.1.3 Transaction Cost Analysis 
Over the past decades, transaction cost analysis (TCA) has received an increased 
amoilllt of attention from a broad range of fields, including sociology, organisation 
theory, contract law, business strategy, corporate fmance and marketing (Rindfleisch 
and Heide, 1997). Owing to TCA's substantive focus on 'exchange', it covers a wide 
range of marketing phenomena. These fields include vertical integration decisions (e.g., 
Anderson, 1985; John and Weitz, 1988), foreign market entry strategy (e.g., Anderson 
and Coughlan, 1987; Klein, Frazier, and Roth, 1990), sales force control and 
compensation issues (e.g., Anderson, 1988; John and Weitz, 1989), industrial 
purchasing strategy (e.g., Noordewier, John, and Nevin, 1990; Stump and Heide, 1996) 
and distribution channel management (e.g., Anderson and Weitz, 1992; Heide and John, 
1988). Clearly, TeA plays an important role in marketing. The following section will 
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first discuss TCA and then examine how TCA may explain franchising. 
Firstly, we start with a brief overview of TCA and its origins. There are two 
institutional economic paradigms, which are new institutional economics and 
neoclassical economics. They have different views on the firm. Neo-classical 
economics view the concept of the :firm as a production function (Barney and Hesterly, 
1996). However, new institutional economics (TCA) views the firm as a governance 
structure. In the governance structure, TCA researchers have conceptualized three 
general types of governance structures: market, hierarchy, and hybrid or intermediate 
mechanisms. One ofCoase's (1937) initial propositions was that firms and markets are 
alternative governance structures that differ in their transactional costs. Specifically, 
Coase propose that under certain conditions, the cost of conducting economic exchange 
in a market may exceed the costs of organizing the exchange within a firm. Williamson 
(1975, 1985) has added considerable precision to Coase's general argument by 
identifying the types of exchange that are more appropriately conducted within firm 
boundaries than within the market. He has also augmented Coase's initial framework 
by suggesting that transaction costs include both the direct costs of managing 
relationships and the possible opportunity costs of making inferior governance 
decisions. Wllliamson's micro-analytical framework rests on the interplay between 
two main assumptions of human behaviour (ie., bounded rationality and opportunism) 
and two key dimensions of transactions (i.e., asset specificity and uncertainty). 
Uncertainty can be categorized as environmental and behavioural uncertainty. 
As far as the underpinning assumptions and dimensions of TCA are concerned, as 
mentioned, there are two assumptions about human behaviour, which are bounded 
rationality and opportunism. Bounded rationality is the assumption that decision 
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makers have constraints on their cognitive capabilities and limits on their rationality. 
Although decision makers often intend to act rationally, this intention may be 
circumscribed by their limited information processing and communication ability 
(Simon, 1957). According to TeA, these constraints become problematic in uncertain 
environments, in which the circumstances surrounding an exchange cannot be specified 
at the beginning (environmental uncertainty) and performance cannot be easily verified 
later (behavioural uncertainty). The primary consequence of environmental 
uncertainty is an adaptation problem, that is, difficulties with modifying agreements to 
changing circumstances. The effect of behavioural uncertainty is a performance 
evaluation problem that has difficulties in verifying whether compliance with 
established agreements has occurred. 
Opportunism is the assumption that given the opportunity, decision makers may 
unscrupulously seek to serve their self-interest, and that it is difficult to know a priori 
who is trustworthy and who is not (Barney, 1990). Williamson (1985) defines 
opportunism as "self-interest seeking with guile", and suggests that it includes such 
behaviour as lying and cheating, as well as more subtle forms of deceit, such as 
violating agreements. In franchising, the source of revenue is based on sales for 
franchisees. Therefore, franchisees may cheat on the sales in order to gain extra profit. 
The other possible situation is that franchisees purchase from unauthorized suppliers. 
This is because franchisees can get a better price or better payment conditions. 
Therefore, opportunism poses a problem to the extent that a relationship is supported by 
specific assets whose values are limited outside of the focal relationship. 
Rindfleisch and Heide (1997) summarised the composition of transaction costs in the 
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following Table 3.1. 
Table 3.1 The Composition of Transaction Cost 
Asset Envirorunental Behavioral 
Specificity Uncertainty Uncertainty 
A. Source of Transaction 
Costs Safeguarding Adaptation Performance 
-Nature of Governance Problem 
Evaluation 
Screening and 
B. Type of Transaction Costs of Communication. Selection costs (ex 
Costs crafting negotiation, and ante) 
-Direct Costs safeguards coordination costs Measurement costs 
(ex post) 
--
- -
-Opportunity Costs Failure to Maladaptation; Failure to identify 
invest in Failure to adapt appropriate 
productive partners (ex ante) 
assets Productivity losses 
through effort 
adjustments (ex 
post) 
Source: Rindfleisch and Heide (1997) 
In the table, asset specificity creates a safeguarding problem (Rubin, 1990). Without 
appropriate safeguards, firms face the risk of expropriation (ex post) or productivity 
losses resulting from the failure to invest in specialized assets (ex ante). 
Environmental uncertainty creates an adaptation problem; the associated transaction 
costs include the direct costs of communicating new information, renegotiating 
agreements, or coordinating activities to reflect new circumstances. A failure to adapt 
involves an opportunity cost of maladaptation (Malone, 1987). Behavioural 
uncertainty leads to difficulties because of ex post information asymmetry regarding 
task performance. Information asymmetry also may exist ex ante, because of an 
inability to ascertain a party's true characteristics prior to exchange. Typically referred 
to as adverse selection (Akerlof, 1970), this problem is more commonly associated with 
agency theory than with TCA. Doherty (1999) suggests that information asymmetry 
arises in the retail sector because of the significant amount of intangible assets involved, 
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such as a strong retail brand and managerial technology, coupled with the complex 
regulatory, economic, sociaL cultural and retail structural boundaries which 
characterise the retail context. Franchising can overcome this information asymmetry 
problem by matching the local market knowledge of the franchise with the retail and 
brand know-how of the franchisor. 
The basic prenuse of TeA is that if adaptation, perfonnance evaluation, and 
safeguarding costs are absent or low, economic factors will favour market governance. 
If these costs are high enough to exceed the production cost advantages of the market, 
ftrms will favour internal organisation. The logic behind this argument is based on 
certain a priori assumptions about the properties of internal organisation and its ability 
to minimize transactional costs. Three specific aspects of organisations are relevant in 
this respect. First, organisations have more powerful control and monitoring 
mechanisms available to them than do markets, because of their ability to measure and 
reward behaviour as well as output (Eisenhardt, 1985, Oliver and Anderson, 1987). 
Second, organisations are able to provide rewards that are long term in nature, such as 
promotion opportunities. The effect of such rewards is to reduce the payoff from 
opportunistic behaviour. Third, Williamson (1975) acknowledges the possible effects 
of the organisational atmosphere, in which organisational culture and socialisation 
processes may create convergent goals between parties and reduce opportunism ex 
ante. 
Although the TeA framework poses the governance question as a discrete choice 
between market exchange and internal organisation, the current version of the theory 
explicitly acknowledges that features of internal organisation can be achieved without 
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ownership or complete vertical integration. A variety of hybrid mechanisms have been 
identified in the literature, ranging from formal mechanisms, such as contractual 
provisions and equity arrangements (Joskow, 1987, Osborn and Baughn, 1990). 
Williamson (1985) notes, "Any problem that can be formulated directly, or indirectly, 
as a contracting problem can be irTVestigated to advantage in transaction cost terms." 
Therefore, franchising can also be explained by transaction cost analysis because it is 
based on the contract between the franchisor and the franchisee. 
As for how TCA may be applied to franchising, the franchise organisation is a kind of 
hybrid organisational form that incorporates elements of both markets and hierarchies 
(Williamson, 1991). This is because in 'market' organisational governance, it is 
supported by classical contract law (Williamson, 1991), which is described by Macneil 
(1974) as "sharp in by clear agreement; sharp out by clear peiformance" where 
conflict or disagreement is ruled by a set of laws and where more formal terms 
supersede less fonnal terms. Clearly, this is not a form of governance that best 
characterizes franchising. The franchise relationship is long-term, and the parties to the 
agreement have interdependence whereas in discreet market interactions the asset focus 
is the individually traded item, and although assets such as a single purpose building 
and secret recipes are franchise specific asset, the principle specific asset in franchising 
is the shared trademark (Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997). Also, 'hierarchy' governance 
describes the individual firm as a nexus of contracts that resembles the market (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976; Fama, 1980) but which must adapt through that and forbearance 
because of the absence of standing in the courts (Eaton and Joseph, 1988). Because the 
franchise relationship is an inter-organisational form between two independent 
companies with access to the courts, it is clear that the hierarchical form of governance 
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does not apply. In the 'hybrid' organisation governance, the franchise license 
agreement seems to embody much of the neoclassical rationale. It is born out of 
economic self-interest, desires to have a continuing long-tenn relationship, and 
anticipates disturbances, specifically in the division of tasks, which gives the franchisor 
the discretion to implement change across the system for all franchisees. Therefore, it 
is clear that franchising is a hybrid organisational form and the excuse doctrine in 
contract Jaw applies (Williamson, 1975). 
In the franchise system, one of the advantages is "mass purchasing power." However, 
instead of being able to purchase supplies less expensively through the franchisor, 
many franchisees found themselves paying exorbitant prices for supplies. One 
disillusioning study found that (l) the practice of requiring franchisees to purchase 
supplies from their franchisors is widespread; (2) franchisees believe they are being 
overcharged on their supplies; and (3) franchisees who must buy supplies from their 
franchisors suffer lower profits (Hunt and Nevin, 1975). From this point, one can doubt 
the cost of transaction within an organisation. In theory, it should be cheaper, but 
actually, many franchisors overcharged on their supplies. 
As to how to maintain a cooperative relationship, both parties will make tangible and 
intangible investments, such as equipment and training. As the relationship is based on 
a contract, once the contract expires, either party has the power to determine whether to 
continue in the relationship. Franchisees may terminate the relationship and transfer to 
other contractual systems such as a voluntary chain. This is because franchisees have 
already got the know-how to run a business. In the voluntary chain, the attraction is that 
franchisees do not need to pay royalties aside from the initial fee. Therefore, 
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franchisees can absorb all the profits. From this point of view, franchisors have to think 
how to make franchisees undertake some specific investments in the transaction to 
stabilize the relationship, and make it difficult to transfer. Also, another important issue 
for franchisors is to maximize the channel efficiency. This is because in the 
competitive franchise market, there are many alternative brands for franchisees. As 
TCA applies to franchising through the assumption that both parties involved in the 
relationship are motivated by economic self-interest and will engage in opportunistic 
behaviour to maximize their own position, how to maintain a good relationship 
benefiting both parties becomes a crucial issue. 
From the above discussions of agency theory, resource constraint theory and 
transaction cost analysis, it is not difficult to see the motivations for either party 
provided by franchising. The next section will explore the characteristics of the 
decision-maker, and will focus on entrepreneurship. The purpose is to have an 
understanding of the perception gap between franchisors and franchisees. 
3.2 Entrepreneurship in Retail Franchising 
This section will discuss the characteristics of decision makers and the focus will be 
placed upon entrepreneurship. The other attributes of decision-makers, like leadership 
qualities, knowledge and experience will be explored in the section on 'relationships 
and conflict in the franchise distribution channel'. The role of franchising, as a type of 
entrepreneurial activity in economic development, is now receiving attention 
(Dandridge, Falbe and DuPuis, 1991; Hoffinan and Preble, 1993). It has been applied 
across many disciplinary boundaries (e.g., management, economics, sociology, 
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marketing, fmance, history, psychology, social anthropology, etc.). Consequently, 
entrepreneurship researchers have pursued a wide range of goals, adopted different 
units of analysis and espoused diverse theoretical perspectives and methodologies 
(Low and MacMillan, 1988). In general, entrepreneurship includes the introduction of 
new products and services, innovative marketing, openness to change, outrunning the 
competition, and fast growth (Aldrich and Auster, 1986; Stopford and Baden-Fuller, 
1994). Franchising, as an organisational form has emerged as an important vehicle for 
entrepreneurship. Franchising is a way for large companies to become nimble and 
more responsive to customers (Matusky, 1990). Franchising is also a preferred method 
for developing growth in small businesses (Huber, 1992). As a result, each year, 200 
new business format franchisors appear in dozens of industries (Tannenbaum, 1991). 
Therefore, there must be a dedicated link between franchising and entrepreneurship. 
The following section will explore entrepreneurship in retail franchising from two 
perspectives - that of the franchisor and the franchisee. First of all, we have to provide 
a definition of entrepreneurship. 
3.2.1 The Definition of Entrepreneurship 
As far as the origin of the term entrepreneurship is concerned, it was first utilized in the 
sixteenth century in France. It was used to describe captains of fortune who hired out 
mercenary soldiers to serve princes and towns; the term's usage in business contexts 
commenced in the eighteenth century to refer to economic factors that undertook 
contracts for public works, introduced innovative agricultural techniques, or risked 
personal capital in industry (Martinelli, 1996). Hence, from the very beginning, 
constitutive associations were posited between entrepreneurship and the entrepreneurs' 
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willingness to accept the risk and the uncertainty associated with new economic 
enterprise (Kaufinann and Dant, 1998). 
A consistent theme in the entrepreneurship literature is that the process involves 
venture creation (Hornaday and Aboud, 1971; Powell and Bimmerle, 1980; Gartner, 
1985; Timmons, 1986; Low and MacMillan, 1988). Some authors differentiate the 
start-up of an entrepreneurial venture from other types of organisations by the integral 
inclusion of change, innovation, and risk (Vesper, 1980; Shapero, 1984; Philips, 1986). 
There are frequent references in the literature that the entrepreneurial process in the 
venture extends beyond start-up (Baty, 1981; Cooper, 1982; Schollhammer, 1981; 
Covin and Slevin, 1986; Roberts, 1987). According to some scholars, the 
entrepreneurial process includes acquisition as well as start-up (Dunkelberg and 
Cooper, 1983; Winters and Murfin, 1988). Still others define entrepreneurship even 
more broadly as the creation of weahh or value (Ronstadt, 1984; Stevenson, et aI., 
1985). Interpreting the responses to a three-phase Delphi survey of academics and 
business leaders, Gartner (1990) included innovation, organisation creation, value 
creation, growth, and uniqueness as venture-related themes characterizing the nature of 
entrepreneurship. 
From these various perspectives, it is possible to conclude that the concept of venture in 
the entrepreneurship literature is that of an entity, with features distinct from traditional 
views of the :firm or organisation. Venture studies address value creation through 
start-up and acquisition, but can include entrepreneurial activities both prior and 
subsequent to the point of creation. 
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According to Kaufinann and Dant {I 998), the contemporary definitions of 
entrepreneurship can be roughly categorized into three groups. They are: (1) 
definitions stressing the characteristic traits or qualities supposedJy possessed by 
entrepreneurship, (2) definitions stressing the process of entrepreneurship and its 
outcomes, and (3) definitions focusing on the activities entrepreneurs perfonn. 
(1) The Personal Traits Perspective 
• An entrepreneur is an individual who possesses qualities of risk-taking, 
leadership, motivation, and the ability to resolve crises (Leibenstein. 1968). 
• Entrepreneurs are leaders and major contributors to the process of creative 
destruction (Schumpeter. 1942). 
• An entrepreneur is an individual who undertakes uncertain investments and 
possesses an unusually low level of uncertainty aversion (Knight, 1921). 
Ahhough some scholars have suggested psychological profiling as a useful tool in 
entrepreneurial research (Brockhaus, 1982; Perry. 1990; Shaver and Scott, 1991), as 
Amit, Glosten, and Muller (l993) point out, it is simply not known whether there is an 
essential set of entrepreneurship characteristics and, if so, what that set may be. Other 
traits such as creativity, technical know-how, the ability to make decisions quickly and 
SO on may also be associated with successful entrepreneurs. 
(2) The Process Perspective 
• Entrepreneurship is the creation of new enterprise (Low and MacMillan, 1988) or 
new organisations (Gartner, 1985). 
• Entrepreneurs introduce new combinations of the factors of production (land and 
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labour) that, when combined with credit, breaks into the static equilibrium of the 
circular flow of economic life and raises it to a new level (Schumpeter, 1934). 
• Entrepreneurship is the process of extracting profits from new, wUque, and 
valuable combinations of resources in an uncertain and ambiguous environment 
(Amit, Glosten and Muller, 1993). 
From the above defInitions, we can see that entrepreneurs are those who combine 
different resources and processes, and then create a new organisation to realize their 
business goals. 
(3) The Activities Perspective 
• An entrepreneur performs one or more of the following activities: (1) connects 
different markets, (2) meets/overcomes market deficiencies, (3) creates and 
manages time-binding implicit or explicit contractual arrangements and 
input-transforming organisational structures, and (4) supplies inputs/resources 
lacking in the marketplace (Leibenstein, 1968; Amit, Glosten, and Muller, 1993). 
• Entrepreneurship is the purposeful activity to initiate, maintain, and develop a 
profit-oriented business (Cole, 1968). 
• Entrepreneurs perceive profit opportunities and initiate actions to fill currently 
unsatisfied needs or to do more efficiently what is already being done (Kirzner, 
1985). 
• Entrepreneurs are residual claimants with operational control of the organisation 
(Shane and Cable, 1997). 
Summarizing the above three perspectives, we can see that diversity in the 
conceptualisations of entrepreneurship have led some to suggest that, like leadership, 
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the tenn "entrepreneurship" may be too imprecise a concept to defme tightly (Low and 
MacMillan, 1988). The following Table 3.2 is a summary of different defmitions of 
entrepreneurship and their applications in the context of franchising. 
Table 3.2 Definitions of Entrepreneurship and Their Applicability to the Franchising 
Context 
Representative Definitions of Entrepreneurship Application t o Application to 
Franchisors Franchisees 
Entrepreneur is an individual who possesses qualities of 
Irisk-taking, leadership, motivation, and the ability to Yes Yes 
reso lve crises (Leibenstein, 19681 
Entrepreneurs are leaders and major contributors to the Yes No process of creative destruction (Schumpeter, 1942) 
Entrepreneur is an individual who undertakes uncertain 
investments and possesses an unusually low level of Yes Yes 
uncertainty aversion (Knight, 1921). 
Entrepreneurship is the creation of new enterprise (Low Yes (concept) Yes (market) 
and MacMillan, 1988) 
Entrepreneurship is the creation of new organisations 
I {Gartner, 1985) Yes (concept) Yes (market) 
Entrepreneurs introduce new combinations of the 
factors of production (land and labour) that, when 
combined with credit, breaks into the static equilibrium Yes No 
of the circular flow of economic life and raises it to a 
new level (Sc~eter, 193~. 
Entrepreneurship is the process of extracting profits Yes from new, unique, and valuable combinations of Yes (ambiguous 
resources in an uncertain and ambiguous environment 
environment) ( Amit, Glosten, and Muller, 1993). 
Entrepreneur performs one or more of the following 
activities: (1) connects different markets, (2) 
meets/overcomes market deficiencies, (3) creates and 
manages time-binding implicit or explicit contractual Yes Yes 
arrangements and input-transforming organisational 
structures, and (4) supplies inputs/resources lacking in 
the marketplace (Leibenstein, 1968). 
Entrepreneurship is the purposeful activity to initiate, 
maintain, and develop a profit-oriented business (Cole, Yes Yes 
1968), 
Entrepreneurs perceive profit opportunities and initiate 
actions to fill currently unsatisfied needs or to do more Yes Yes 
efficiently what is already being done ~er, 1985). 
Entrepreneurs are residual claimants with operational Yes (system Yes (unit 
control of the organisation (Shane and Cable, 1997). profits/shared profits/shared 
control) control) 
Source: Kaufmann and Dant (1998). 
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In table 3.2 above, Kaufmann and Dant (1998) combine the characteristics of 
entrepreneurship and the applications to franchisorsl franchisees. For franchisors, all 
the definitions are applied but for franchisees, two definitions are not applicable. This 
is because franchisees do not need creativity for developing a whole package of 
operational know-how. What they need to do is to pay the royalty to use the 
franchisor's know-how. However, Venkataraman (1988) has argued for overtly 
abandoning the pursuit of definitional standardisation. He sees it as a futile endeavour. 
Instead, he advocates reaching a consensus on the distinctive domain 0 f 
entrepreneurship research. His recommendation is that entrepreneurship, as a scholar1y 
field should seek to understand how opportunities for profit are discovered and 
exploited, by whom, and with what consequences. Kaufinann and Dant think it is 
interesting because his suggestion can be viewed as accommodating all three categories 
of definitions discussed above: how (action), by whom (traits), and consequences 
(process). 
Also, according to Leibenstein (1968), the fewer the market deficiencies, the less likely 
entrepreneurs are to find a niche to connect markets. In other words, incomplete and 
imperfect markets give rise to entrepreneurship. This partially explains why, in 
advanced industrial countries, entrepreneurship is not as important than in less 
developed countries (Linda, 1990). However, the author suggests that if 
entrepreneurship is examined from the perspective of Maslow's hierarchy theory, we 
know that self-realisation is the final stage of the hierarchy. This implies that as GNP 
(Gross National Production) grows, then people will be more likely to exhibit the 
behaviour of self-realisation because other needs have already been satisfied. 
Therefore, we can confer that franchising is a way of self-realisatioIL This conflicts 
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with Linda's argument; so, different results can be explained from different 
perspectives. Generally, both of the above arguments are applicable to Taiwanese 
society because the former view suggests that something can be created under higher 
uncertainty and the latter view implies that franchising is a means to realize 
entrepreneurship under a structured society. 
From the above definitions, we see that entrepreneurship can be explained from 
different perspectives. As to how entrepreneurship is applied to the franchisor and 
franchisee, the next section will provide an explanation. 
3.2.2 The Franchisor as Retail Entrepreneur 
The role of the franchisor as an entrepreneur is generally assumed, for franchisors have 
to bear the risk of running a business. Entrepreneurial activity by the franchisee is 
sometimes viewed as a paradox, this may be because the franchisee's operational know 
how is acquired from franchisors rather than innovated. Therefore, the franchisee just 
follows instructions to organize their business units. Often, when choosing a franchisee, 
franchisors state that they prefer to seJect a manager rather than an entrepreneur to 
protect their business system from unauthorized change. This is because franchisees 
may exit the franchise system to create their own brand once they have discovered the 
operational know-how, and then become competitors of the original franchisor. This is 
true but failure rates for this type of competitor are usually higher than for the original 
franchisor. 
Franchising is predominantly a retailing phenomenon in both segments of product 
franchising (e.g., automobiles) and business format franchising (e.g., McDonald's). 
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Some would argue that it is a me-too strategy, which offers similar products or services 
that reflect little true innovation. This view arises from the ease of access to the 
industry, which does not need a lot of capital or difficult technological know-how. 
Nevertheless, even concepts that appear to duplicate existing non-franchise retail 
establishments (e.g., photo finishing outlets) often gain their competitive advantage 
through the development of unique and efficient operating systems that "industrialize" 
the service offering (Levitt, 1983). Therefore, it is obvious that although the entry 
barrier is quite low, only those franchisors exhibiting continual innovation will prosper. 
This is a reason why the franchise failure rate is lower than the average business failure 
rate. Moreover, the entrepreneur-franchisors that create these systems must not only 
risk the resources to develop the concept and operating system, but must do so in a 
manner that permits efficient turnkey transfer to the operating franchisees (Kaufmann 
and Dant, 1998). Aside from internal innovations, the franchisor has to face the 
changing external environment to adapt and offer the latest news to franchisees. 
Therefore, from the previous table 3.2, we know that franchisors are on the whole more 
entrepreneurial than franchisees. Storey (1994) suggests that any entrepreneur 
intending to build up a franchise should consider devoting at least two years to 
establishing a basic business idea in terms of testing out sales, marketing, 
product/service, pricing and staffing strategies. After all, every small business start-up 
plan inevitably requires considerable modification during the initial months of its 
implementation. High failure-rate figures, particularly during the first 30 months of 
operation, verify this fact. Stanworth, Purdy and Price (1997) stress that there are three 
key documents, operating manuals,franchise contracts andfranchise prospectuses that 
need to be drawn up prior to franchising 
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3.2.3 The Franchisee as Retail Entrepreneur 
As far as whether franchisees are entrepreneurs, the argwnents are quite diverse. In the 
economics literature, two unique perspectives have been offered to explain the 
existence of franchising and are relevant to entrepreneurship. The fIrst one is the 
capital acquisition model and the other one is agency theory. The details of the two 
models have been discussed previously. As far as the capital acquisition model is 
concerned, scholars suggest that franchisees are an efficient source of financial capital 
for retail fums seeking to expand (Caves and Murphy, 1976; Dant, 1995; Oxenfeldt and 
Kelly, 1968-69). Although the subject of some dispute (Rubin, 1978; Kaufmann and 
Dant, 1996; Lafontaine, 1992), the capital acquisition argument is consistent with the 
concept of an entrepreneurial partnership. Whereas the franchisor risks resources to 
develop the brand, the franchisee risks resources in the development of local markets. 
The different parties have different kinds of risk. Although the risk they face may be 
reduced by this familiarity, the franchisees' role as entrepreneur-partner is supported by 
the fact that they accept the risk of operating in an unexplored market, and the degree of 
risk is dependent upon the relationship between supply and demand in the market. As 
to agency theory (Rubin, 1978), it is considered that franchising solves the problems of 
shirking that occur because the franchisor cannot directly and efficiently monitor the 
widely dispersed retail outlets that comprise a chain. By providing the franchisee with 
claims to the profits, then both parties come into alignment. However, due to 
differences in local markets, besides accepting the maintenance of the franchisor's core 
concept, franchisees often have their own unique ways doing business. Take 
McDonald's for example, pepper and salt are separate in ~ but in Taiwan, both of 
them are mixed together in one pack. This kind of change must be adapted by local 
franchisee's knowledge of local culture. However, if there are too many different 
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systems within a franchise brand, customers will feel confused and doubt the 
standardisation of the brand. In this situation, the franchisor has to use its power to 
intervene in the franchisee's operations. 
In addition, there is a tendency for entrepreneurs to choose to franchise rather than 
establish an independently owned business if the expected utility from franchising 
exceeds the expected utility from independent business ownership. Differences in 
expected utility will depend on differences in the expected profits under each 
alternative contractual arrangement, the individual entrepreneur's attitudes toward risk, 
and tastes (Rubin, 1978). However, as far as personal qualities are concerned, Wattel 
(1968-69) suggests that the franchisee needs less planning ability, less creativity and 
less competitiveness; instead, he needs a highly co-operative personality, including the 
ability and willingness to follow the decisions, policies and daily routines laid down by 
others. However, the author argues that this depends on which kind of industry is 
involved. In the convenience store industry for example, the operation is basically 
routine and does not need any special creativity to attract customers. However, in a 
highly personal, interactive industry, such as estate agency, every franchisee faces 
different market characteristics and customer attitudes. Therefore, their strategies may 
differ from one another. So, the standardisation of operational know-how varies with 
different industries. However, in general, the franchisees' operations are confined to 
the franchise contract. They cannot act like an independently owned business; in other 
words, their freedom of operation is limited. 
The other key point in the literature is that although partners with very different roles, 
franchisors and franchisees may have a great deal in common. Research has 
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demonstrated that franchisees are very similar to those entrepreneurs who start their 
own independent businesses, and that they often consider both courses before doing 
one or the other (Kaufinann and Stanworth, 1995; Peterson and Dant, 1990). However, 
there are still different arguments as to whether the franchisee is an entrepreneur. Rubin 
(1978) argued that the franchised enterprise is, in reality, simply a managed outlet 
featuring in the corporate marketing strategy of another truly independent business -
that of the franchisor. Knight (1984) placed the franchisee on a continuum of 
independence "exactly mid-way" between "solo independent entrepreneurs" and "large 
corporate managers". However. Bradach and Kaufmann (1988), in their own research 
found that "franchising and starting an independent business are part of the same 
decision process". Therefore, there is still no universal viewpoint on whether 
franchisees are entrepreneurs. It just depends on which kind of standpoint and industry 
being discussed. In addition, the power of the franchisor is very important. if the 
franchisor's power is strong enough, the unity of operations will be higher and the 
space for franchisees' creativity will be minimized. 
Summarizing the above views, one can see that most people agree that franchisors are 
entrepreneurs, but in the case of franchisees, some key characteristics are not as evident, 
such as the need for creativity. However. it is possible for a firm to switch from being a 
franchisee to becoming a franchisor. In addition, culture also plays an important role in 
the business environment. No matter which party it is, what is important is that the 
entrepreneur has the characteristics of risk-taking, leadership, motivation, and the 
ability to resolve a crisis. 
81 
3.3 Relationships and Conflict in the Franchise Distribution Channel 
Any commercial transaction between two organisations is governed by the nature of the 
formal and informal relationships that pertain, and all have the potential for conflict 
(Spinelli and Birley, 1996). Therefore, conflict exists in all commercial organisations 
at some level (Thomas, 1992). Carlson and Kusoffsky (1969) were two of the early 
researchers to classify conflict, based on an analysis of organisational goals, decisions, 
and communications. Palamountain (1967) identified three different forms of channel 
contlict, including horizontal, intertype and vertical conflict. Conflict will increase, 
decrease, or stay the same depending on how people deal with it. For this reason, 
Brown (1980) emphasized the need to determine whether conflict causes other 
behavioural dimensions or whether the other dimensions cause conflict. He suggests 
that the two major dimensions that could cause conflict were power (Beier and Stern, 
1969; Cadotte and Stern, 1979; Korp4 1973; Lusch, 1976; Lusch, 1978; Raven and 
Kruglanski, 1970; Stem, Schultz, and Grabner, 1973) and the performance of other 
channel members (Gill and Stem, 1969; Foster and Shuptrine, 1973; Anand, 1987). 
Many researchers have used a variety of research designs and empirical and theoretical 
settings to examine various aspects of channel relationships and conflict. For example, 
Assael (1968), Stem, Stemthal, and Craig (1973), and Hunger and Stem (1976) 
investigated conflict management within distribution channels. Pruden (1969) 
examined the relationship between channel conflict and inter~organisational 
co-ordination. Rosenberg and Stem (1971), Foster and Shuptrine (1973). Kelly and 
Peters (1977). and Etgar (1976) investigated the nature of distribution channel conflict. 
Rosenberg and Stem (1971). Pearson (1973), Lusch (1976), and Brown and Frazier 
(1978) examined the relationship between channel conflict and other important 
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constructs such as channel member satisfaction, channel performance, and channel 
power. Finally, the relationship between power and the source of power in a channel of 
distribution has also been tested by Hunt and Nevin (1974). 
From the above, we know that relationships and conflicts have been investigated from 
various perspectives of marketing. In franchising, Kedia, Ackerman and Justis (1995), 
suggest that the emphasis on franchising has increasingly moved from the source of 
resources to the relationship between partners. The relationship becomes more 
important in terms of maintaining long-term cooperation because it will influence the 
performance of the system As mentioned before, cooperation is built on the exchange 
of brand name and royalty. Carman and Klein (1986) propose a process model (Figure 
3.1) to explain these key issues in a vertical channel organisation. 
DEPENDENCE GOAL DISPARTY 
~~ 
CONFLICT 
.. 
POWER BEHAVIOR 
.. 
OUTCOME 
+-
PERFORMANCE 
Figure 3.1 The Dependence, Conflict, Power, Performance Process in a Loosely 
Coupled Vertical Channel Organisation. 
Source: Carman and Klein (1986) 
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The figure above reveals that conflict arises from dependency and goal disparity 
between the parties. In other words. the degree of conflict depends on how one party 
depends on the other and how both coordinate organisational objectives. Once either 
party cannot satisfy the other, conflicts will arise, and the principal will exert its power 
on the relationship. The outcomes could be either good or bad, and will directly or 
indirectly influence channel members' performance. Hence, the development of the 
relationship and conflict between both parties are linked by cause and effect. One 
party's action will influence the other party's reaction. 
From this overview, we see that relationships and conflict occur in every organisation. 
In the following section, key issues in relationships and conflict will be discussed and 
first of all, we start with a definition of conflict and relationships. 
3.3.1 Definitions of Conflict and Relationships 
Conflict, according to one authoritative definition, is "tension between two or more 
social entities (individuals, groups, or larger organisations) which arises from 
incompatibility of actual or desired responses" (Raven and Kruglanski, 1970). Based 
on this definition, we know that conflict arises from the perceptual gap between the 
desired and actual reaction of two or more entities. Major responses to conflict are: 
political action to resolve intense conflict (AssaeI. 1968); bargaining and expansion of 
alternatives outside of the buyer seller dyad (Firat, Tybout, and Stem, 1974); litigation 
(Mason, 1975); joint goal setting (Rosenberg, 1974); membership exchange when 
interdependence is high (Stern, 1971); and arbitration (Weigand and Wssson, 1974). 
Therefore, there is still no generally accepted definition of 'conflict' in the literature and 
the response to conflict also varies depending on the kind of relationship that exists 
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between two parties and the attitudes they hold towards each other. Putnam and Poole 
(1987) proposed a family of three general defmitions, which are: interdependence 
between the parties (i.e. each has the potential to interfere with the other), perception of 
incompatibility among the parties' concerns, and some form of interaction. This group 
of definitions is interrelated, and different researchers have focused on different aspects 
of these themes. 
In the context of franchising, with the high degree of functional interdependence 
between franchisor and franchisee, the possibility of channel conflict is high. In 
addition, due to the nature of the contractual arrangement between the two parties, 
economic and social powers are usually imbalanced in favour of the franchisor (Lusch, 
1976). In other words, franchisees have to abide by the contract even if it is unequal. 
Hence, the franchisor holds the strongest position for channel leadership. Rubin (1978) 
suggests that franchise contracts sometimes have clauses preventing the franchisee 
from opening a similar business for some period after termination of his franchise 
relationship. We would predict that this would be most common in those cases where 
substantial amounts of trairting are provided by the franchisor; much of this training 
would be in the form of general human capital, and the franchisor might well desire to 
avoid having persons acquire this human capital for other uses. 
As to whether conflict occurs in the channel of distribution, the arguments are quite 
diverse. It depends on how the channel leader utilizes power resources. Stanworth, 
Kaufmann and Purdy (1995) suggest that in the longer term, as franchisees fmd 
themselves paying ever increasing royalties in line with increasing sales, and as their 
level of reliance upon the expertise of the franchisor in day-to-day problem-solving 
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tends to decline, then the franchisor's power-base relies increasingly upon (a) the 
marketing power of the franchise tradename and (b) the fact that the franchisee has 
gained access to his/her knowledge and understanding of the field of operation 
exclusively via the franchisor. Therefore, franchisors have different power bases in 
different stages to main the franchise relationship. The relationship is also dependent 
on the style of leadership, and leadership is usuaI1y closely linked with the 
characteristics of senior managers or the corporate culture. Ivancevich, Szilagyi and 
Wallace (1977) propose three kinds of leadership - participative, supportive, and 
achievement. Similarly, Schu~ Pride and Little (1985) also suggest three kinds of 
leadership; participative. supportive and directive. Aside from leadership, Hunt and 
Nevin (1974) suggest that conflicts arise from the inappropriate use of coercive and 
non-coercive power. 
Power, in its most general sense, refers to the ability of one individual or group to 
control or influence the behaviour of another. Dahl (1957), for example, defines power 
as the ability of one individual or group to get another unit to do something that it would 
not otherwise have done. EI-Ansary and Stern (1972) applied this notion to distribution 
channels by operationally defining power as the ability of a channel member to control 
the decision variables in the marketing strategy of another member at a different level in 
the channel of distnbution. 
In the franchisor-franchisee channel of distribution, the direction of power for most 
decisions has already been built into the relationship by means of the franchise contract. 
Previous analysis has suggested that most franchisees enter the negotiations at an 
extreme bargaining disadvantage vis-a-vis the franchisor and that franchisors go to 
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great lengths in developing the contract to protect their own prerogatives (Ozanne and 
Hunt, 1971). Therefore, power in a franchisor-franchisee channel usually refers to the 
ability of the franchisor to control the business decision variables of the franchisees. 
The franchisor-franchisee relationship is essentially a channel of distribution with a 
unilateral dependency relationship. The franchisor, being the strong channel member, 
has coercive and non-coercive sources of power that can be exercised to control the 
franchisee. Some authorities, have suggested that the non-coercive sources of power 
appear to be better alternatives for enhancing the satisfaction of the weak: channel 
members (Frederick and Stern, 1969; John and Raven, 1959). 
As far as the sources of power are concerned, French and Raven (1959) have defined 
five, which seem common and important: reward, coercive, legitimate, referent, and 
expert power. Coercive power can be differentiated from the others because it, alone, 
involves potential punishment. For all other non-coercive sources of power, i.e., 
reward, legitimate, expert, and referent, the individual willingly yields power to another. 
Franchisors were found to be able to increase the franchisees' satisfaction with the 
franchise relationship by relying more on non-coercive sources of power, such as 
providing higher quality assistance in the areas of equipment, site location, national 
advertising, "on-the-job" training, local advertising, pricing assistance, and product 
deletions and additions. The results also showed that franchisors could increase 
franchisee satisfaction by relying less on the coercive sources of power (Hunt and 
Nevin, 1974). 
In the ~ Rainbird (199]) has highlighted the power of the actor's subjective 
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perception in prevailing over even the starkest of objective realities. However, this is 
not to say that franchisees' perceptions of autonomy are of necessity subjectively led, 
but to acknowledge that they can be a mctor at play. Franchisees' perceptions here 
certainly accord quite closely with the kind of claims typically made in franchisor 
advertising: .. ... secure your own future .,. JOu will be in control of your own business" 
(Business Franchise Magazine, September, 1994). 
Usually, franchisors use different kinds of power to keep a stable relationship with 
franchisees, because franchisors have more resources and stand in the dominant 
position. In general, results show that a franchisor could increase franchisee 
satisfaction by relying Jess on coercive sources of power. Therefore, the important 
thing is how the channel leader develops a good channel management mechanism that 
will reduce or at least contain the level of vertical conflict, rather than let the conflict 
stay there or even become worse - because the cost of dealing with conflict is far greater 
than the cost of prevention. 
As far as the relationship is concerned, if a good relationship is maintained then the 
coordination in a franchise channel will be better, and conflicts will be minimized. 
Here, the definition of the relationship between franchisor and franchisee as 
interdependent organisations in the process ofmaking a product or service available for 
use or consumption is adopted (Stero, El-Ansary and Brown. 1989). Thus, what is 
important are the nature and extent of the inter-related roles and the allocation of the 
productive value generated by the relationship. The alternative approach has assumed a 
hierarchica~ dependent relationship (lensen and Meckling, 1976; Stem, EI-Ansary and 
Brown, 1989). 
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As to the maintenance of a good relationship, Guiltinan, Rejab and Rodgers (1980) 
suggest that a good relationship is related to the effectiveness of channel 
communications, the degree of uncertainty reduction and the extent of participative 
decision making. Therefore, the complicated relationship between franchisor and 
franchisee requires careful management given the franchisor's interest in protecting his 
trade name and public image, on the one band, and the franchisee's motivation for 
independence, on the other. On the issue offranchisee independence, Felstead (1993, 
pp. 92-129) has constructed an index of contractual control as an aid to analysing and 
understanding the power of the franchisor over the franchisee. Others have considered 
franchisor-franchisee links at a more behavioural level (Achrol, 1996; Dant, Li and 
Wortze~ 1995; Spriggs and Nevin, 1995; Stanworth, 1995). In the past, Ozanne and 
Hunt (1971) in the US, and in the UK, Stanworth (1977, 1984), Stanworth and Curran 
(1999) and Stanworth, Curran, and Hough (1983), showed that, in some respects, 
franchisee' independence is considerably less than that of the conventional independent 
small business owner. For instance, decisions on product content and mix, service 
presentation, and pricing were largely the franchisor's responsibility even if in other 
areas such as operating hours. staffing, and staff wages, the franchisee had considerable 
autonomy. The franchisees' autonomy is however constrained, as the franchisor has an 
interest in closely monitoring the activities of franchised outlets stemming from a desire 
to ensure that standards of service and efficiency are maintained. These interests 
potentially clash with the franchisee's role as a self-employed small businessman with 
its norm of independence and autonomy (Stanworth, 1990). Therefore, it might be 
argued that the franchised enterprise is in reality, simply a managed outlet featuring in 
the corporate marketing strategy of another truly independent business - that of the 
franchisor (Rubin, 1978). According to Baron and Schmidt (1991), franchisees wish to 
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be allowed to run their business, but to have support available when required; to quote: 
"1 don ~ want the franchisor to run the business for me, but 1 do expect 100 per cent 
backing if there is a problem." According to Stanworth, Kaufinann and Purdy (1995), 
people without previous self-employment experience are most strongly attracted to 
franchising by the goal of 'independence'; those currently owing their own business are 
most attracted by the appeal of 'proven business formula'. Thus, franchising appeals in 
different ways to two separate groups of people and franchisees recruitment marketing, 
to be fully effective, needs to take account of this. So, franchisors have to know about 
that the needs from franchisees are varied. Also, Knight (1986) suggests that both 
parties have different expectations of each other. To be a successful franchisee, the 
desire to succeed and, the willingness to work hard are the two most important 
characteristics. As to how to keep a good relationship, he suggests that the recognised 
trademark and operating manuals are the most two important variables affecting 
satisfaction with the relationship. 
Schul, Little and Pride (1985) suggest that channel climate is significantly affected by 
leader consideration and reward orientation. They suggest that overall franchisee 
satisfaction is further intensified when the member perceives a strong association 
between performance and channel-related rewards. Therefore, the franchisor has to 
design a reasonable reward system, which can motivate the franchisee to maximize 
hislher performance. Hence, performance is another criteria for evaluating the 
relationship. This is because performance leads to satisfaction with the franchisor's 
role performance, but not directly (Lewis and Lambert, 1991). They suggest that the 
amount of credit or blame a franchisee attributes to the franchisor for its performance 
appears to moderate the relationship between performance and satisfaction. A 
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franchisee's satisfaction with the franchisor's perfonnance across a wide spectrum of 
services influences the franchisee's overaH satisfaction with the franchisor's 
performance. Therefore, they found that financial dependence and performance are 
detenninants ofa franchisee's satisfaction with the relationship. Rubin (1978) suggests 
that the performance evaluation can be from four perspectives. First, the trademark of 
the franchise and the product sold appear to be valuable. Second, the franchisor often 
gives managerial advise to the franchisee. 1bird, the franchisor often makes capital 
available to the franchisee in some form. either by consigning for a bank loan or by 
actually buying the plant and leasing it to the franchisee. Finally, to the extent that 
franchisees are closer to being employees than entrepreneurs, they may simply lack the 
requisite human capital to open businesses without the substantial assistance of 
franchisors. 
Anand (1987) used the agent/profitability information on attribution formation to test 
the control issue and found that franchisees in the franchisor-initiated profitable 
performance group belieVed their success was due to the franchisor's ability and effort. 
Franchisees in the self-initiated profitable performance group believed their success 
was due to their ability or effort whereas those whose performance was unprofitable felt 
they had not worked hard enough or had not had sufficient ability. Therefore, the 
franchisee's performance is not only related to the franchisor's efforts on promoting the 
brand but is also linked to the franchisee's ability and diligence. In addition, Anand and 
Stem (1985) found that channel members, particularly franchisees, would relinquish 
control over decision making if the franchisee attributes the success of the unit to a 
franchisor. Even though they also suggest channel members should act rationally to 
maximize perfonnance outcomes, channel leaders should not attempt to control 
associates who are performing well on the basis of their own decisions. Therefore, if 
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the franchisor is strong enough, then franchisees are likely to follow the franchisor's 
policy and relinquish some rights in order to get the potential benefits. In other words, 
the relationship is related to the franchisor's ability and the power exerted on the 
franchisee, once the franchisor begins to perform well, franchisees will be more loyal to 
the franchisor's policy and the potential conflict will thus be minimized. 
From the above discussion of relationships and conflicts, we see that leadership plays 
an important role in the interactions between franchisors and franchisees. The 
performance of both parties is another criteria used to evaluate the relationship. Once 
conflict takes place, the franchisor has to use coercive and non-coercive actions to 
intervene for the protection of the franchisor's brand. Therefore, based on self-interest, 
franchisors have to design a good system of rewards to maximize the franchisee's 
performance and minimize the potential conflict. 
3.3.2 The Origin of Conflict 
As far as the origin of conflict is concerned, it always arises from disagreement between 
both parties. In the franchise channel of distribution, conflict between channel 
members A and B is inevitable when both of them are functionally independent (Stern 
and Gorman, 1969, Stem and Heskett, 1969). Also, there is a high degree offunctional 
interdependence between the franchisor and franchisee. Therefore, how to coordinate 
independence and interdependence between franchisors and franchisees is important to 
organisational development. In general, with this high degree of functional 
interdependence, the potential for conflict is high. As far as conflict is concerned, it 
tends to arise over the policies and procedures used to achieve individual channel 
members' goals rather than the incompatible goals themselves (Stern and Gorman, 
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1969). The policies and procedures of one channel member may be obstacles for the 
other channel members as they attempt to achieve their own goals and objectives. 
All of these issues differ in their ability to impede or facilitate goal attainment; that is, 
conflict issues may vary according to their relative importance or relative stakes 
(Thomas, 1976). Therefore, both parties come together for the purpose of producing a 
benefit, which they believe would not be attainable, in total or in scope, if not for the 
alliance (Rubin, 1978). Therefore, understanding the goals of the franchisee allows a 
greater understanding of their perceptions of any conflict in the relationship (Achrol 
and Etzel, 1990). 
Achrol and Etzel (1990) also suggest that the mutual franchisee-franchisor goals should 
include concepts of co-operation, communication, co-ordination and commitment. The 
dynamic perception of conflict between the franchisee and franchisor by either party 
invariably includes goal congruency, and so if the franchisee's goals for the relationship 
are not being met there is a greater probability that conflict will become manifest as 
dissatisfaction (Schul, 1987). Take location for example; Current and Storbeck (1994), 
Bush, Tatham and Hair (1976) suggest that the objective of the franchisor is to locate 
outlets so as to maximize total market share and/or the total number of outlets in such a 
way that each individual franchise has sufficient demand to attain normal profit. The 
objective of the individual franchisee, on the other hand, is to locate its particular outlet 
so as to maximize its individual market share. This means that market penetration goals 
and location goals of the members of the franchising system do not coincide easily 
(Zeller, Achabal and Bro~ 1980; Kaufinan and Rangan, 1990). Each member would 
like to maximize its revenue. Therefore, these different objectives might lead to 
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conflict. 
AchroI and Etzel (1990) use four goals to measure the relationship with the franchisor. 
The theoretical underpinning for these goals comes from Parson's (1959) functional 
imperatives. Parson's functional imperatives have been used by Kumar, Stem and 
AchroI (1992), and Quinn and Rohrbaugh (1983) for goal definition in marketing 
channels. Parson (1959) argues that a successful organisation must achieve four 
functional imperatives: goal attainment, integration, adaptation and pattern 
maintenance. These four functional imperatives have been empirically tested and 
integrated into the literature vis-a-vis a rational system model, an open system mode~ a 
behavioural system model, and an internal process model (Kumar, Stem and Achrol, 
1992; Quinn and Rohrbaugh, 1983). As for the franchisor, his concern is to maximize 
total system sales in an effort to maximize royalty receipts (Mittelstaedt and Stassen, 
1991). 
In a word, both parties have different goals and in these circumstances, how they 
communicate with each other in order to agree the same organisational goals, is 
important. If any party ignores communication, then conflict will take place. During 
the conflict, several situations may develop. Therefore, the following section will 
discuss the tensions in different stages of conflict. 
3.3.3 The Stages of Conflkt 
The process of conflict, usually initiates from psychological dissatisfaction then moves 
to behavioural conflict. Therefore, conflicts can range from "tongue-in cheelC' 
comments to verbal abuse or even physical violence (pondy, 1967; Thomas, 1976). 
Much of the previous research in the distribution channels area has taken the process 
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approach (Cadotte and Stern, 1979; Rosenberg, 1971, 1974; Rosenberg and Stern, 1970, 
Stem and Gorman, 1969; Assail, 1968; Foster and Shuptrine, 1973; Kelly and Peters, 
1977; Brown and Frizzier, 1978). Each conflict episode is particularly shaped by the 
results of the previous episode and in tum lays the groundwork for subsequent episodes 
(Cadotte and Stern, 1979). In other words, conflict is progressed step by step and the 
treatment of each step wiIl influence the following step. A problem with this approach 
is that separating the various stages of the process from each other is a very difficult 
task (Schmidt and Kochan, 1972). Therefore, some researchers focus on the cross 
analysis of different stages (Hunger and Stern, 1976; Etgar, 1977). 
Based on the literature, the author introduces two approaches from Thomas and from 
Pondy. Thomas (1976) specifies that the stage of conflict could be progressed in a 
sequence of frustration-conceptualisation-behaviour-outcome, while Pondy (1967) 
classifies conflict into five stages: 
1. Latent conflict: underlying sources of conflict; 
2. Perceived conflict: perception only, when no conditions of latent conflict exist; 
3. Felt contlict: tension, anxiety, disaffection in addition to the perception; 
4. Manifest conflict: behaviour which blocks another's goal achievement; 
5. Conflict aftennath: post-conflict conduct, either resolution or suppression. 
From Pondy's approach, we can see that this is in line with what was specified by 
Thomas. Both approaches have arisen from some dissatisfaction in the mind of an 
agent, which then manifests itself in actions based on emotion or behaviour. No matter 
what the result, the future relationship between both parties will be influenced. 
Therefore, in the relationship between a franchisor and franchisee, each stage has the 
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potential to occur and can last for differing periods of time. During the conflict, how 
the franchisor exerts its power and leadership will in turn influence the development of 
the conflict. Once the franchisee's goals for the relationship are not being met, there is 
a heightened probability that conflict will become manifest as dissatisfaction (Schul, 
1987). 
To swn up, conflict is inevitable although not all conflicts are serious, therefore, 
conflict can be both a positive and negative force (pondy, 1967). However, it is clear 
that the relationship will only be maintained if the value of the transactions exceeds the 
cost of completing them (Williamson, 1991). If this is not the case, then the positive 
aspects of conflict will disappear and 'the potential for conflict in the 
franchisor-franchisee relationship will be manifest as franchisee dissatisfaction', 
(Spinelli and Birley, 1996, p.336). In other words, if either party feels that he gets hurt 
from the conflict and the cost is greater than any benefit that he receives, then the 
relationship will be terminated. As conflicts take place, March and Simon (1958) 
defined four general types of conflict resolution strategies in the franchising channel: 
'problem solving', 'persuasion', 'bargaining' and 'politics'. Also, Zonober (1990) lists 
seven potentially positive results of conflicts: 'stimulating problem solving', 'causing 
parties to the inter-organisational relationship to unite around an issue', 'uncovering 
and defining problems', 'creating new learning opportunities', 'forcing the prioritising 
of opportunities', 'preventing escalation of unaddressed conflict' and 'increasing 
mutual understanding'. From the above analysis, we can see that conflict is not always 
bad; it depends on how both parties perceive and deal with conflict. A good 
relationship is usually built on the trust of both parties. 
The next section will introduce the framework ofrelational exchange theory to provide 
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a perspective on the topic of relationship and conflict. Relational exchange theory is 
used for the analysis of establishing and continuing a relationship with fundamental 
areas of conflict. 
3.3.4 Relational Excbange Theory 
Research in marketing channels has increasingly been devoted to examining the nature 
of relationships among member firms. Transaction cost analysis and relational 
exchange theory are the dominant theoretical perspectives in these investigations. The 
normative goal of both perspectives is to minimize the costs of exchange. Macneil 
(1974, 1978, 1980, 1985) is the principal proponent of relational exchange theory, 
which proposes that the norms governing commercial exchange behaviour in discreet 
transactions are markedly different from those in relational exchange, which involves 
long term, continuous, and complex relationships where individual transactions are of 
low importance. When parties in a cormnercial exchange become involved in a conflict 
episode, it might be expected that the types of norms that govern their relationship 
would affect their characterization of each other's conflict behaviour. Generally, 
relational exchange is opposite to discrete exchange. It recognizes that during 
transactions, aside from the price factor, there are also emotional exchanges. Further, 
each transaction is closely linked with the next transaction; therefore, economic and 
non-economic satisfuction can be achieved by the transaction. 
In relational exchange theory. channel fIrms all have characteristics such as role 
integrity, mutuality, solidarity, flexibility, bilateral information exchange, harmonious 
conflict resolution, and a long-tenn orientation (Dwyer and Oh, 1987; Ganesan, 1994; 
Kaufmann and Dant, 1992; Kaufinann and Stern, 1988; Macneil, 1980). Kaufmann and 
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Stem (1988) used relational exchange theory to assess the attitude of parties to 
transactions between entities, when operational conflict exists in the exchange. In the 
following Table 3.3, they propose the differences found in exchange norm 
characteristics along a discrete/relational exchange continuum. 
Table 3.3 Representative Differences of Exchange Norm Characteristics Along 
DiscretelRelational Continuum 
Solidarih' Ro Ie Integrity Mutuality 
Enforcement of the Maintenance of Precise 
terms of the unidimensional prespecification of 
individual roles of buyer and terms of exchange, 
Discrete transacting transaction or seller and monitoring on 
contract basis of each 
individual 
transaction 
Preservation of the Maintenance of Imprecise 
exchange complex prespecification of 
relationship itself multi-dimensional terms of exchange, 
Relational Exchange roles fonning a 
and monitoring on 
network of basis of long term 
relationships but indefinite 
length of 
relationship 
Source: Kaufinann and Stem (1988) 
From the above table, we can easily distinguish the difference between discrete 
transitioning and relational exchange behaviour from the perspectives of solidarity, role 
integrity and mutuality. We can say that relational exchange is indicative of those 
channels in which the norms of relationship preservation, role integrity, and 
harmonisation of conflict are intensified (Macneil, 1980). These shared norms are 
characteristics of relational exchange. Role integrity considers channel members' 
expectations for needed future roles and suggests that roles expand to Hcover a 
multitude of issues not directly related to any particular transaction" (Kaufmann and 
Stern, 1988). This contractual norm ensures the stability necessary for exchange 
relationships to deepen (Dant and Schul, 1992; Kaufinann and Dant, 1992). The 
98 
harmonisation of relational conflict depends on the extent to which channel members 
achieve a mutually satisfying resolution of their conflicts (Macneil, 1980). Therefore, 
we view the extent of relational exchange in a marketing channel as the degree to which 
the norms of role integrity, preservation of the relationship, and harmonisation of 
relational conflict characterize that channel. 
In franchising, the mutuality of the exchange does not mean that it is an exchange 
between equals. Instead, the reliance relationship created by the franchisor's relative 
superiority and the franchisee's relative inexperience is an essential component of the 
typical franchise exchange (Hadfield, 1991). Therefore, this kind of exchange in the 
franchise relationship is usually unequal. Kaufinann and Stern (1988) especially note 
franchising as the prototype relational exchange. In franchising, the alliance between 
franchisee and franchisor is established and maintained to promote the trademark 
because the trademark embodies commercial value for both parties to the licence 
agreement. If the franchisee perceives the relationship as inadequate and therefore the 
value of the trademark as not having long-temt potential to fulfil their return 
requirements, then the franchisee, or any party to a transaction, will have a short-term 
view of the relationship or move toward a discrete transaction relationship, or seek to 
end the relationship. (Kaufmann and Stern, 1988; Pondy and Huff, 1985; Macneil, 
1978). As franchising is a relationship normally characterized by a higher relational 
norm of solidarity, where the parties are likely to develop a strong reputation for trust, 
therefore, either party may discount observed behaviour to keep the relationship 
(Spinelli and Birley, 1996). 
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Relational exchange theory gives a theoretical measure of the strength of the 
relationship. The relationship between franchisor and franchisee is a special one 
because it lies in the intennediate range between employment and independent 
contracting. Both parties could be expected to work towards developing high relational 
norms of solidarity and mutuality, with strong role integrity to benefit each other. If 
they are just co-operating with each other within the tolerance zone, then the trademark 
would be more valuable and the relationship would be longer. 
Summarising the above understanding of management issues in relationships and 
conflict, it is clear that the relationship between franchisor and franchisee is based on 
the exchange behaviour between trade name and royalty. Once one party is dissatisfied 
with the other party's behaviour, then conflicts arise. However, not all conflicts will 
destroy the relationship, if both parties can have a good communication mechanism, 
then the relationship will be closer. Otherwise, the relationship will no longer exist. 
3.4 Summary 
In this chapter, management issues have been discussed from various perspectives. In 
these discussions, it is obvious why franchising is so attractive to both franchisors and 
franchisees. The beginning of the chapter, the motivations for franchising, which 
include agency theory, resource constraint and transaction cost analysis perspectives, 
were examined. From these approaches, we understand the importance of the franchise 
contract and potential problems between the two parties. Regarding decision maker 
characteristics, entrepreneurship was discussed and compared with respect to the 
characteristics of franchisors and franchisees. Most researchers agree that franchisors 
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are entrepreneurs, but for franchisees, the arguments are diverse. Finally, as far as 
relationships and conflict are concerned, conflicts arise from the misuse of power and 
performance evaluation. Therefore, the franchisor has to develop a sound system of 
rewards to motivate franchisees and use an appropriate level of control to solve 
potential problems between both parties. This is because conflicts directly influence 
the relationship, once the relationship bas deteriorated, then the value of the trademark 
decreases. As a resu~ how to minimize the cost of exchange behaviour is an important 
issue for franchising. The motivations for co-operation are not only important but so is 
the maintenance of the relationship. If there is a good link between motivational and 
relational maintenance, then a good franchise system should develop. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: RETAIL FRANCHISING IN TAIWAN 
4.0 Introduction 
In the previous chapters, existing research about international retailing, franchising, 
and management issues in franchising were explored. In this chapter, relative issues 
about franchising in Taiwan will be discussed. Taiwan is a sman island of 36,000 
square kilometers with a population of 23 million. However, as far as its economic 
power, location and culture are conceIlled, its powers are greater than its geographical 
scale. For example, Taiwan has the 3rd highest foreign currency reserves and its GDP 
already totals $258 billion, making Taiwan the world's 13 th largest economy. In 
addition, it is also the world's 14th largest tradIDg country (Export: 14th, Import: 15th) 
and according to the World Economic Forum (WEF) in 2002/03, Taiwan was ranked as 
3rdout of the 80 selected countries in the global growth competitiveness ranking (see 
Appendix 3). As Taiwan was governed by Japan, its people are familiar with the 
Japanese culture and language, although Taiwan has the same culture as Mainland 
China. The implication of this is that the Taiwanese can potentially communicate with 
2.2 hundred billion people in the world (Chinese: 1.3 hWldred billion, English: 0.7 
hundred billion and Japanese: 0.13 hundred billion). In addition, since China and 
Taiwan joined the WTO (World Trade Organisation) at the beginning of 2002, the 
Chinese market has attracted the attention of many foreign companies. Taiwan has 
been getting used to Western cultural values (such as creation) but still keeps the sense 
of Chinese culture (such as the virtue of hard working). Therefore, as foreign 
companies enter the Chinese market, they may practice :first in Taiwan or hire 
Taiwanese to manage the nmket. This is an opportunity for the Taiwanese. In this 
chapter, general issues on retailing in Taiwan will be introduced, and then the focus will 
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be placed upon franchise chains especially in the convenience store and estate agency 
industries, which will form the focus of this study. Finally, the future development of 
retailing in Taiwan will be detailed. 
4.1 Innovations in the Retail Market in Taiwan (1960s-2000s) 
GeneralJy speaking, commerce in Taiwan has been deeply affected by the forces of 
foreign and local development. In the past, there were three stages for the 
internationalisation of Taiwanese business, which were based on interactions with 
foreign countries. According to Shih (1999), they are the Ching Dynasty (15tb 
century-1895), the Japanese colony (1895-1945) and the After War period 
(l945-present). The common points were: (1) an exporting orientation, (2) an input of 
foreign capital, (3) low labour costs, (4) single industry (product), (5) exclusive 
exploration and (6) a positive trading balance. The details for each period on criteria of 
the social structure, GNP, consumption behaviour, business policy, distribution trends 
and channels are listed in Table 4.1. 
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Period GNP Consumption Business Distribution Trends Distribution Time Social Structure (USS) Behaviour Policy Channels 
Pirates; Basic Private trading Taiwan Harbour 
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Mercantilism Transit trade I Holland (1624-1662) Basic and plunder economics 16005 Colony of Spain pbysiological Transit trade 
(1626-) 642) needs Mercantilism 
and plunder 
Colony of Chen economics 
Dynasty Multilateral trade 
(I 662-1683) Economics of 
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Ching Dynasty 
(1683-1895), 
Agriculture 
1700s -1 cultivation; 
800s Political and 
economic centers 
move toward the 
north 
Colony of Japan 
(1895-1945) The 
foundation of 
modernisation 
1900s 
The KMT party 
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Taiwan by the 
Communist; 
China was then 
1950s divided two parts; 
In dustrialisation; 
Aid from US 
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High quality Trading 
with a rational business 
price 
Harbor trading Trading agents; 
with mainland Different channel 
China; members in 
Open the market to transactions 
UK and France 
The invasion 
of Japanese 
consumption 
style and the 
emergence of 
urbanisation 
The invasion 
of Chinese 
consumption 
style 
The The basic 
economics of distribution 
Capitalism; channel was built, 
Supply the such as railway 
raw materials Mass output of 
to its home agricultural 
country products 
Develop and 
emphasize 
industries; 
ignore the 
development 
of business 
Basic business 
laws were 
constituted 
The retail outlets 
were run by the 
army 
The first railway; 
Licensing system 
(wine, cigar, and 
salt etc,) 
Traditional open 
market, Army 
retail outlets; 
Street vendors; 
Night markets 
Agricultural 
society 
The development 
t--__ E=OL-----+---~~----:~-IKeep price Variety and stable and Encourage Department store 
1960s 
1970s 
1980s 
1990s 
was directed by 
theKMT 
Industrial society; 
The emergence of 
middle class 
Liberalisation of 
economy; 
Privatisation; 
Internationalisati 
on 
Society of 
servicing; 
Democracy of 
politics; 
Variety of values; 
Society of the old 
1,000 
3,000 
6,000 
better quality take care of exporting; 
the groups Import 
who work for international 
government brands; 
The emergence of 
new business 
types; 
TV appears (1962) 
Ten national Supermarket Wider and 
quicker choice 
Quick and 
convenience 
constructions; 
The operations of 
freeway (1987); 
New business 
block appear 
Liheralisation The variety of 
of distribution business types; 
policy; Vigorous 
Import competition of 
foreign chain stores; 
capital, The foundation of 
technology consumer 
and protection 
management association (1980); 
skills The legislation of 
labour law (I 985) 
Low price The Green mru:keting; 
pursuing, d' t' The adoption of 
. . mo ernlsa Ion h' h t h (POS personahsatlon f b . Ig - ec , 
Convenience store; 
Fast-food chain; 
Clothing chain; 
Household electric 
appliances chain; 
Service chain 
Distribution center; 
Wholesalers; 
Direct-marketing; 
Pharmacy chain o .us~ness EOS, QR), 
10,000 pohcy, Fair transaction 
The law (1992)' mst~l.ment of Fair of con~umer 
retalItng park protection (1994) 
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Information Combine The make-up of Multi-function 
society; shopping with store image; shopping center; The economic leisure Internationalisation DIY shops; 2000s integration of 15,000 together and ofretaiJing The reorganisation Taiwan and China satisfY of urban isation; 
personal Internationalisation 
achievement of retail iJ!g 
Source: Shih (1999) 
From the above table, we can see that consumption behaviour; business policy, 
distribution trends and distribution channels were deeply affected by the social 
structure and the growth of GNP. Basically, this table follows Maslow's hierarchy of 
needs, in other words, with improvements in life, people started to require convenience, 
safety and fun from the process of shopping especially in recent years. 
Table 4.2 details the relationship between GNP and the development of retailing in the 
Taiwanese market. 
Table 4.2. The Relationshij) between GN P d h D an t e eveopment 0 fR t T e almg 
GNP (US$) Consumption Characteristics Retail Operations 
$1000 Variety and better quality Department store 
$3000 Wider and quicker choice Supermarket 
$6000 Quick and convenience Convenience store 
$10,000 Low price pursuing, 
Warehousing store 
personalisation 
$12,000 Multi-functional shopping 
Shopping mall 
environment 
Combine shopping with DIY (Do It Yourself) 
$15,000 leisure together and satisfY 
personal achievement 
Source: Tatwan Department of Commerce (2000) 
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The above table implies that shopping behaviour and retail innovation have changed 
progressively. When the GNP was under $1 ,000, street vendors and traditional grocery 
stores played the main roles in the distribution system. In 1976, as the GNP grew to 
over $1,000, people started to care about quality, hence, department stores evolved. 
This period lasted until around 1986 when, as the GNP was over $3,000, customers' 
needs for a wider choice and quicker service induced the advent of the supermarket. 
The next stage was the appearance of convenience stores as GNP extended to $4000 in 
1989. With the rapid development of society, people started to feel the inconvenience 
of traffic jams, parking problems and hence the shopping mall (like Makro) appeared in 
1989. Finally, in 1995, the DIY market was explored by the import of the UK retailer· 
B&Q. From the above phenomenon, the author suggests that shopping behaviour is 
related to economic growth and the hierarchy of needs. In addition, based on the 
developed countries' experience, we can say that the life cycle of retail innovations was 
applied to the Taiwanese market based on a combination of internationalisation and 
localisation. Before the 19705, innovation came from a kind of inward 
internationalisation; this meant that most of the know-how was learned from the 
Western industrialized countries. Since the 1980s, localisation and adaptation have 
progressed to meet local needs. Finally, since the 1990s, outward intemationalisation 
has occurred, starting with the neighbouring countries with geographical and/or 
cultural proximity, such as China and Southeast Asia countries. 
As far as the retail format is concerned, aside from a widening of the variety of products 
and services~ another change has been in the innovation of operational issues. In the 
past, the typical retail markets were traditional open markets, grocery stores, hardware 
stores and clothing shops. All of them were run as family businesses on a small scale. 
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The only difference among them was in product line. However, as the market opened 
up, with more and more stimuli, local retailers gained know-how and brought various 
new store formats to the market. Figure 4.1 shows the innovation of the retail format in 
Taiwan from the perspectives of wholesaling and retailing. 
Figure 4.1 The Innovation of the Retail Format in Taiwan 
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Source: Taiwan Department of Commerce (2000) 
From the above figure, we can see when different retail formats first appeared in 
Taiwan. Before the 1960s, government policy was focused on the development of 
manufacturing and trading rather than commerce. However, with the natural 
interactions between supply and demand, commerce developed under the market 
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mechanism. Most businesses in Taiwan are traditionally small scale. According to a 
report of the Commerce Department in 1994, 130,000 businesses (including retailing) 
were run by one person, with annual sales of under NT$2 million dollars accounting 30 
percent of all businesses, but just 4 percent of sales. This means that most businesses 
were typically run on a small scale (limited capital, low efficiency and family owned). 
According to the Economist (1998): the Taiwanese have ajoke that if you throw a stone 
in the streets of Taipei. you are likely to hit the chairman of a board. With one company 
for every 18 people in Taiwan (the highest density in the world), it could almost be true. 
The Chinese prefer not to work for other people - "better the head of a chicken than the 
tail of an ox," according to an old Chinese saying - and feel most comfortable in a 
company financed and run by their own family. Small to medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs) make up 98.5% of Taiwan's companies, 75-80% of all employment and 47% 
of the total economy. Even government economists refer to corporate Taiwan as an 
"army of ants". From this description, we can see that SMEs are very popular in 
Taiwan and therefore, it is difficuh to find large Taiwanese enterprises such as those 
found in South Korea or Japan. This also demonstrates that the Taiwanese prefer to be 
bosses. In recent years, with the development of the economy and the changes in 
customers' shopping behaviour, commerce has tended to develop through large scale, 
chain-formatted, and professionally run organisations. From Figure 4.1 above, we can 
see that this tendency is still ongoing. Based on the typical characteristics of the 
Taiwanese, chain stores provide opportunities for them. The prevalence of store chain 
(whether regular chains or franchise) is also related to customers' shopping preferences 
for well-known brands and social identity. Table 4.3 and Table 4.4 show a significant 
growth of chains in the Taiwanese market. 
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Table 4.3 The Growth of Chain Stores 
Year/ltem No. of Business No. of Chain No. of Chain Store 
Types Systems Outlets 
1990 14 26 ~-
"" "- 895 
1994 60 299/ 15,899 
1995 92 375 20,486 
1996 122 458 23,786 
1997 146 675 34,177 
1998 175 831 45,034 
1999 196 999 56,677 
2000 226 1126 64,066 
1990/2000 growth 1614% 4330% 7135% 
. Source: T81W3Il Chain Store Almanac (2000) 
Table 4.4 The Percentage of Chain Stores in the Channels of Distribution 
All the No. of All the 
No. Store Percentage Percentage 
outlets of the of the 
Distribution Store Chain Chain Chain 
Channels Outlets Stores Store Store Sales 
Sales (A) (B) Sales(C) (D) (DIB) (CIA) 
32,000 12,000 
1998 hundred .. 450,000 hundred .. 45,000 10% 38% 
millions millions 
Source: Taiwan Chain Store Almanac (1999) 
According to these two tables, it is very obvious that the role of store chains is growing 
in terms of both the number of store outlets and store sales. We can say that store chain 
development is still the trend and is likely to continue into the future; therefore, in the 
following section. chain stores will be highlighted due to their importance. 
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4.2 The Development of Chain Stores in Taiwan 
According to Taiwan Chain Store Almanac (1993), the origin of the chain store can be 
traced back to 1956. Table 4.5 illustrates four stages in the development of chain stores 
in Taiwan. 
I . T· Table 4.5 Stages of Chain Store Deve opment m 81wan 
Stage Time Period 
Development Stage Characteristics Typical Chains 
Stage 
1. Chain store appears Ten-Ren Tea 
2. Most of the chain (1953), 
stores are National 
1 Before 1979 Local learning stage 
company-owned Electronics 
outlets (1974). 
3. Low expansion spee d Treasure Island 
4. Localisation Clock and 
Watch (1956) 
1. Rapid growth of 7-ELEVEN 
chain store (1979). 
2. President Company President 
Inward import 7-ELEVEN Bread (1980). 
2 1980-1983 Internationalisation from US 31 Ice Cream 
stage 3. Start to import the (1983). Sin-Yi 
know how of House (1981) 
international chain 
store 
1. McDonald's is MacDonald's 
imported to Taiwan (1984), 
and cause a wave of Kentucky 
inward Fried Chicken 
internationalisation (1985), Pizza 
High-degree 
of chain store Hut (1986), 
2. 7-ELEVEN started to Watson's 
3 1984-1990 development of make profit in 1986 (1987), Makro 
business type stage and brought about (1989) 
the prevalence of 
CVS. 
3. Different kind of 
operational types 
appear 
1. The establishment of Taiwan Chain 
Taiwan Chain Store Store 
Association Association 
Integration and 2. Chain store was (1991) 
4 After 1991 
outward regulated by the law 
intemationalisation of Fair-transaction 
stage 3. Domestic chains 
started to do outward 
internationalisation 
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Source: Taiwan Department of Commerce, 2000 
In the very beginning, the famous chain stores included Ten-Ren Tea, National 
Electronics, Treasure Island Clock and Watch. All of them were run in the format ofa 
regular chain. Hence, their expansion speed was not fast. In 1961, the first franchise 
chain, Zheng-Zhang Laundry Chain, appeared. It adopted a plural system combining a 
regular chain (RC) with a franchise chain (Fe). Through this plural system, it 
experienced rapid growth - over one hundred outlets were set up within 2 years. Hence, 
it can be considered to be the forerunner offranchise chain development in Taiwan. 
All of the above statements belong to the first stage (before 1979), which can be seen as 
a local learning stage during which chain stores started to appear in the market. In the 
second stage (1980-1983), typically businesses like 7-ELEVEN were imported from 
the US first appearing in 1979. In other words, the inward intemationalisation of 
retailing had commenced. After that, the market stepped into another stage, from 1984 
to 1990, when international brands, like McDonald's, KFC, Pizza Hut, Watson, and 
Makro started to operate in the retail market. Meanwhile, an important event was that 
7-ELEVEN started to make a profit after seven years of financial deficits. As 
7-ELEVEN started to make a profit, other competitors joined the market operating 
various business formats, such as RC (Regular Chain), FC (Franchise Chain) and VC 
(Voluntary Chain). However, they could not compete with 7-ELEVEN who had 
benefited from past experiences. 
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In the retail market, the most popular business formats are still based on the regular 
chain (RC) and the franchise chain (FC). Generally speaking, the regular chain is an 
industry of 'management' because of centralisation. Its advantage is in policy 
execution, in other words, every retail outlet looks the same, and you should get the 
same service wherever you go. However, its disadvantage is in speed of response and 
lack of efficiency. The franchise chains advantages are the regular chain's 
disadvantages, especially in terms of efficiency such as the speed of market responses. 
In contrast, its disadvantage is mainly in the consistency of service quality. Hence, we 
can say that franchise chain is a kind of 'thought' industry. Without the same objective 
for all franchise chain members, it is difficult to compete with the regular chain. 
Therefore, communication would seem to be more important in the franchise 
organisations. 
The final stage is from 199 I tm now. Many businesses have started to undertake 
vertical or horizontal integration to create synergy. Another important characteristic is 
that some retail chains have started outward internationalisation. For example, the 
Taiwanese 7-ELEVEN bought up a 51% share of the Philippines 7-ELEVEN in 2000 
and was selected as a joint venture partner with China and Japan for entry into Beijing 
in 2002. 
The Chain Store Association was born in 1987; the name then was the 'Jiu-Ru Club', 
made up of9 chains and this was the forerunner of the Taiwan Chain Store Association 
(TCSA). Four years later in 1991, the formal association, TCSA, was set up with 54 
member companies. The definition given by the Association for a chain store is that 
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there must be at least 7 retail outlets with the same brand name and its previous annual 
sales must have reached $NT 70 million dollars (about £1.4 million). In 2000, 
reflecting innovation in the retail environment, the TCSA moved into another stage and 
changed its name to the Taiwan Chain Stores and Franchise Association (TCFA). 
Currently, its membership stands at over 200 enterprises, with 19,724 store outlets, 
170,908 employees and $NT6,221 hundred million annual output value. The renaming 
of the association suggests that the franchise chain has become more important in the 
retail market. Hence, the following section will focus on franchise chains in the 
Taiwanese market. 
4.3 The Development of Franchise Chains in Taiwan 
Taiwan has changed from a manufacturing to a service orientated society. Hence, the 
industrial characteristics are not only focused on high technology but also high touch. 
The retail franchise chain is a kind of organisation combining both features. As 
mentioned before, the first franchise organisation was set up in 1961. Since then this 
kind of organisational form has been growing very quickly and has spread into different 
business sectors since the 1980s. The main reason is the pressure of brand advantages 
created by RC retailers. In order to compete with these regular chains, individual shops 
looked for some kind of organisation similar to RC system. Under this circumstance, a 
flexible system, the franchise chain, started to attract their attention. Franchise 
organisations were flexible and most of them possessed know-how from the 
industrialised countries. Hence, in order to compete with the large regular chains, many 
small businesses chose franchise chains to achieve their business objectives. By 2000, 
the numbers offranchise organisations had reached 343 businesses. 
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As discussed in the literature review, the franchise relationship is based on a contract, 
involving the exchange of trademarks and royalties between franchisors and 
franchisees. However, as the contract is usually beneficial to franchisors, the originaJ 
expectation of franchisees to be 'their own bosses' is often in conflict with the 
contractual regulations. This leads to dissatisfaction and conflicts can arise between 
franchisors and franchisees. One reason could be explained by Maslow's hierarchy of 
needs, when the Taiwanese annual GNP grew to ten thousand dollars, motivations of 
self-realisation and autonomy, became important. In other words, over and above the 
physiological needs, other needs became important. Hence, before becoming partners 
with each other, both parties must be clear about lines of authority and responsibility. 
Once the relationship has been formed, communication will be the most important 
factor of all in maintaining the relationship. The ideal situation is that under the 
principle of self-interest, both parties can maximize their efforts with the same 
organisational objectives. In the following section, the two industries forming the basis 
of the study will be introdu~ the first one is the convenience store (CVS) typifying 
the retail industry and the other is the estate agency (EA) typifying the service industry. 
4.3.1 The CODvenience Store (CVS) Industry 
In the Taiwanese franchise market, the CVS could be considered the most outstanding 
and successful industry in terms of the number of outlets and innovations. This is 
because, aside :from the daily necessities, they always create new needs for customers. 
They are not just like traditional grocery stores because they have positioned 
themselves as everyone's good neighbour. The president of7-ELEVEN, Mr. C.J. Hsu 
said, 
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"as long as you keep your customers in mind, there will always be something that 
needs to be improved If we work hard and stick to our belief in having the spirit of 
a small enterprise and the strength of a big enterprise, we can serve our valued 
customers and offer more comprehensive services in the near future. " 
Nowadays, many value-added services are offered in the CVS like photocopying, 
mobile phone recharging, catalogue shopping, internet shopping, coupon shopping, 
facsimile transm.issio~ local and international parcel delivery, film development, 
Duskin rental service (home cleaning), bill and fine payment, free calls for ringing up 
radio taxi firms and so on. The main function of the CVS is to satisfy customers' 
instant needs rather than that of the supermarket whose function is to satisfY customers' 
daily needs. In other words, you can 'get what you forgot' in the convenience store. 
The Japanese MeR (Manufactual Convenience Store Research) defmes the CVS as 
having the following characteristics: 
(1) Operating space: between 720 and 2520 square feet. 
(2) Structure of products: food lines must be over 50% of the total and must be 
convenience food Non-food items must be daily necessaries. In addition, 
service items should be provided, such as phone card and stamps. 
(3) Product lines: any product line must be not over 50% of the store sales. 
Otherwise, it should be called specialty store. 
(4) Operating hours: it should open long hours or 24 hours. 
(5) Selling style: most of the shop should be self-service. 
(6) Staff Attitude: considerate, cheerful service, and interactions with customers. 
(7) Management belief: willing to invest to improve store efficiency, including the 
update of equipment, customer research, operational improvement and POS 
(Point ofSaIes). 
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From the above characteristics, we can suggest that CVS has some core features, such 
as the convenience of distance, time, commodity, store decoration, and efficiency. 
With 24-hour operation, it not only satisfies daily needs but also creates fashion trends. 
Hence, its target customers' ages are between 10 and 30. Take 7-ELEVEN for example; 
its policy is to create a shopping environment of QSCV (Quality, Service, Cleanliness 
and Value). Under this guideline, not only has the retail environment been improving 
but also customers' needs are satisfied. 
The development ofthe Taiwanese convenience store can be traced back to 1979, when 
7-ELEVEN was imported from the US. The concept has now been in Taiwan for over 
20 years and the market has reached a highly competitive stage. By 1992, the average 
trading distance between stores was just 0.55 square kilometres; this is similar to the 
Japanese situation, where there is an average distance of 0.6 square kilometres between 
each shop. Because of the high density ofpopulation, the development of big stores is 
restricted, so, small stores will be the mainstream for future development. Nowadays, 
the total number of24-hour CVS in Taiwan is over 6,000, and the competition among 
brands seems more intensive. The trend is emerging too for most convenience chains to 
move from a purely regular chain to a franchise chain or a plural system. Franchisors 
can take advantage of franchising to minimize their costs and maximize their efficiency. 
In the following section, the four franchise chains, which were interviewed as part of 
this study, will be introduced to provide an understanding of their business background 
and historical development. 
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Generally speaking, there are two franchise packages in the CVS industry with the 
difference being in the ownership of the store outlets. In some franchise chains, the 
store outlets are the franchisees' property (FCl) whereas for others the outlets belong 
the to franchisor (FC2). The sharing percentage of sales for FCl is higher than for Fe2. 
Today, most franchisors adopt a plural system, with the coexistence of store operation 
as a regular chain and as a franchise chain format. In other words, you can see three 
different kinds of ownerships within one brand, company ownership (Re), FCI and 
Fe2. During the interviews, with the interviewees' permission, the author uses the 
brand names directly to introduce their business backgrounds. 
• 7-ELEVEN 
The 7-ELEVEN convenience store concept was created in 1927 in US, and at that time 
operated mainly as an ice, milk, and eggs retailer. By 1946, the company introduced a 
new convenience service that involved prolonging the opening time from 7 a.m to 11 
p.rn. This was how the Jegendary trade name came about. In 1979, 7-ELEVEN was 
imported by the biggest food company in Taiwan - the President Enterprise. In the 
initial stage, owing to a poor positioning strategy, it was in financial deficit for 7 years 
until 1986, when the business started to make profits as the number of store outlets 
reached the 100s. 
There were also some other important issues for the business in Taiwan. For example, 
in 1983, 7-ELEVEN Taiwan started to open for 24 hours. In 1989, 7-ELEVEN Taiwan 
became the 3rd largest chain system of 7-ELEVEN in the world, and 7-ELEVEN 
Taiwan started to franchise its business beyond the master franchise. As the franchise 
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system started to run, an EOS (Electronic Ordering System) was operated online at the 
same time. In 1995, a POS system was also implemented to improve operational 
efficiency. Later in 1999, the 2000th outlet was set up and the company was awarded 
ISO 9002 certification in 2000. Because of the reliable management strength and 
remarkable performance of 7-ELEVEN Taiwan, CEO Jim Keyes decided to sign a 
perpetual license contract with Chairman, C. Y. Kao, in the presence of the press on 
April 20, 2000. With this rare contract signing, the development of 7-ELEVEN in 
Taiwan was further secured. In the same year, 7-ELEVEN Taiwan singed a contract 
with the Philippine 7-ELEVEN and therefore, its operations started to expand into the 
international market. Later in 2002, the company landed in Beijing using a joint 
venture with China and Japan. At the time of completing the interviews in 2001, the 
number of store outlets in Taiwan had reached 2,854. 
From the interviews, information on internationalisation and localisation was gained. 
The reason for inward internationalisation was that it was easier to get successful 
operating know-how from industrialized countries. But in the beginning, the original 
concept failed because localisation was not camed out at the same time. For example, 
tealeaf eggs are sold in the store, which was thought impossible by the US franchisor. 
Now, based on local consumption habits, most of the experiences of the Taiwanese 
7-ELEVEN were gleaned from Japan rather than the US. The other advantage of 
internationaIisation is that they can transfer this kind of know-how to other group 
businesses; for example, COSMOS is a pharmacy retail outlet operated by the company 
and most of the outlets were set up next to 7-ELEVEN to create synergy. As far as 
outward internationalisation is concerned, they feel that they are now in the stage 
between cautious and emboldened. The stage is basically related to organisational 
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culture. So, they started in countries with cultural and geographical proximity, the 
Philippines and China. Being a member of a big business group, aside from advantages, 
can create some disadvantages, for example merchandising. As stated earlier, the 
mother company is a food company, so, the mother company asks 7-ELEVEN to 
purchase its products, even though it is not competitive in the market. This situation 
has changed over time and the percentage purchased 'in-house' is down from 85% to 
25%. From the front-line selling information gained by 7-ELEVEN, the mother 
company can get the latest news to introduce new products meeting customer's needs 
allowing both parties to benefit from co-operation. 
• CIRCLE K (OK) 
In 1988, a Taiwanese business groups, the Fong Chin group, co-operated with the 
American Circle K, and started to operate convenience stores in Taiwan. Three years 
later in 1991, the 1 OOth store was opened and one year on EOS was run online. The POS 
system was then installed in 1993, and in 1998, the franchise department was set up and 
the company started to attract franchisees to expand its market by FC2 (i.e., franchisor 
owns property). By 2000, the total number of stores exceeded 600. 
From the interview, the franchisor said that inward internationalisation is by master 
franchising. Although it is part of a big business group, Circle K Taiwan does not think 
it has any relationship with the mother company; in other words, every business unit in 
the group is independent. On the issue of localisation, most of the convenience food is 
local, hot, Chinese food rather than cold food. In addition, products sold in the US are 
sold in pairs or packages, but in Taiwan, they are sold individually with Taiwanese 
stores also running regular promotions. As to the outward intemationalisation stage, 
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the company is in the cautious stage. The Circle K brand is the final entrant into the 
franchise market of the four case companies, the reason being that they felt that if they 
did not join the market, the market would be occupied by other brands . 
• NlKOMART 
In 1990, another Taiwanese business group linked up with the Japanese company Niko 
Mart and started to run the convenience store in Taiwan. By 1991, all the store outlets 
were installed with the EOS. One year later, the business started to franchise its 
business by FC2 in March and FC} in May. In 1993, the franchisor set up its own 
logistic company to deliver commodities. The 100th store outlet was opened in 1995 
but by 2001, its store outlets numbered over 300 and the POS system were introduced 
to all stores. 
This franchisor is the only one co-operating with a Japanese company. As far as 
localisation is concerned, it is mainly found in the product mix. Regarding 
standardisation, the franchisor said that training is the best way to achieve this. 
However, this franchisor had a different point of view from the previous case 
companies, he said that the there is no relationship between the scale of the company 
and internationalisation. They co-operated with a foreign partner because they did not 
have any know-how on the store operations. 
• HI-LIFE 
Hi-Life is a local company, which is owned by another business group. Based on the 
strategy of forward integration, the company set up its stores in 1989. One year later, 
EOS was run online and in 1992, the company started to run an internal franchise 
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system to allow existing company managers to become franchisees. An external 
franchise system was run one year later in 1993. By 1996, the company had over 300 
outlets and 750 by 2000. 
Compared with the previous case companies, this company is the only local company. 
The reason for not cooperating with foreign partners, according to the manager, is that 
they had the ability to do this by themselves. All the store outlets were operated 
through company ownership initially. 
The above introductions provide a brief history of each franchise system. They have 
some points in common, for example, all of them were originally run as 
company-owned outlets (RC). The reason for this approach is to accumulate 
operational know-how. When they felt that it was time to run the franchise system, they 
started via the FC2 system to reduce the risks, as the franchisor still owns the stores. 
Later, when the franchisors thought that their computer systems and logistics were 
good enough to let franchisees have higher levels of autonomy, then the FCI system 
was introduced. 
4.3.2 The Estate Agency (EA) Industry 
Real estate is a huge industry; the industrial cycle includes production, transaction, 
usage and investment. The role of the estate agency industry lies in three core activities, 
which are channels, information, and customers. Hence, it plays an important role at 
each stage of the industrial cycle, especially in the transaction stage, as the estate 
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agency serves as the intermediary between buyers and sellers. There are seven 
characteristics of the industry specified in the Taiwan Real Estate Almanac (1998). 
(1) Uniqueness: every house or estate is unique, in fact, it is impossible to have the 
same estate at the same time, so the differentiation is very obvious. 
(2) The rate offlow is very low: even if the price is very high in place A but very low in 
place B, it is impossible to move the property from B to A. 
(3) The transactional frequency is quite low: even if the transactional frequency is 
relatively high as in foreign countries, many people still prefer selling houses by 
themselves or through acquaintances rather than through the estate agency. 
(4) The industry is based on reliance and trust: companies have to invest money in 
brand management and advertising to gain customers' attention and trust. As a 
result, the cost of marketing is, on average, higher than for other industries. 
(5) It is a human industry: in other words, it is a labour-intensive industry with high 
proficiency. The company has to spend a lot of money to train its staifto maintain 
service quality. 
(6) The reliance on public media is very high: the higher the exposure, the higher the 
transaction opportunity for a house. Therefore, companies use different channels 
for an advertisement, such as mail, newspapers, window displays, journals, TV, the 
Internet and so on. 
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In addition, the Almanac also suggests that there are eight stages in the development of 
the Taiwanese real estate market. The author has rearranged this information into the 
following Table 4.6. 
Table 4.6 The innovations of the Estate Agency industry in Taiwan 
Stage Period Characteristics 
• Sellers posted the selling infonnation of the 
1 houses by themselves. 
(prior to 1970 Traditional period • Individual brokers existed but most of them ) 
were part-time and the transactions were based 
on the land rather than houses. 
2 • The first agency was established to deal with 
(1970-1980) Miniature period the transactions of houses. 
3 Fragmentary • Fragmentary agencies existed to solve the 
(1980-1985) period problems arising from advance bookings. 
• The first estate agency was opened. 
• RC started from 1985. 
4 Estate agency • FC started from 1986. 
( 1985-1990) period 
• Foreign brands entered the market. 
• Three business types (US, Japanese and local) 
coexisted. 
5 Total service • Quick expansion stage for FC. 
(1990-1993 ) period • Two main streams: RC and FC. 
6 • Because of the recession, the reward system is 
( 1993-1995) Adaptation period based on high commission without base salary. 
7 • Companies allied together to share cases with 
(1995-1996) Alliance period one another. 
8 Conswnptive • Payments were dealt and guaranteed by banks 
(l996-now) safety period to ensure the transactional safety. 
9 E-commerce • Customers can use the Internet to see the 
(l997-now) period houses. 
Source: Taiwan Real Estate Almanac (1998) 
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From the above table, we have a clear idea ofthe development of the industry and the 
role the estate agencies play in this industry. As far as the service commission is 
concerned, sellers and buyers have to pay 4% and 1 % of the house value to the agency. 
However, with high levels of competition, the commission rates are usually discounted 
for customers. Consolidation has taken place and those chains in the middle are 
disappearing little by little. This is because the public usually knows about the leading 
brand and it continues to grow steadily. The small/local brands can just focus on local 
markets with a policy of 'deep cultivation'. The leading brands are regular chains 
rather than franchise chain systems, because the regular chain gives the public a 
positive impression of its service quality in the media. Within the franchise chains, 
because the franchisors and franchisees sometimes cannot cooperate together, their 
collective powers are weaker than the regular chain brands. In the following section, 
four companies will be introduced as background to this study. 
• HOUSE & BUSINESS (DB) 
HB was established in 1979 and it is the forerunner of the EA industry in Taiwan. 
Before becoming a franchise brand, it was a research institution. It helped other brands 
and building companies by undertaking market research. In 1986, the institution 
became the first EA franchise chain in Taiwan. In 1993, the company introduced 
high-tech to the operating system and was awarded a prize for its infonnation 
technology application. In the same year, it created the certificate system for salesmen. 
Later, in 1996, the organisation reached ISO 9002 certification. 
124 
In the initial interview, the franchisor said that the public did not accept the concept of 
an estate agency at the time they started, so, it was impossible to undertake inward 
internationalisation at that time. There were two reasons for not operating company 
owned outlets. One was the high cost of running a regular chain system; the other was 
that, as the market is unstable, the franchisor could dodge the external risk. 
• REBAR RESHOUSE 
The company was established in 1988, and is a member of a large business group. It 
started with a regular chain system and then changed into a fully franchise chain system 
in 1996. One year later, the franchisor got the certifications ofISa 9002 and ISO 1401. 
The purpose was to standardize its operations. As it has support from other businesses, 
the brand combined its services with other businesses to create synergy, for example 
combining insurance with house sales to protect customers. Their objective is to 
become the strongest brand in the Chinese market in the near future. 
From the preliminary interview, the franchisor specified that the reason for creating its 
own brand was to create synergy because the mother company could perfonn vertical 
and horizontal integrations. As for the reasons to transfer from a regular chain to a 
franchise chain system, the manager said that this is a labour-intensive industry and 
with the implementation of the Law of Labour, company's costs rose. The other reason 
was that remote outlets were difficult to manage, so the company converted all the 
company-owned outlets to franchise little by little. The process took two years to move 
from a fully regular chain to a fully franchised chain system. 
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• CHINATRUST 
ChinaTrust was established in 1985, and started as a brand ofa regular chain. In 1997, 
in order to face changes in the external environment, the company changed its policy 
and transferred all the regular chain outlets to franchise chain outlets. In order to attract 
new franchisees, the franchisor adopted a penetration strategy by charging a lower 
royalty. This brand also has a strong business background, including banking, building 
and media. However, the franchisor said that there is no relationship with other group 
businesses; the only association is in having the same brand name. In addition, he 
argued that the estate agency is a 'local' and 'unmovable' product, so, unless there is no 
estate industry already established in the country, it is difficult for an international 
brand to enter the market. The international brands present in Taiwan like ERA and 
Century 21 are not as competitive as the local brands because their operations are not so 
localised. 
• CENTURY 21 
Century 21 is an international brand, which is different from the other three in the 
sample. It is the final entrant into the market and was set up in 1997. The company's 
background seems more complicated because its shares are held by many businesses, 
located in Taiwan, Hong Kong and US. The franchisor said that they adopted an 
international brand because the brand had existed for 30 years, so through the 
co--operation, the franchisor could easily obtain know-how. In addition, the franchisor 
could save a lot of money in promoting a new brand name. For the franchisees, they get 
the benefit of being members ofa global brand. As to issues oflocalisation, operations 
must be changed according to the local laws and operational habits. The most difficult 
point in the internationalisation process is the communication with foreign managers. 
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The respondent also believed that there is no relationship between company scale and 
internationalisation. The most important factor is how the two companies co-operate 
with each other. 
From the above introductions to the CVS and EA franchisors, one has a basic 
understanding of these franchisors. Based on this, we can see differences between the 
industries and also among companies. For example, the CVS industry exhibits stable 
growth no matter what the constraints of the external environment (see Figure 4.2). In 
contrast, the EA was influenced deeply by pressures in the external environment (see 
Figure 4.3). Given the recessionary pressures in the external environment (see Figure 
4.4), we can suggest that the relationship between EA franchisors and franchisees is 
becoming unstable. In the following chapters, these relationships will be examined and 
the perceptions of those in both industries will be compared. The relationships between 
franchisors and franchisees are, not only influenced by the external environment, but 
also by the development and nature of the chain industry. In other words, franchising is 
a relatively young and growing industry in Taiwan and hence, as the external 
environment becomes worse, many franchisors do not know how to react. As a result, 
conflict takes place between both parties. 
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Figure 4.2 The Growth of CVS Outlets 
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Figure 4.3 The Growth of Estate Agency Outlets 
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Figure 4.4 GOP Growth in Taiwan 
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Finally, Table 4.7 provides a general comparison between both industries, based upon 
the comments of franchisors and franchisees, author's observation and analysis, and 
published material in Taiwan. From these comparisons, we can have a clear map of the 
differences. These differences suggest that a comparison of the industries may reveal 
interesting findings. 
T bI 47Th G al C a e e ener 0 mpansons 0 fE A dC state 1gency an onveruence S tore 
Items Estate Agency Convenience Store 
1 1000rating hours 9arn-9pm 24 hours 
2 Product characteristic l. Unmovable 1. Movable 
2. Unique 2. Common 
3 Entry barrier (experience) High Low 
4 Outlets Pure franchising Combined systems 
5 Transaction fteguency Few Daily 
6 Personal contact High Low 
7 Unit Price High Low 
8 Organisational form Hybrid Hybrid + Hierarchy 
9 Integration Vertical + Horizontal Vertical + Horizontal 
10 Ownership 100010 owned by franchisees PartlY owned by franchisees 
11 Entrepreneurship Medium-High None-Low 
12 Multi-unit franchisee Few Many 
13 Limitation outlet numbers No Yes 
for multi-unit franchisee 
14 Exclusive trading distance Yes No 
15 Guaranteed annual sales No Yes 
16 Contract period 1-4 years 5 years 
17 Royalty Fixed Variable with sales 
18 Self-Motivation High RC (low), FC (high) 
19 Leadership lNon-coercive RC (Coercive) 
FC (Non-coercive/Coercive) 
20 Communication channel Head office staff (horizontal) Store supervisor (vertical) 
21 Each party's status More equal More unequal 
22 Cost of changing brand as 1. Original customers 1. Cost oflosing the outlet 
the contract is expired 2. Redecoration fee (FC2) 
3. Initial fee 2. Initial fee 
23 Quality control 1. Cooperation with 1. United sourcing 
qualified solicitors and 2. Store supervisor's 
banks supervision 
2. Official contracts 3. Other departments' 
3. Periodical check non-periodical check 
4. Computer network 4. POS system 
5. Emphasize the 5. Trained store manager 
transactional process 6. Emphasize the result 
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24 Flexibility of the store High (90%) Low (10%) 
operation 
25 Impact of recession Huge Tiny 
26 Overall growth Negative Positive 
27 Industry characteristic PeoplelProduct People/Product 
80/20 20/80 
28 Contract with customers Yes (at least for 3 months) No 
29 Transactional focus Safety QSCV (Quality, Service, Cleanliness and Value) 
30 Negotiability on royalty Yes (depends on your sales No, but internal franchisees 
or whether you are an old have special discounts 
franchisee or whether you 
are from another franchise 
system) 
31 Contract Some are different, The same 
especially on the initial fee 
and royalties 
32 The most common conflict Brand exposure rate is not 1. Policy products 
enough 2. Absorbing of defects 
3. Interactions 
33 Limitation of the No 
The reach ability oflogistics 
franchisor's expansion 
34 Purchasing from the Recommended Necessary 
franchisor 
35 Management oftrading area Very important 
Not so important 
36 Interactions with customers Very proactive 
Very reactive 
37 CSF (Critical Success 1. Brand advertisement 1. Strong logistics 
Factors) 2. Attitude of staff 2. Location 3. Attitude of staff 
4. Quantity of product lines 
5. Advertisement 
38 Autonomy High 
Low 
39 Attitude for the franchisor's Not welcomed and useless 
Welcome and helpful 
assistance 
40 Experience required Yes 
No 
41 Franchisee's representative Yes 
No 
42 Franchisor's objective To earn profit from To help franchisees making 
franchisees money 
43 Create own brand for a Possible 
Impossible (because most 01 
multi-unit franchisee 
the products and estates are 
the franchisor'S properties) 
44 Product lines Limited Gust related to houses 
Wide (aside from the daily 
and land) necessities, the shop also offers services, such as film 
development, national and 
international express, clothes 
washing, faxing, 
photocopying, bill payment, 
internet shopping, catalogue 
shopping, and publication 
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I.- selling) 
45 Coexistence ofRC and Fe No and impossible Yes and many 
46 Industrial characteristic Industry of thoughts Industry of management 
47 The importance of personal Very important Not important 
network 
48 Both party's relationship Loosely Tightly 
49 The importance of the brand More important to sellers The same importance for 
to potential customers than buyers sellers and buyers 
50 Being a RC before a FC Not necessary Necessary 
Source. the author 
4.4 The Future Development of Retailing in Taiwan 
As far as the future development of retailing is concerned, there are some general 
developments in the Taiwanese retail market. For example, 24-hour operations have 
become common. Aside from convenience stores, other businesses like cinemas, 
shopping malls, restaurants, gas stations, Internet coffee shops, MTV, KTV, and 
bookstores have the same operating hours. An interesting fmding is that most of these 
stores are chain stores. This kind of phenomenon not only suggests that there are more 
business opportunities for them but also implies that customers' preferences and habits 
are changing. Another development is the prevalence of multi-function stores; 
convenience stores are the most outstanding examples. Aside from the general 
developments in retailing, another phenomenon in the Taiwanese market is 
internationalisation. As mentioned before, inward internationalisation started in the 
19708, and was then followed by a stage of localisation. Since the 19905, outward 
internationalisation had been lUlderway. As far as inward internationalisation is 
concerned, each retail sector has been influenced by different countries. Hence, aside 
from the influences from the local cuhure, some countries have had influences and 
impacts on Taiwanese retailing. For example, Figure 4.5 illustrates the effects of Japan, 
Europe and the US from different perspectives. First, supermarkets and distribution 
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centres are Japanese orientated; warehouses like Carrefour and Makro were imported 
from European countries and fmally, convenience stores were brought in from the US, 
for ~xample 7-ELEVEN. 
Figure 4.5 The External Impacts of the Taiwanese Retailing 
Source: Shih (1999) 
Retailing in Taiwan 
Intemationalisation 
Localisation 
Earlier in this chapter, it was suggested that the Taiwanese business cultures are mixed 
with Chinese (Ching Dynasty), European (Dutch! Spanish period), Japanese (Colony 
period) and US (post war period) influences. Figure 4.6 shows the modern time of the 
Taiwanese business with mixed culture influences drawn from different countries. 
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Figure 4.6 The Modern Time of the Taiwanese Business 
Taiwanese Local Culture 
Source: Shih (1999) 
With the same cultural background, the Chinese market is considered to be the biggest 
future opportunity for Taiwanese businesses. With Taiwan and China both recently 
joining the WTO, their markets will become more open and many Taiwanese 
businesses have started to move into the Chinese market as they share the same culture 
and language. So far, there have been some successful Taiwanese retailers in the 
Chinese market such as 7-ELEVEN, Starbucks Coffee Shop and Pacific Department 
Store. In addition, the Taiwanese have to think about how to combine foreign capital 
and local human resources to enter the Chinese market. If this model could be 
established, then Taiwan can not only upgrade its industrialleveI but also become the 
interface between foreign countries and China Therefore, as the Taiwanese local 
market becomes mature and saturated, the future is likely to be based on expansion into 
the Chinese market. With this market, retailers could establish their capacity and ability 
to be international brands. Regarding the external impact ofWfO membership, within 
CVS, the main impact will be from the open market. Foreign retailers will be able to 
distribute more products to Taiwan and prices will become lower. For customers this is 
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good news. As to the response by retailers, they could enhance their operations by 
automation and e-commerce; in practice, they seem to have done this already. Within 
EA, as the market opens up, foreign companies can directly set up subsidiaries in 
Taiwan. However, as the market is already highly competitive, local agencies should 
not feel a great difference and it may even produce opportunities to co-operate with 
foreign retailers to enhance competitiveness. 
As to the future development of chain stores, the Department of Commerce (2000) 
suggests six tendencies (Table 4.8). Some ofthese have already taken place; others are 
still at the experimental stage. 
a e e uture T bl 48Th F D eve opmen 0 m t fCha· St ores 
Tendeng Tendency in the chain store Illustrations 
One stop shopping Clearly positioning, Multi-function shop 
Individualisation, 
Satisfaction of customers' needs 
Self-service From 'face to face' to 'self service', Self-service laundry 
it can not only reduce the cost of Self-service photocopying 
personnel but also let customers 
feel free. 
Chain operation By collective purchasing, costs can Convenience store 
be reduced, e.g., supermarkets - Book chain 
bargaining ability can rise 5-7% as Fast food chain· 
every 10-store outlets increase. 
Failure rate: 
Independent store: 80% in the frrst 
year and 92% in the fifth year. 
Chain store: 20% in the first year 
and 23 % in the fifth year. 
Automation Through the use of information POS 
technology, the lead-time between EOS 
purchasing and selling will become VAN 
shorter. 
Interface Fitness Integration of money, commodity, The use ofIC 
logistics and information. The use of Bar-code 
Direct sales Service will become important. Direct marketing 
Major cost savings without the Catalogue selling 
~hysical store. Internet marketing 
Source: Taiwan Department of Commerce (2000) 
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Within CVS, all of the case companies have already taken the above trends on board 
but for EA, not all are applicable. EA has its own special trend like the setting-up of 
distribution centres to share cases. If this could be carried out, then it would be good 
news for sellers, buyers and agencies because it would speed up property rotation. 
However, due to issues of self-interest, it is difficult to make franchisors cooperate with 
one another. 
4.5 Summary 
This chapter has provided a background to retailing innovation in the Taiwanese retail 
market. Franchise chains were then highlighted owing to their importance and 
relevance to this research. For this research, CVS and EA have been chosen to allow 
comparisons of the perspectives of general and management issues between franchisors 
and franchisees in two very different industries. These sections also provided a contrast 
in the way they operate and in their reaction to economic pressures. Finally, the 
development of retailing in Taiwan was examined from the perspectives of its historical 
background and future tendency. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
S.O Introduction 
Following the literature review and the chapter on retail franchising in the Taiwanese 
market, this chapter discusses the research methodology ~ how this research was 
designed, conducted and analysed. This chapter is closely linked with the previous 
chapter 4 and the following chapters 6 and 7 as the analysis was spread over these three 
chapters according to the characteristics of questions. In this methodology chapter, the 
author will demonstrate how the research was developed and how each section is 
connected. First of all, the research design is both inductive and deductive to serve 
different purposes. Strauss and Corbin (1998) suggest that inductions (the derivation of 
concepts, their properties and dimensions from data) and deductions (hypothesising 
about relationships between concepts) are interplayed from the perspective of theory 
building. Based on the essence of the research, research pre~assumptions are used to 
replace hypotheses. In this chapter, the author will explain the different approaches that 
were adopted to qualify the research questions and objectives; detailing the sampling 
strategies, data collectio~ analysis and fInally, reliability and validity testing will be 
explored. 
5.1 Research questions, objectives, conceptual framework and 
pre-assum ptions 
From the review of the literature discussed previously, we can see that there are some 
important and interesting questions relating to franchising. For example, in the 
franchise organisations, although this organisational fonn theoretically has a greater 
channeJ efficiency, compared to traditional distribution channels, the fact that both 
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franchisors and franchisees are self-interested entities, raises the issues of how to 
motivate and satisfy each participant, and then how to create synergy in the channel. 
Conflicts are sometimes unavoidable because the franchisor is in the dominant position, 
therefore, how to minimise both party's perceptual gaps and how to keep a good 
relationship during the relational exchange process between the parties are key issues. 
For this reason, leadership characteristics and the role of decision-makers becomes 
more important in interactions from the perspective ofreJationship maintenance. These 
two broad areas may offer different perspectives in different industries (e.g., retail and 
service), and in the Chinese cultural context (i.e., Taiwan). 
5.1.1 Research Questions 
From the above general points, seven research questions arise: 
I . What is the motivation to be an international or local player and which kind of 
international franchise path did the international retailer adopt for Taiwan? 
2. Why franchising is so popular in the Taiwanese retail market? 
3. Is there any relationship between entrepreneurship and ownership patterns in 
franchising? 
4. Are there differences between the convenience store (retail sector) and estate 
agency (service sector) from the perspective of organisational patterns: such as 
RC (Regular Chain) and FC (Franchise Chain); internal and external franchisee; 
original and transferred franchisee; local and international franchise system; 
single and multi-unit franchisee? 
5. How do franchisors and franchisees in Taiwan co-operate with each other to 
maximise the brand value and, if conflicts take place, what will the reactions 
be? 
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6. What role do the decision-makers and leadership play in the interactions? 
7. Based on relational exchange behaviour, do both parties think that it is an equal 
balance between give and take? 
5.1.2 Research Objectives and Conceptual Framework 
From these seven broad research questions, research objectives were formulated and 
these research objectives were identified from three main perspectives fOWld in the 
literature, which are international retailing, franchising as an organisational from and 
management issues in franchising. Each perspective relates to different objectives. 
These objectives are detailed in 5.1 : 
Topic 
Pers ctive 
Franchising 
as a business 
form 
Management 
issues in 
franchising 
Table 5.1 Research Ob·ectives 
Research Objectives 
• 
To understand the development of franchising in the 
Taiwanese retail market, especially in the convenience store 
and estate agency industries and to comprehend why this kind 
of business format is so popular. 
• 
To explore the relative issues in franchising, such as regular 
and franchise chain, single and multi-unit franchisee, local 
and international franchisee, internal and external franchisee, 
original and transferred franchisee and so on. 
To understand what was transferred during the process of 
internationalization for both convenience store and estate 
agency industries, and to identify any difference in 
international franchise ath . 
• 
To explore the motivations for franchising ~om the 
perspectives of agency theory, resource constramts and 
transactional cost analysis. 
To evaluate the importance of the decision maker on the 
interactions between franchisors and franchisees, including 
the decision maker's characteristics, leadership, attitude, and 
the role of entrepreneurship. 
To explore what was exchanged between the franchisor and 
franchisee, and how this kind of interorganisational form was 
maintained to maximize both party's benefits. If both party's 
exchange behavior is not balanced, how will one party react to 
the other. 
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To address the above research objectives, many issues will be explored. The most 
important topics of all are those relating to the relationships and conflicts between 
franchisors and franchisees. Therefore, key theories like the motivation, 
decision-maker and relational exchange theory were discussed. In order to have a clear 
perspective of how these dimensions interact with one another, Figure 5. I illustrates the 
conceptual framework and illustrates the interactions from which the research 
objectives were derived. The numbers in the shaded boxes relate to the research 
objectives shown in Table 5.1. 
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• 
Retail Franchising, in Taiwan: Convenience Store (retail) and Estate Agency (service) as Illustrations 
of Contrasting Systems 
• 
Outward Internationalisation 
International Franchise 
Path 
• Private label products 
• Own brand products 
• Concept sales 
• Business format 
franchising 
• I Inward Internationalisation 
Figure 5.1 Conceptual Framework 
. ........................... . 
~-II~~ Relationship 
and 
Conflict 
Motivations for franchising 
• Agency Theory 
• Resource Constraint 
• Transaction Cost Analysis 
Decision Maker 
• Knowledge and experience 
• Leadership 
• Entrepreneurship 
Relational Exchange Theory 
International Franchising 
• 
Retail Franchise 
Dimensions 
• Regular chain vs. 
franchise chain 
• Single vs. Multi-unit 
franchisee 
• Local vs. 
international system 
• Internal vs. external 
franchisee 
• Original vs. 
transferred franchisee 
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The conceptual framework is derived from two main topics or perspectives: franchising 
as an organisational form, and management issues in franchising. For the field study, 
two distinct industries, convenience store (CVS) and estate agency (EA) were selected. 
The reason for choosing CVS and EA is because one (CVS) is based on a tangible 
product·based offer and the other (EA) is based on an intangible service· based offer. 
The intention was to compare and contrast these industries. Eisenhardt (1989) suggests 
that it makes sense to choose cases such as extreme situations and polar types in which 
the process of interest is 'transparently observable'. Thus, from the comparison, we can 
expect to see differences regarding relationships and conflict. Wrthin the two chosen 
industries, other sub.categories relating to franchise characteristics were designated 
and compared to explore the complex relationships within the channels. These 
sub-categories include comparisons between regular chain and franchise chain, single 
and muhi·unit franchisees, local and international systems, internal and external 
franchises, original and transferred franchisees. As for the path for international 
franchising, as mentioned before, they are private label products, own brand products, 
concept sales and business fonnat franchising. Based on both inward and outward 
internationalisation, operational know how is transferred. Finally, the core 
management issues concerning relationships and conflict will be explored; these 
analyses will be based on the theories relating to motivation, decision· maker 
characteristics and relational exchange. 
From the above approach, the author hopes that the findings can offer constructive 
suggestions to both practitioners and academics. For practitioners, the outcomes and 
models can help franchisors and franchisees to improve channel efficiency and let one 
party know how the other party thinks, minimising conceptual gaps. Ifboth parties are 
clear about the channel problems, then the brand value can be maximised to benefit 
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both parties. As to the contribution for academics, this is rooted in the analysis, as some 
findings may conflict with existing theories. Hence, theory generation, testing, 
elaboration and extension will be highlighted. All of these expected results are based 
on the background of the research. In other words. all the culture backgrounds, 
industrial characteristics are focused in the Taiwanese context. 
5.1.3 Research pre-assumptions 
From the literature review in Chapters 2 and 3, a number of central pre-assumptions 
contributing to knowledge development can be defined and SUbsequently evaluated. 
• It is believed that analysis of international franchising will provide an 
understanding of the intemationalisation process of franchise systems in the 
Taiwanese retail market. 
• It is anticipated that the development of a franchise system in Taiwan is a little 
different from those observed in industrialised countries, from the perspective of 
localisation and industrial characteristics. 
• It is anticipated that culture based motivations, lower failure rates, and ownership 
for franchising will be uncovered as explanations of the prevalence offranchising in 
the Taiwanese retail market. 
• It is anticipated that the attitude of the decision-makers and leadership of the head 
office play an important role in the interactions between franchisors and 
franchisees. 
• It is expected that the relationship between franchisors and franchisees plays an 
important role in the development of a franchise system, and based on the same 
objectives, both parties should ally together to reach a win-win status. 
• It is anticipated that if the franchise relationship is based on something important, 
which is worthy of exchange, (e.g., based on a valuable asset, such as the brand 
name), both parties should maintain a long~term relationship. 
• It is anticipated that if conflicts take place, both parties should negotiate with each 
other to reach a win-win status. 
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5.2 Research Design 
Research design can be broadly classified as either exploratory or conclusive. The 
difference between exploratory and conclusive research is summarised in Table 5.2. In 
this thesis, exploratory research was adopted for the purpose ofproviding insights into, 
and an understanding ot: marketing phenomenon, especiaUy the motivations and the 
relationships between franchisors and franchisees. As a method, a qualitative in-depth 
interviewing approach was adopted. Hence, the research is qualitative and exploratory 
in nature. This approach is used where the subject of the study cannot be measured in a 
quantitative manner. The researcher was trying to understand how the concepts of 
·motivation', ·decision-maker' and 'relational exchange' worked in the franchise 
organisations. Therefore, exploratory research can help to establish all the appropriate 
variables and see the linkages. In contrast, conclusive research requires a method, 
which is more formal and structured than exploratory research, typically based on large, 
representative samples, and in which the data generated is subjected to quantitative 
analysis. The findings from this type of research are considered conclusive in nature. 
The differences are tabulated below (Table 5.2). 
de I· h Table 5.2 Differences between Exploratory an one USIve researc 
ExoloratoTY Conclusive 
• To provide insights and • To test specific hypothesis 
Objective understanding of the nature of and examine relationships 
marketing phenomena • To measure 
• To understand 
• Information needed may be • Infonnation needed is 
loosely defined clearly defined 
• Research process is fleXIble, • Research process is formal 
unstructured and may evolve 
and structured Characteristics 
• Sample are small SampJe is large and aims to • 
• Data analysis can be qualitative be representative 
or quantitative 
• Data analysis is 
quantitative 
FinQings/ • Can be used in their own right • Can be used in their own 
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results • May feed into conclusive right 
research • May feed into exploratory 
• May illuminate specific research 
conclusive findings 
• Expert surveys • Surveys 
• Pilot surreys • Secondary data 
• Secondary data • Databases 
Methods • Qualitative methods • Panels 
• Unstructured observations • Structured observations 
• Quantitative exploratory • Experiments 
multivariate methods 
. Source. Malhotra and Buks (1999) 
As far as exploratory research is concerned, Malhotra and Birks (1999) propose that it 
is an appropriate design for the following: 
When the nature of the topic under study cannot be measured m a structured, 
quantifiable manner, 
When the problem needs to be defined more precisely; 
When alternative courses of action need to be identified; 
When research questions or hypotheses need to be developed; 
When key variables need to be isolated and classified as dependent or independent. 
Points one and five are relevant to this study. The research requires an understanding of 
the attitudes and perceptions of the franchisors and franchisees: these cannot be 
adequately measured in a structured and quantifiable manner. In addition, key variables 
like management issues and the two industries under study are independent variables, 
and other variables like characteristics as entry path, business format, single and 
multi-unit franchisee, local and international system, internal and external franchisee, 
original and transferred franchisee, are dependent variables. Hence, we can say that 
this research can be considered to be an exploratory research. 
As for the research strategy, case studies were adopted. Yin (1994) gives a strict and 
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more "technical" definition: A case study is an empirical inquiry which: 
• investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context; 
• when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; 
• in which muhiple source of evidence are used. 
Eisenhardt (1989) agrees that case studies can be used to accomplish various aims: to 
provide description, test theory or generate theory. The interest here includes all of the 
above aims. For example, the analysis in Chapter 4 is related to exploration, whereas 
Chapter 6 and 7 aims at generating, testing and refming theories. Besides, 
Bettenhausen and Murnighan (1986) have converted theory-testing research into 
theory-building research by taking advantage of serendipitous fmdings. Hence, some 
testing in the research will help generate or refine theories. Finally, as to what 
constitutes a case? There is no clear definition of what is a single case study or unit of 
analysis; single cases may sometimes involve the opportunity to study several contexts 
within the case (Mukherjee et ai., 2000). In this research, the case is based on the 
company level; so, there are eight cases in this study. 
Regarding the different research strategies employed in qualitative research, Yin (1994) 
proposes three conditions: the type of research question posed; the extent of control an 
investigator has over actual behavioural events; and the degree of focus on 
contemporary as opposed to historical events. The conditions are then related to five 
major research strategies, shown in Table 5.3 below. 
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or eren esearc Table 53 Relevant Situations fi Diffi t R h Strat . egles 
Strategy Fonn of research 
Requires control Focuses on 
question over behavioral contemporary 
events? events? 
E.~jJCliment How, why Yes Yes 
Who, what, where No Yes 
Survey How many 
How much 
Who, what, where No Yes/no 
Archival analysis How many 
How much 
History How, why No No 
Case study How, why No Yes 
Source: Ym (1994) 
Table 5.3 displays these relevant situations for different research strategies. Each of 
these options has its advantages and disadvantages. As to which kind of strategy is the 
most suitable, Yin (1994) states, "the goal is to avoid gross misfits - that is, when you 
are planning to use one type of strategy but another is really more advantageous". It is 
clear from the table that a case study research strategy is considered to have a distinct 
advantage when a 'how' or 'why' questions is being asked about a contemporary set of 
events over which the investigator has little or no control. For example, in this research, 
the core research questions were designed to explore motivations, which are 'why' 
questions, and the development of relationships and conflicts, which are 'how' 
questions. The main reasons for choosing case studies for the research strategy were 
the descriptive nature of the research and the dominance of 'why' and 'how' questions. 
Although the research questions were reformulated several times during the research, 
the objectives are still focused on the 'exploration of the relationships and conflicts 
between franchisors and franchisees'. 
In this research, a comparative approach was adopted to compare different dimensions 
within two different kinds of industries, the convenience store and the estate agency 
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industries. The reason for choosing these two industries was to alJow a comparative 
study between retail and service industries. The convenience store is a product-based 
retail industry whereas estate agency is a service-based industry. Hence, by the 
comparison of these two industries, potential relationships and conflict between 
franchisors and ftanchisees can be uncovered and contrasted. Figure 5.2 typifies this 
research because the research is to investigate the relationship between franchisors (A) 
and franchisees (B). From an analysis of interactions between both parties, many 
implications from the interactions will be found. 
and discourses 
~j/ 
Studying cultural framing of 
practices 
Figure 5.2 Research perspectives in qualitative research 
Source: Flick (1998) 
Study of subject 
(B) and his or her 
viewpoint( s) 
Regarding the sampling strategy (which will be explained in more detail in the 
following sections), three main strategies were adopted: they are convenience, stratified 
and random sampling, but strategies can be still varied at different stages. After the 
samples were selected, the primary data were collected from two methods, in-depth 
interviews and telephone interviews. Elango and Fried (1997) provide a table based on 
recent research in franchising mentioned before (see Appendix 2). In the research 
studies shown, 49 were conducted using quantitative methods and only 2 through 
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qualitative methods. Although qualitative research was not so prevalent before, this 
does not mean that the quantitative method is superior to the qualitative method. The 
author suggests that the method is closely related to the essence of the questions to be 
researched. In this research, the relationships between franchisors and franchisees and 
the related issues to be explored are difficult to measure effectively using quantitative 
methods. As a resuh, a qualitative method was adopted. 
In the analysis stage, coding and comparative analysis was undertaken to highlight the 
similarities and differences between the two industries. In addition, the author 
introduced his own insights to the analysis trying to find out the abstract implications 
and make it more concrete. After the stages of description and analysis, the final stage 
is to highlight those points, which are in conflict with established theories. From these 
conflict points, the aims are to test, elaborate and generate theories; hence, it is a kind of 
grounded research. The following Figure 5.3 suggests that there are two ways to build 
theories. The author chose the second one - the circular model, to be the basis of the 
research process. According to this mode~ the research process for this study was 
constructed as shown in Figure 5.4. 
Linear model of 
the research 
process 
Circular model of 
the research 
process 
Theory 
Pre-assurnpti 
ons 
Hypothesis 
Figure 5.3 Models of process and theory 
Source: Flick (1998) 
Operation 
alsatian 
Collection 
Interpretation 
Sampling 
Comparing 
Collection 
Interpretation 
Collection 
Interpreta 
tion 
Collection 
Interpretation 
Comparing 
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Validation 
Theory 
Pre-assumptions 
(RC vs. FC) 
Comparing Comparing 
----_ .. 
Interpretation ~' ----
Cases 
(Single vs. Multi-unit) 
Relationship and Conflict 
between franchisors and 
~ ! : ~ ': "! ... ' 
Theory generation, elaboration, extension and test 
Figure 5.4 Research Process: application of circular model to the thesis 
Source: the author 
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5.3 Sampling 
Sampling is as important in qualitative research as it is in quantitative research. For 
qualitative research, we cannot study everyone everywhere doing everything. Flick 
(1998) states that sampling decisions are required not only about which people to 
interview or which events to observe, but also about settings and processes (see Table 
6.4). The issue of sampling emerges at different points in the research process. In an 
interview study, it is connected to the decision about which persons to interview (case 
sampling) and from which groups these should come (sampling groups of cases). 
Furthermore, it emerges with the decision about which of the interviews should be 
further treated, i.e., transcribed or interpreted (material sampling). In the process of 
data interpretation, the question again arises with the decision about which parts of a 
text should be selected for interpretation in general or for particular detailed 
interpretations (sampling within the material). Finally, it arises when presenting the 
[mdings: which cases or parts of text are best used to demonstrate the findings 
(presentational sampling). 
Table 5.4 Sampling Decisions in the Research Process 
S~e in research Sampling methods 
While collecting data 
Case sampling 
Sampling groups of cases 
Material sampling 
While interpreting data 
Sampling within the material 
While presenting the findings Presentational sampling 
Source: Flick (1998) 
From the above table, we can see that different sampling methods can be applied to 
different stages in collecting data, interpreting data and presenting the findings. Each 
stage has different kinds of sampling methods; this implies that sampling is not just 
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applied at the stage of data collection. In general, sampling starts from extreme, 
negative, critical or deviant cases, i.e., from the extremities of the field. It may be 
disclosed from the inside, starting from particularly typical or developed cases. The 
structure of the sample may be defmed in advance and filled in through coIIecting data, 
or it may be developed and further differentiated step by step during selection, 
collection, and interpretation of material. In this research, the samples were defined in 
advance but further developed and differentiated during the stages of selection, 
collection and interpretation due to the actual access to the interviewees being different 
from that planned in advance. As far as sampling strategy is concerned, Miles and 
Hubennan (1994) evolve a typology provided in Table 5.5. 
Table 5.5 Typology of Sampling Strategies in Qualitative Inquiry 
Type of Sampling Purpose 
Maximum variation Documents diverse variations and 
identifies important common patterns 
Homogeneous Focuses, reduces, simplifies, facilitates 
group interviewing 
Critical case Permits logical generalisation and 
maximum application of information to 
other cases 
Theory based Finds examples of a theoretical construct 
and thereby elaborates and examines it 
Confinning and disconfirming cases Elaborates initial analysis, seeks 
exceptions, looks for variation 
SnowbalJ or chain Identifies cases of interest from people 
who know people who know what cases 
are information rich 
Extreme or deviant case Learns from highly unusual 
manifestations of the phenomenon of 
interest 
Typical case Highlights what is nonna! or average 
Intensity Involves information-rich cases that 
manifest the phenomenon intensity, but 
not extremely 
Politically important cases Attracts desired attention or avoids 
attracting undesired attention 
Random purposeful Adds credibility to the sample when the 
potential purposeful sample is too large 
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Stratified purposeful Illustrates subgroups, facilitates 
comparison 
Criterion Includes all cases that meet some 
criterion, useful for quality assurance 
Opportunistic Follows new leads, takes advantage of the 
unexpected 
Combination or mixed Involves triangulation and flexibility, 
meets multiple interests and needs 
Convenience Saves time, money, and effort but at the 
expense of information and credibility 
. Source: Miles and Huberman (1994) 
In Table 5.5, sixteen different kind of sampling strategies are suggested to meet 
different needs. With each different sampling strategy, the results generated would be 
different. As sampling decisions start from integrating concrete cases, the origin of 
reconstructing cases is concretely realised. In sampling decisions, the reality under 
study is constructed in a specific way: certain parts and aspects are highlighted, others 
are phased out. For example, in this research, only nationaVinternational franchise 
brands were highlighted. Sampling decisions determine substantially what becomes 
empirical material in the form of text and what is taken from available texts and how it 
is used (Miles and Hube~ 1994). 
For a comparative case study, a specific or a combination method can be chosen to fit 
the research objectives. The author combined the above two typologies together to 
develop the sampling strategy. The following Table 5.6 shows how the researcher used 
different sampling strategies at different stages. 
Table 5.6 Application of Sampling Strategies 
Sampling methods Practice 
Stage in research (Flick) (Miles and Hubennan) 
While collecting Case sampling 
Critical case and maximum 
(CVS and EA) variation (Retail vs. Service data sector) 
ISS 
Stratified purposeful 
(NationallIntemational brand) 
Sampling groups of cases Maximum variation 
(Re vs. FC) Convenience (Location) 
(Single vs. Multi-unit franchisee) Stratified purposeful (Personal 
(Local vs. International system) network) 
(Internal vs. External franchisee) Random purposeful (Phone list 
(Original vs. Transferred and Store visits) 
franchisee) 
Material sampling Maximum variation (All) 
(RC vs. FC) 
(Single vs. Multi-unit franchisee) 
(Local vs. International system) 
While interpreting (Internal vs. External franchisee) (Original vs. Transferred 
data franchisee) 
Sampling within the material (RC) Maximum variation 
(FC) ... (Transferred franchisee) Extreme or deviant case 
Intensity 
Combination or mixed 
Maximum variation 
Homogeneous 
Extreme or deviant case 
While presenting the 
Presentational sampling Typical case findings Intensity 
Theory based 
Confirming and disconfirming 
cases 
Source: the author 
From the above table, we can see that the sampling strategies used varied from data 
collection to the presentation of findings. The purpose of choosing a specific sampling 
strategy is to highlight, compare or contrast any similarities and differences. Hence, in 
the following chapters of comparative interpretation, analysis and findings, all the 
above sampling strategies will be rooted in these contexts. 
After the sampling strategies were defined, the next step was to detennine how many 
cases should be collected. There are many formulas to decide the sample size, but there 
is no set answer, it depends on the entity of the research itself. Krippendorff (1980) 
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suggests that when all sampling units are exactly identica~ a sample size of one is 
satisfactory. When there are a few rare and significant incidents on the lists of units, the 
sample will have to be large and will include the whole population when each sampling 
unit is unique. In this case, the situation is between these two extremes. Based on the 
costs of analysis, there comes a point at which a further increase will not appreciably 
improve the generalizability of the findings. This is the point at which the sample size 
is most efficient. It is a cost-benefit question, which depends largely on how the 
property to be generalised is distributed in the sample. Hence, the main constraints in 
this research are the time (six months) and the cost of travelling to access the 
interviewees. The ideal sample size for each franchise system was predetermined, i.e., 
at least 3 interviewees should be selected from each franchisor office and at least 10 
franchisees should be interviewed from each brand. There are two reasons for selection 
of the number of cases; one is to minimise the difference and bias among interviewees. 
The other is that the author wished to identify the similarities and differences among 
different groups. Based on grounded research, Strauss and Corbin (1998) suggest that 
there are three criteria to follow in choosing the sample size, which are: no new or 
relevant data seems to emerge regarding a category; the category is well developed in 
terms of its properties and dimensions demonstrating variation; and the relationships 
among categories are well established and validated. For these reasons, people who 
were either a senior manager in head office or a store supervisor were interviewed to 
allow comparisons. From the interactions between franchisees and store supervisors or 
senior managers, we can observe the relationship between franchisees and franchisors. 
Within the CVS sector, different types offranchisees were selected to allow comparison 
between different SUbtypes, for example, RC (Regular Chain, the store outlets are 
company omted), FCI (the store outlets are the franchisees' property) and FC2 (the 
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store outlets belong the to franchisor); single and multi-unit franchisees; and internal 
and external franchisees. Within the EA sector, the comparisons were mainly from 
single and multi-unit franchisee; original and transferred franchisee. From the 
franchisors' and franchisees' opinions toward each party, it is possible to find out the 
conceptual gaps between both parties. 
5.4 Data collection 
After the sampling strategies were decided, the next step was data collection. As far as 
the principles of data collection are concerned, Ym (1994) proposes that there are three 
principles of data collection: using mUltiple sources; creating a case study database; and 
maintaining a chain of evidence. These principles can help to construct validity and 
reliability of a case study. 
Using muhiple sources as a means of providing many different sources of evidence is a 
major strength of case study research. According to Ym (1989), any finding or 
conclusion in a case study is likely to be much more convincing and accurate if it is 
based on several different sources of information, following a corroboratory mode. In 
this research, the sources of data are not only from primary and secondary data 
collection but also from two different industries, the convenience store and estate 
agency industries. These multiple sources of evidence essentially provide multiple 
measures of the same phenomenon. 
Ym's (1994) argument for the second principle, creating a case study database, is that 
every case study should strive to develop a formal retrievable database so that other 
investigators can review the evidence directly and not be limited to the written reports. 
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In this research, all the interviews were transcribed into English written format. This 
database will increase markedly the reliability of the entire case study. Finally, Yin 
(1994) suggests that maintaining a chain of evidence is the principle of traceability: this 
allows an external observer to follow the derivation of any evidence from initial 
research questions to ultimate case study conclusions, moving from one portion of the 
case study to another, with clear cross.referencing to methodological procedures and to 
the resulting evidence. He states that this is the uhimate 'chain of evidence' that is 
desired. In other words, the methodology should be well connected with the analysis 
and conclusion to let external observers have a clear perspective in their minds. In this 
research, the methodology acts as the bridge between the literature review, the 
background of the Taiwanese retailing and the following analysis. Therefore, each 
chapter is like a chain, connected to each other. By following these criteria, the 
reliability and validity of the research can be constructed. The following section will 
elaborate on each section of the data collection to justifY the research. 
5.4.1 Sources of Data 
In this research, there are two different kinds of data resource: primary data and 
secondary data. As far as secondary data is concerned, internal data was used for 
example company brochures and franchise contracts, and external data such as 
published material and computer databases. The role of the secondary data is to 
provide the background and basis for the primary research. Three kinds of qualitative 
data collection methods were used to gather the primary data: participation, observation 
and in-depth interviews (Marshall and ~ossman. 1999). Participant observation 
demands firsthand involvement in the social world chosen for the study. Immersion in 
the setting allows the researcher to hear, see, and begin to experience reality as the 
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participants do. Ideally, the researcher should spend a considerable amount of time in 
the setting, learning about daily life. In this research, this method was difficult for two 
reasons: the difficulty of becoming a participant in a business were there may be 
sensitive information and the nature of the research focussing on a comparison of the 
convenience store and estate agency industries. This meant there were at least eight 
sets of comparisons to be processed. Hence, it was even more difficult to do 
participative observation Observation entails the systematic noting and recording of 
events, behaviours, and artefacts (objects) in the social setting chosen for study. The 
observational record is frequently referred to as field notes - detailed, non-judgemental, 
and concrete descriptions of what has been observed. In this case, as what was being 
investigated was the attitudes of the franchisors and franchisees towards each other, 
observation was not appropriate due to the emotional nature of these daily interactions. 
Kahn and Cannell (1957) describe interviewing as "a conversation with a purpose" 
(p.149). Typically, qualitative in-depth interviews are much more like conversations 
than formal events with predetermined response categories. The researcher explores a 
few general topics to help uncover the participant's views but otherwise respects how 
the participant frames and structures the responses. A degree of systematisation in 
questioning is necessary, for example, well-organised questions. As this research is 
based on exploratory research design, trying to uncover the interactions between 
franchisors and franchisees, the qualitative methodology of in-depth interviewing is 
very appropriate to achieve the research objectives. 
5.4.2 Pilot Testing 
Before doing the formal interviews, pilot testing is the final preparation for data 
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collection. The criteria for selecting the pilot were based on personal networks and 
geographical convenience. The pilot case study helps the researcher to refme the data 
collection plans with respect to both the contents of the data and procedures to be 
followed. UsualIy~ pilot studies are undertaken prior to the selection of specific 
technologies for the final data collection and prior to the final articulation of the study's 
theoretical propositions (YIn, 1994). Thus, the pilot data provided considerable insight 
into the basic issues being studied. In addition, the pilot inquiry can be much broader 
and less focused than the ultimate data collection pian, and can cover both substantive 
and methodological issues. In this research, pilot tests were undertaken for both 
industries. Within each industry~ one franchisor and three franchisees were selected for 
pilot testing. From these pilots, the author learned how to improve the research 
questions and refine the questions for different subgroups. Due to the minor nature of 
the corrections, these were progressed during the following interviews; these changes 
will not affect the overall reliability of the study as they were about issues oflanguage 
translation and the use of proper nouns. 
5.4.3 In-depth Inten'iews 
Once the pilot testing was completed, the next step was to undertake formal interviews. 
The interview is one of the most powerful ways of collecting data. As Fontana and Frey 
(1994) put it: 
"Interviewing has a wide variety of forms and a multiplicity of uses. The most 
common type of interviewing is individual, face-to-face verbal interchange, but it 
can also take the form of face-to-face group interviewing, mailed or 
self-administered questionnaires, and telephone surveys. Interviewing can be 
structured, semi-structured, or unstructured It can be used for marketing 
purposes, to gather political opinions, for therapeutic reasons, or to produce data 
for academic analysis. It can be used for the purpose of measurement or its scope 
can be the understanding of an individual or a group perspective. An interview 
can be a one-time, brief exchange, say five minutes over the telephone, or it can 
take place over multiple, lengthy sessions, sometimes spanning days, as in 
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life-history interviewing. " 
From the above description, we can see that there are many alternatives for interviews. 
In this research, two kinds of interview, face-to-face interviews (79 interviews) and 
telephone interviews (5 interviews) were adopted. No matter which kind of 
interviewing was undertaken, as the purpose was to understand another person's 
constructions of reality, they were asked in such a way that they could respond in their 
terms and in a manner from which the rich context that is the substance oftheir meaning 
was evident (Jones, 1985). Mariampolski (2001) also suggests that individual depth 
interviews are the preferred methodology when the project demands intensive probing 
of respondents, or reactions to ideas without influence from peers. This kind of 
interviewing facilitates a high degree of psychological depth, that is, investigation of 
motivations, associations and explanations behind preferences. 
Although interviewing is a powerful method, just like other research methods, 
interviews have particular strengths and weakness. Although the interview technique 
has the strength of obtaining large amounts of data quickly, Marshall and Rossman 
(1999) stress that the main limitations involve the difficulties of personal interaction 
and co-operation. Interviewees may be unwilling or may be uncomfortable sharing all 
that the interviewer hopes to explore, or they maybe unaware of recurring patterns in 
their lives. In the process of interviewing, the author encountered the former situation, 
with franchisees afraid that if they told the truth, the franchisor would have a bad 
impression of them. Where the questions were felt to be sensitive, some franchisees 
preferred to answer "No comment", although the researcher told them that the 
franchisor would not know the individuals concerned. This kind of situation occurred 
mostly in the CVS industry because that the ownership is combined with the 
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franchisors. 
As far as the styles of interviewing are concerned, Patton (1980) distinguishes between 
three main types of interview: the infonnal conversational interview; the general 
interview guide approach; and the standardised open-end interview. Fielding (1996) 
uses the tenns 'standardised', 'semi-standardised' and 'non-standardised'. Similarly, 
Fontana and Frey (1994) use a three-way classification of structured, semi-structured 
and unstructured interviewing, and they apply this schema to both individual and group 
interviews. In this research, the author adopted Fontana and Frey's semi-structured 
interviews. This kind of approach, in particular, has attracted interest and is wideJy 
used. This interest is linked to an expectation that the interviewee's viewpoints are 
more likely to be expressed in a relatively openJy designed interview situation than in 
the case ofa structured interview or a questionnaire. Flick (1998) classified this kind of 
semi-structured interview into five categories: focused interview, semi-standardised 
interview, problem-centred interview, expert interview and the ethnographic interview. 
The differences between these approaches are shown in Table 5.7. Each kind of 
interview has its advantages and disadvantages. The reason for selecting a specific 
interview type for this research is based on the criteria 'domain of application'. Hence, 
the researcher used four methods for semi-structured interviews - the focused, the 
semi-standar~ the probJem-centred and the expert inte~ew. 
Table 5.7 Com arison of Methods for Semi-Structured Interviews 
Ethnographi 
c interview 
• NorH!irectio • Open questions • Object and • Limited • Descriptive 
nby process because only questions 
unstructured oricn1ation interested in 
questions 
• Room for 
the expert, not 
narratives in the person 
Structuring 
• Giving a • Hypothesis-dim; • Interview • Interview • Structural (e.g. deepening) 
stimulus ted questions guide as basis guide as Questions the issue by: for tums and instrument for 
• Contrastive • Structured • Con1i'on1ationaJ 
uestions ending structuring uestions uestions 
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unproductive 
• Focusing on 
feelings 
presentations 
Contribution to 
• the general Four criteria • 
Structuring the • Sort • Highlighting • 
Highlighting 
development of for designing 
contents with questionnaire of direction: the problem 
the interview as a interviews 
structure laying 
• Postscript 
limitation of of mak ing 
method • Analysing 
technique the interview to interview 
the object as • Suggestions for 
the expert situations 
a second data explicating 
sort implicit 
knowled2c 
Domain of 
application • Analysis of • 
Reconstructioo' • Socially OfT • Expert ~.~ 
• In the 
, Ii subjective I~ of subjective , 
IT) biographically ,~ knowledge in framework 
. 
I' meanings theories 
.,li I~ relevant ' I institutions offield "-~ 
l'l, ' , it. 
. problems : , . 
research in 
. ,' , 
. '. 
.": ' ,. 
ie, 
.' 
,.> open fields 
Problems in 
"' 
I .." 
conducting the • Dilemma of • 
Extensive • Unsystematic • Role diffusion • 
Mediation 
method combining 
methodological change from of the between 
the criteria input narrative to 
interviewee friendly 
• Problems of 
question-.answe 
• Blocking by 
conversation 
interpretation 
r schema the expert 
and formal 
interview 
Limitations of the 
method • 
Assumption • Introducing a • 
Problem • Limitation of • Mainly 
of knowing structure orientation 
the sensible in 
objective 
• Need to adapt the • 
Unsystematic 
interpretation combination 
features of method to the combination of 
on expert with 
the object is issue and the most diverse 
knowledge observation 
questionable interviewee partial 
and field 
research 
• Hardly any 
elements 
application 
in its pure 
form 
References Merton and Groeben (1990); Ruff (I 991); 
Meuser and Nagel Spradley (1979) 
Kendall (1946) Scheele and Witzel ( 1982; (1991) 
Groeben (1988) 1985) 
Source: Flick (1998) 
From the above table, we can see that aside from the ethnographic interview, the other 
four types of interview applications are applicable to this research. For example, 
franchisees were asked about the leadership of the franchisor, which bas a subjective 
meaning. In addition, from the fieldwork, some theories can be reconstructed for the 
purpose of localisation. Further, many questions are about socially relevant problems, 
such as the interactions and relationship maintenance between franchisors and 
franchisees. Finally, as the interviewees are those who have particular experiences in 
this industry, they are qualified to answer the questions, and as such, fall into the expert 
interview category. 
In practice, as the interviews were conducted, the author tried different ways to access 
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franchisors and franchisees, such as personal networks; formal letters of inquiry; 
telephone inquires; or just walking into the store asking for an interview. With EA, the 
researcher started with his personal network because he worked in an estate agency 
company, so, he interviewed his ex-boss and asked him to introduce the franchisor and 
other franchisees. After interviewing the franchisor, the franchisor introduced two 
other franchisors (ChinaTrust and Century 21) based on his personaJ network. In 
addition, the author initially sent out formal inquiry letters (see Appendix 5), but as the 
response rate was quite low, he fmally decided to directly telephone them asking for 
interviews and the response was generally much higher. In general, the success rate of 
the phone call approach was quite high, about 50%. Some even asked for an interview 
just after the phone call, but some were unable to honour the appointed time due to 
customers commitments and a further appointment had to be made. 
With CVS, there were two ways to access the franchisors, one was through a personal 
networ~ as two of the author's friends worked in a franchisor's head office and were 
able to introduce the author to some managers and franchisees. Where there was no 
relationship, the author just sent the formal inquiry letters to the franchisors and 
surprisingly all of them agreed to an interview with the author. Some franchisors even 
introduced the author to 10 franchisees, including franchisees in the tbree categories 
(RC, FCI and FC2). Where the franchisor was unwilling to do this, the author simply 
visited stores and asked for interviews randomly. The final response rate was fuirly 
good; around 71 % of approaches were achieved in the CVS sector. The details of all 
the interviews are shown in Table 5.8. 
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Table 5.8 The Details ofInterviewees 
Brand LocallInternational Partner Franchisor Franchisee Franchisee Characteristics· Franchise Interviewees Interviewees (RCIFC IIFC2/SimdelMulti-Unit) 
HB Local 2 10 Single writ franchisee 4 Multi-writ franchisee 6 
Rebar Local 2 10 Single writ franchisee 10 Estate Agency Multi-unit franchisee 0 
(EA) Industry ChinaTrust Local 2 10 Single writ franchisee 8 Multi-unit franchisee 2 
Century 21 Inward I (Joint US 1 10 Singte unit franchisee 9 
venture) Multi-unit franchisee 1 
Inward I (Master RC 3 
franchising) and US, Philippine FCl 4 7-Eleven 2 10 FC2 3 Outward I (Joint and China Single unit franchisee 7 
venture) Multi-unit franchisee 3 
RC 2 
Inward I (Master FCl N/A Circle K franchising) US 2 10 FC2 8 Convenience Single unit franchisee 8 
Store (CVS) Multi-unit franchisee 2 RC 0 
Industry Inward I (Master FCl N/A Niko Mart franchising) Japan 1 6 FC2 6 Single unit franchisee 5 
Multi-unit franchisee 1 
RC 1 
FC1 1 
Hi-Life Local 1 5 FC2 3 
Single unit franchisee S 
Multi-unit franchisee 0 
13 71 84 
• RC: Regular Chain (company-owned system); FC}: Franchise Chain 1 (the ownership of the store outlet belongs to the franchisee); FC2: Franchise Chain 2 
(the ownership of the store outlet belongs to the franchisor) 
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During the interviews, with the permission of the interviewees, all the interviews were 
recorded. After the interviews, thank you cards were sent to them with the author's 
Chinese calligraphy card. The following map shows where the researcher carried out 
the interviews. 
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Figure 5.5 Geographical locations of interviews 
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The interview questions were designed to relate to the original research objectives, 
Appendix four summarises how these interview questions relate to the research 
objectives. The interviews then completed the data collection stage of the research. 
After data collection, the next step is data analysis and reporting. 
5.5 Data Analysis and Reporting 
"Analysing data is the heart of building theory from case studies, but it is both the 
most difficult and the least codified part of the process" (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
Wolcott (1994) sees data analysis as a process of data transfonnation that involves 
description, analysis and interpretation. In description, data should speak for 
themselves and the account stays close to the data as originally captured. In analysis 
the researcher expands and extends data beyond a descriptive account. The emphasis is 
on the search for patterns and themes in the data, followed by the author's interpretation 
of what is going on. Interpretation is imaginative, freewheeling, casual, unbounded, 
aesthetically satisfying, idealistic and impassioned. Malhotra and Birks (1999) suggest 
that the key factors in developing analysis and interpretation of qualitative research lie 
in a combination of (1) theoretical understanding of the researcher collecting and 
analysing the data; and (2) marketing understanding, i.e., the appreciation of how 
decision-makers will use qualitative research findings. Hence, the data anaJysis and 
interpretation can not only contribute to academic study but also provide insights into 
how to improve the practical efficiency. 
5.5.1 Data Analysis Framework 
As far as the data analysis is concerned, this is divided into two sections, one is the core 
topic explored in the primary research - relationships and conflict, which will be 
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detailed in chapters 6 and 7. The others are the general issues in international 
franchising and franchising; this analysis was detailed in Chapter 4, where the author 
placed the analysis within the Taiwanese retail market. The author developed an 
analytical framework shown in Figure 5.6, which illustrates how the analysis will be 
presented in Chapters 6 and 7. 
In this framework, we can see that there are three dimensions: international retailing; 
franchise organisation; and relationship and conflict. The three dimensions interact 
with one another. The core issue of this research is in the relationship and conflict 
between franchisors and franchisees. By using comparative study, local and 
international systems, regular chains and franchise chains, single and multi-unit 
franchisees, original and transferred franchisees, internal and external franchisees are 
compared. The potential relationship and conflict can be uncovered. 
International Franchising 
Franchise Organisation 
Relationship and Conflict 
Regular Chain vs . 
Franchise Cha~ 
Original vs. Transferred 
Franchisee 
Figure 5.6 Analysis framework 
Source: the author 
Local vs. International 
System 
Single vs . Multi-unit 
Franchisee 
Internal vs . External 
Franchisee 
Fnmc:hi~or 
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Generally speaking, the analysis is based on text description; hence, the author selected 
key and typical statements from each subcategory. Glaser (1992) suggests the' constant 
comparative method' as a procedure for interpreting texts. This basically'consists of 
four strategies: (1) comparing incidents applicable to each category, (2) integrating 
categories and their properties, (3) delimiting the theory, and (4) writing the theory. For 
Glaser, the systematic circularity of this process is an essential feature. Although this 
method is a continuous growth process, each stage after a time transforms itself into the 
next, but previous stages remain in operation throughout the analysis and provide 
continuous development to the following stage until the analysis is terminated. Hence, 
based on continuous comparison, similarities and differences should be uncovered. 
First of all, the author adopted four kinds of coding: entire docwnent coding (what is 
going on here?), paragraph coding (interviewee's description). axial coding (CVS vs. 
EA; local vs. international; single vs. multi-unit franchisee; original vs. transferred 
franchisee; RC vs. FC; and internal vs. external franchisee), and selective coding. 
Selective coding integrates concepts around a core category, and fills in categories in 
need of further development and refinement. In addition, with entire document and 
paragraph coding, the analyst is concerned with generating categories and their 
properties, and then seeks to detennine how these categories vary dimensionally. In 
axial coding, categories are systematically developed and linked with subcategories. 
Finally, selective coding is the process of integrating and refining categories (Strauss 
and Corbin, 1996). From this coding, we can not only find categories but also the 
similarities and differences. So, the standard procedures of asking questions and 
making comparisons remain the essential analytical process; what is somewhat 
different is the analytical focus. Aside from developing new theories, the author is also 
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interested in extending existing theories, so he will enter the field with some existing 
concepts and relationships in mind and look for evidence of how their properties and 
dimensions vary under a different set of conditions. Hence, there are two purposes for 
the analysis: theory or model generation and refinement (theory test, elaboration and 
extension). 
Analysing data is usualIy the heart of building theory from cases study, but it is both the 
most difficult and the least codified part of the process because it has no definitive 
format. In this research, two kinds of analytical formats were adopted, one is 
within-case analysis and the other is cross-case analysis. The importance of 
within-case study analysis is driven by one of the realities of case study research: a 
staggering volume of data As Pettigrew (1988) described, there is an ever-present 
danger of 'death by data asphyxiation'. Within-case analysis typically involves 
detailed case study write-ups for each site. These write-ups are often pure descriptions, 
but they are central to the generation of insight (Gersick, 1988; Pettigrew, 1988) 
because they help researchers to cope early in the analysis process with the enormous 
volume of data However, there is no standard format for such analysis. In this research, 
within-case analysis is applied to the company level. Each company was seen as a case; 
hence, how the relationships and conflicts evolve within the case will be explored. The 
other approach the author adopted is cross-case study: the similarities and differences 
among companies between CVS and EA industries can be listed. These comparisons 
can be new categories and concepts, which the author did not anticipate. Hence, the 
following analysis starts with the analysis of the CVS sector, followed by the EA sector, 
then the two industries will be compared. 
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5.6 Reliability and Validity of the Research Method 
Generally speaking, critics of qualitative research often refer to the fact that this type of 
research does not meet the demands of reliability and validity. This is because 
qualitative research does not measure, it provides insights. This insight can be gained 
through a process consisting of analysis and the meaningful integration of views 
expressed by respondents (Spiggle, 1994). Indeed, as a result of the relative freedom 
and lack of structure and rigour characteristic of most qualitative research methods it is 
easy to question validity and reliability in their traditional sense (Kirk and Miller, 1986). 
According to Quinn Patton: 
"Validity focuses on the meaning and meaningfulness of data; reliability focuses on the 
consistency of results" (Quinn Patton, 1986) 
Although critics are from various perspectives, many researchers still develop some 
useful tools to justifY qualitative research. For example, Yin (1994) proposes the case 
study tactics to construct the reliability and validity of a research; Table 5.9 highlights 
such tactics. 
Table 5.9 Case Study Tactics or our eSIgn ests fC F D· T 
Case study tactic Phase of research in which Test 
tactic occurs 
• Use multiple source of • Date collection 
evidence 
Construct validity Establish chain of evidence • Date collection • 
• Have key informants review draft • Composition 
case study report 
• Do pattern-matching or • Data analysis 
Internal validity explanation building or time-series 
analysis 
• Use replication logic in • Research design External validity 
muhiple-case studies 
• Use case study protocol • Data collection Reliability 
• Develo~ case study database • Data collection 
Source: Yin (1994) 
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The question of validity can be summarised as 'a question oj whether the researcher 
sees what he or she thinks he or she sees' (Kirk and Miller, 1986). Therefore, the 
validity of qualitative research is primarily related to the fact that constructs are closely 
aligned to their real-life context. A basic problem in assessing the validity 0 f 
qualitative research is in how to specify the link between the relations that are studied 
and the version of them provided by the researcher. In this research, according to Yin 
(1994), we use the following three tests to examine the validity: _ 
• Construct validity is the extent to which we establish correct operational measures 
for the concepts being studied. Through the use of mUltiple sources of evidence, 
triangulation allows an investigator to address a broader range of historical, 
attitudina~ and behavioural issues. The most important advantage presented by 
using multiple sources of evidence is the development of converging lines of 
inquiry (Yin, 1994). Denzin and Lincoln (1994) distinguish four types of 
triangulation. They are 'data triangulation', 'investigator triangulation', 'theory 
triangulation' and 'methodological triangulation'. In this research, data 
triangulation was applied by using different data sources, such as interviewing and 
secondary data. As for investigator triangulation. the purpose of this approach is to 
minimize bias resulting from the researcher as a person. However, because of the 
constraints oftime and money, the author had to do the research by himself, so this 
research does not allow investigator triangulation. Third, theory triangulation is 
achieved as many theories regarding the management issues were adopted (e.g., 
motivational theory, decision-maker characteristics and relational exchange theory). 
Finally, concerning methodological triangulation, the researcher used different 
kinds of methods to carry out the study. For example. the analyses are based on 
both within-case and cross-case analysis. With regard to the establishment of a 
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chain of evidence, this has been covered in the previous section. As to suggestion 
that key infonnants review a draft case study report, this was done in the pilot test. 
• Internal validity is a notion often seen to be particularly appropriate to qualitative 
research. It refers to the internal coherence of the fmdings by cross-checking and 
amplifying of ideas as they emerge out of the data (Sykes, 1991). In this research, 
pattern-matching was adopted in the leadership questions, for example, 
interviewees were asked which kind of leadership their franchisors adopted, they 
chose from three patterns: which are participative; supportive; and achievement 
leadership. If the patterns coincide, the results can help a case study strengthen its 
internal validity. 
• External validity is knowing whether a study's finding can be generalised beyond 
the immediate case study. The main approach is to use replication logic in mUltiple 
case studies. In this research, for example, the replication logic is not only used at 
the industrial level but also at the business format level. By means of replication, a 
theory can be tested in a second case or even more times, and the same results 
should occur. 
Finally, concerning reliability, the question, which seems to be asked most often is: 
would the same study carried out by two researchers produce the same findings? It is 
the inherent characteristics of qualitative methods, their flexibility and the absence of 
rigid experimental control, that throws into doubt their ability to produce reliable 
fmdings (Sykes, 1991). However, an in-depth insight into the motivations and 
perceptions of respondents does not primarily require reproductively. Instead, it 
requires a feeling for the logic and psychology of, as well as certain 'drivers' ot: 
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consumer behaviour (Ruyter and Scholl, 1998). In this study, the consumers are both 
the franchisors and the franchisees. Even so, Ym (1994) suggests reliability can 
enhance the credibility of a research study and specifies that reliability is the extent to 
which a study's operations can be repeated. A case study database can be developed to 
enhance the reliability. In this research, as mentioned before, databases of the 
interviews were developed and transcribed into English written format. 
5.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has presented the philosophical stances of various methodological 
approaches and adopted the most suitable strategies to carry out this study. All of these 
strategies are related to the research objectives and questions, which were, derived from 
previous literature reviews of international retailing, franchising and management 
issues in franchising. The research design was then developed, with the reasons given 
for carrying out a qualitative exploratory research. Details of particular issues to be 
investigated like the relationships and conflicts between franchisors and franchisees 
were presented, along with the practical considerations such as sampling, data 
collection and analysis procedures. Finally, considerations of reliability and validity 
were adopted to quaIi:tY the research. 
The next chapters provide the findings ofthe primary work. These are divided into two 
chapters. The first, chapter 6, deals with the motivations for franchising defined as 
objective 4 in the conceptual framework. The second, chapter 7, considers the 
managerial issues of decision-maker characteristics (objective 5) and relational 
exchange theory (objective 7). 
CHAPTER SIX: ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS - I 
(MOTIVATIONS FOR FRANCHISING) 
6.0 Introduction 
)76 
Based on the previous discussions, this chapter and the following chapter will present 
the data gathered from the interviews. These data are fIrstly presented in their original 
form and then the author uses his insight to analyse them. In this analysis, management 
issues were explored due to their importance in the relationship between franchisors 
and franchisees. Three aspects influencing relationships were identified in the 
literature: (1) the motivations for franchising (relating to the literature on agency theory, 
resource constraint and transaction cost analysis), (2) decision-maker characteristics 
(knowledge, experience, attitude and entrepreneurship); and (3) relational exchange 
theory. From these analyses, potential conflicts between the franchisor and franchisee 
could be identified. After the discussions and analysis, key fmdings will be highlighted, 
particularly those in conflict with existing theories. Finally, models will be generated to 
explain the phenomena of interactions between franchisors and franchisees. 
6.1 Agency Theory 
According to agency theory, there are three issues that provide an explanation for the 
motivation to franchise, namely: the selection of franchisees; monitoring costs; and risk 
considerations relative to the external environment. As stated in the literature review, 
agency theory suggests two areas with the potential to lead to conflict, i.e., 
pre-contractual and post-contractual problems. Before signing a franchise contract, the 
key issues are whether a particular prospective agent has the characteristics the 
principal is seeking and the kind of strategy the principal should employ. Problems 
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mainly arise :from information asymmetries. As to post-contractual problems, these, by 
definition arise only after both parties have signed contracts. In the following 
discussion, the views of those within the Convenience Store (CVS) industry are 
presented first followed by those from the Estate Agency (EA) industry. Details on the 
background of the interviewees are shown in Appendix 6. 
6.1.1 The Criteria Franchisors and Franchisees use to SeJect the Other Party 
This section is mainly related to pre-contractual issues. In the CVS industry, due to the 
fact that candidates do not necessarily need specific skills to be franchisees, most 
people are "qualified" to become a franchisee. If somebody has an interest, sbe/he just 
phones the franchisor and asks for an interview. As to how franchisors make their 
selection, this is what they said: 
"There are eight procedures to help select a suitable/ranchisee. These include an 
introduction day to let potential franchisees know about the franchisor. Then 
followed by a family visit, forty-hours of on-line practice, interviews with four 
managers and ends with educational training. Usually, it takes about two months 
to test whether shelhe is a potential franchisee or not. As 10 a RC manager, she/he 
will be evaluated by the regular evaluation on practice and booklet report. " 
(7-Eleven) (International) 
"The criteria are whether shelhe has enough capital, ability, human resources, 
family support, academic qualification (university degree) and correct concept of 
this industry. Asfor experience, that is not necessary. "(Circle K) (International) 
"The criteria are that there must be two persons (not necessarily a married couple) 
running the store, that the age limit is below 50 and finally, that the minimum 
academic degree must be high school level. As to the RC manager, shelhe will be 
trained by the franchisor step by step before being appointed as a qualified store 
manager. " (Niko Mart) (International) 
From the above descriptions, we can see that there are passive and active qualifications. 
Passive qualifications include academic achievement, age, capital and human resource. 
Such qualifications make candidates examine themselves as to whether they are 
qualified for the task. After that, the franchisors use different screening skills such as 
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interviews, pen and paper tests or on-line practice to sort out the potential agents. From 
these tests, both parties will decide whether the other party is suitable for them. If they 
are compatible, then the franchise contract will be signed and will last for at least five 
years. Clearly, both parties need to think carefully to prevent conflicts afterwards. 
The above-cited comments are from the franchisors' points of view. Franchisees will 
have a different way of thinking; the following are typical of their selecting approaches 
to selecting a franchisor. 
"This is because 7-Eleven is the leading brand in Taiwan and the franchisor has a 
sound background As a customer, when I have a choice, I prefer shopping in the 
brand s outlets. Although the sharing percentage is not the highest compared with 
other systems, I would be proud of being afranchisee of this brand II (7-Eleven) 
(Franchisee 5) 
"This is because I was an internal store supervisor but as the salary was not high 
enough for such high responsibility 1 transferred to being a franchisee. Even 
though the franchisor gave a discount to internal employees. As to other brands, I 
carefully thought about it, butfinally, I still chose the one 1 amfamiliar with rather 
than the most popular one. " (Circle K) (Franchisee 2) 
"This is because that we are not qualified to be afranchiseefor the leading brand. 
Our educational levels are not high enough so we have to choose the inferior 
brand. "(Hi-Life) (Franchisee 2) 
As well as from the above reasons, many others were provided, such as the franchisor 
giving a quick response; organisational atmosphere; capital requirement; easy 
recognition of the brand; a friend's introduction and the brand's reputation. There is 
another interesting pattern of those who had previously been store managers; nobody 
transferred from the original franchisor to another brand. The reasons for this could be 
that the franchisors gave them discounts, or that the franchisees were used to the 
particular management style. 
For company managers, the main reasons to remain an employee of the company 
included: it is a good job for a female; it is stressful to be a franchisee and a preference 
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to be promoted within the company. The research revealed that most company 
managers were females and this kind of work was suitable because the work time was 
quite flexible. As to why they did not wish to change to become a franchisee, one 
company manager said that there are two reasons, one is that it is difficult to fmd and 
train part-time staff; secondly, if the franchised outlet were profitable, it was felt that the 
franchisor would open another outlet nearby to share the market. 
After pre-contractual selection, potential franchisees have a choice offive stores for all 
brands. The franchisor will show the candidate the historical sales of these 
company-owned stores and let the franchisee choose one store from the five. Of course, 
all these stores are profitable; otherwise the franchisor would have to cover the deficit at 
the end of the year. The link between the parties is stressed in order to maximise the 
store's performance. 
From the above viewpoints, we can see that CVS franchisors have standardised their 
requirements when selecting franchisees. However, in the EA sector, due to different 
working characteristics, the required qualities vary from those of the convenience store 
industry. In estate agency work, the criteria for choosing a suitable franchisee are more 
flexible and simpler than in the CVS industry, and the selection is more subjective. 
Some franchisors expressed this view as follows: 
"First, we will investigate his credit in the industry and if the candidate has other 
brand experience, we will evaluate his former operating records. Second, we will 
evaluate whether his performance was good and finally. we will take his moral 
standard into consideration. I will not consider those without previous experience. 
This is because the franchisee S operation is related to the brand reputation, and 
inexperience will only increase the franchisor :r burden. Also, if the franchisee :r 
performance is not good, he will ask more from the franchisor rather than from 
himself" (DB) (Local) 
"We will investigate his background, and basically, he must have work experience 
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in thisjield and must hold the license to run the office. Further, he must accept the 
~oncept of sharing house information with other franchisees. Finally, we will 
Investigate his past operational records to see whether his reputation is good or 
not. " (Century 21) (International) 
From these typical comments, we can see that most franchisors prefer those with 
working experience to be their franchisees, as this means that the franchisor does not 
need to supervise them too closely. Moreover, a franchisee's past operating record is 
seen to be particularly important in determining his quality in this industry. However, 
the franchisees' viewpoints may be different when they come to choose a franchisor. 
This is what the franchisees said: 
"There was no international brand before, and this was the leading brand at that 
time and the quality of franchisees was excellent. If 1 could choose again, I would 
still choose this brand because 1 have been used to it for over 10 years. The 
international brand is not so successful as the local brands in Taiwan and its 
operations should be adapted to the Taiwanese market. " (HB) (Franchisee 1) 
"Basically, this brand has a higher market share and 1 havejoined the system/or 6 
years. 1 was an employee of the other RC system. This brand has stronger logistic 
support and the franchisor s background is strong. In addition, the brand gives to 
the public a good impression. " (Rebar) (Franchisee 5) 
"The reason for choosing this brand was that its mother company has a good 
reputation being a new brand it had no detrimental history with the advantage of a 
fresh impression on the customer. "(ChinaTrust) (Franchisee 7) 
"There are three reasons why ljoined the international brand, one was that other 
chain brands had already occupied this trading area so that I had little choice. 
Second, the royalty for this brand is cheaper than others and finally, as this was a 
new it would give customers afresh impression without any good or bad historical 
records. " (Century 21) (Franchisee 5) 
From the above comments, we can see that what franchisees care about most is brand 
reputation. This is followed by market space, the background of the franchisor, 
royalties, friend's introduction and so on. There is a tendency in the industry that shows 
that the earlier the franchisees enter the market, the more opportunities they have to 
choose between brands and locations. As a result, those following can only choose 
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from the inferior options because every franchisee has an exclusive trading distance. 
However, this situation sometimes does not apply, if the original franchisee agrees. 
Summarising the above statements, we can see that in both industries, franchisors and 
franchisees have their own viewpoints on how they choose a good partner. However, 
there are some particular differences among them For instance, the franchisors in CVS 
seem to adopt a standard selecting procedure to fmd out the most suitable franchisee. 
With EA, what franchisors care most is whether the candidate has industrial experience 
and hislher credit record. Generally speaking, the criteria are more flexible. With the 
franchisees, those in CVS care about the strength of the brand and/or the gross margin 
on offer. In the EA, what franchisees care most is the reputation of the brand. 
6.1.2 The Relationship between Monitoring Costs and the Incompleteness of the 
Contract 
After entering into a business relationship with the franchisor, both parties' behaviour is 
based on the contract. However, in practice the contract is usually more beneficial to 
the franchisor and sometimes the franchisor even has the authority to change the 
contract without informing franchisees. As a result, the incompleteness and inequality 
of contracts leads to many agency problems. In order to prevent this, the franchisor 
usually adopts a system of monitoring to ensure that franchisees follow the principal's 
policy. Questions were asked of both franchisors and franchisees to see whether they 
thought that monitoring costs arise from the incompleteness of the contract. First let us 
see what the CVS franchisors said: 
"] don t think so, there is no relationship between monitoring costs and the 
incompleteness of the contract. The monitoring is to help the franchisee do better. 
The store supervisor will tell the franchisee where he should improve and there is 
no penalty, just rewards for those with good performance. As to whether the 
contract is equal or not, in fact, it is impossible to be equal. It is beneficial to the 
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franchisor; especially on the points of obligations and power. But we don ~ count 
on the contract too much, the main interaction is based on mutual 
communication. " (7-Eleven) (International) 
"It should be said that the contract just regulates the policies rather than 
operational issues. As a result, the purpose of monitoring is to check whether 
franchisees follow the franchisor S policy or not. Also, there are two other 
functions of monitoring. One is to check whether the franchisee is used to the store 
~perations and the other is to remind franchisees which kinds of operations are 
zl/egal. As to the contract, to be truthful, it is not so equal because the franchisor 
has the dominant position. "(Circle K) (International) 
"/ don ~ think the contract is equal; this is because the franchisor has to face so 
many different franchisees, and as a result, the franchisor has to think how to 
protect the business from the worst situations that could arise. " (Niko Mart) 
(International) 
All of the CVS franchisors think that monitoring is not related to the incompleteness of 
the contract, this is because even if there were no franchisees but all company-owned 
outlets, the franchisors would stilI follow the same system to maintain quality. Further, 
the contract specifies the policy rather than operational guidelines. Franchisors argue 
that the function of the store supervisor is to help franchisees become familiar with the 
store operations. However, franchisees have a different view when they were asked 
whether they are monitored by franchisors: 
"The monitoring is done by the store supervisor and a computer network., such as 
POs. The store supervisor will ask me to improve the efficiency via the computer 
system. For example, from the computer he can see which kinds of products are 
best sellers and if you don ~ have any stock at all, and then he will no doubt ask 
why you don t order more. Also, he will evaluate the layout of products, and the 
cleanness of the store. If the result is good enough (the top 100s), then you will be 
rewarded by a free trip abroad and it is an important criterion on your application 
to be a multi-unitfranchisee. lfthe result is not good, you will need to attend the 
retraining course to improve the service quality. Such kind of monitoring is not 
related to the incompleteness of the contract. / (hink it is to keep brand value 
because total outlets are over 2500s. Jfthe franchisor doesn t monitor franchisees, 
then the brand will be easily damaged" (7-Eleven) (Franchisee 6) 
"The monitoring is very strict. If the monitoring is reasonable, that's fine and 1 
am happy to accept it. But if the monitoring is unreasonable, then the motivation 
for a franchisee to run a store will become lower. Now, the franchisor asks too 
much on the hot product lines, i.e., you cannot be short of 5 product items among 
the 200 hot product Jines. !f you are found in such a situation, you will be fined 
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Aside from the store supervisor who assists the store once a week, the auditor also 
comes and scores the performance once a month Performance is based on how 
the franchisee operates the store. If the performance is not good 3 times within 
one year, then the franchisor has the power to terminate the relationship. If the 
franchise is terminated, shelhe has to pay the penalty as well. The monitoring is 
somehow related to the incompleteness of the contract. But the monitoring is very 
unreasonable, for example, the auditor may check the store at midnight, when he 
comes, you have to be sure that you don't have any shortage on the display shelves, 
otherwise, you will be fined Take fast food for example, it is unreasonable to 
audit at midnight. As a result, the problem is on the communication channel, i.e., 
the people who are in the franchisor office don 'f know the practices on the front 
line so that they give many poor and bad directions. " (Circle K) (Franchisee 9) 
From the above comments, we see that there are two kinds of monitoring mechanisms, 
one is via the store supervisor, and the other is from the auditor. Some of the 
franchisors use a positive rewards system but others use punishments. From the 
researc~ it seems that more complaints arose when the franchisor used coercive power. 
In reality, most franchisors used both powers to manage franchisees, the store 
supervisor uses non-coercive power and the auditor uses the coercive power. However, 
most franchisees say they welcome some kind of monitoring, because the store 
supervisor can assist the franchisee in rwming the store especially if the franchisee is 
unfamiliar with the operations. The supervisor can tell him about other franchisees' 
experiences so that he can learn and improve his own perfonnance. Some franchisees 
think it depends on the attitude and ability of the store supervisor. In addition. if the 
franchisor is the owner of the store outlet as in the FC2 system, the franchisor needs to 
assign somebody to check whether there is any damage by the franchisee. Final1y, 
Some franchisees said it should be called assistance rather than monitoring, and most of 
them do not think monitoring is related to the incompleteness of the contract because 
monitoring is already specified in the contract. 
As for the contract itself, most of them think the contract is unequal, especially on the 
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sharing percentage, exclusive territory, the power to change the contract at any time 
without notice to the franchisees and the prices of commodities. One franchisee even 
said that the franchisor can sue the franchisee for breaking the rules and can terminate 
the relationship at any time, but on the other hand there are no contract terms to regulate 
the franchisor's bad service and management. 
Compared with franchisees, the company-owned managers' mission is to achieve the 
franchisor's annual objectives. If the performance is achieved, then an extra bonus is 
awarded, if not, the store manager may be downgraded. Aside from the store supervisor, 
franchisors usually assign auditors to check the inventory and product management at 
regular times. If the performance is not good, then the store supervisor will be blamed 
by the franchisor, and in turn, the store supervisor will blame the franchisee. 
After examining the case of the CVS industry, we can see that the views expressed 
conflict with agency theory on some points, but is it the same in the EA industry? In the 
estate agency case, the transaction frequency with end customers is not so high as in the 
CVS industry. Also, the ownership patterns are independent between the franchisors 
and franchisees. As a result, the franchisors have different policies from the CVS. This 
is what the franchisors said: 
"No, it should be said that the contract is so efficient that the franchisor has to 
monitor franchisees to see whether they follow the franchisor s policy. As to 
whether the contract is equal, it should be. But owing that the contract is designed 
by the franchisor, the franchisor has to stand on the top point to see the whole view 
rather than view from the single franchisee. Therefore, the contract should be fair 
to most franchisees. " (HB) (Local) 
"No, I don t think the monitoring cost is from the incompleteness of the contract. 
Rather, the contract is equal to both parties. The difference is just in the 
responsibility. The monitoring is to check whether franchisees follow the 
franchisor s policy so that the brand value can be reserved If the contract were 
not equal, franchisees would not join the system. The contract should be an 
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interactive too/, each party stands on the negotiated point to maintain and 
promote the brand to benefit with each other and coexist without the absence of 
the other party. " (Rebar) (Local) 
"... The purpose of monitoring is to protect customers rather than to make 
franchisees' trouble. As to whether the contract is fair, to be the truth, it is not fair. 
This is because the franchisor paid so much on acquiring the know-how' and 
promotes the brand but franchisees just pay a little and then can benefit from the 
brand. But on rights and duty, it is equalfor both parties. So, on the protection of 
the brand and customer satisfaction, the franchisor has its subjectivity. As a result, 
conflicts are usually from these two points. " (ChinaTrust) (Local) 
Again, none of the franchisors think that monitoring comes about from incompleteness 
of the contract. Rather, most ofthe franchisors think the contract terms are reasonable 
and fuir, because they have to limit the actions of the worst franchisees and protect both 
themselves and the customers. In this light, monitoring is believed to protect both 
franchisors and customers. However, monitoring depends on the franchisor's ability to 
carry it out. If the franchisor has difficulty in surviving financially, then monitoring is 
worth nothing, as unless customers complain directly to the franchisor about a 
franchisee's bad service, the franchisor usually ignores the franchisees' operations. 
In examining how the EA franchisees perceived the contract tenns and monitoring, 
typical responses were: 
" ... Monitoring intensity relates to the degree of dependence on each other. Being 
an old franchisee, what I use isjust the brand name. In theory, the contract should 
be equal, but in practice, some rules are more beneficial to the franchisor. For 
example, franchisees have to pay the guarantee fee that franchisors take for the 
prevention of franchisees' illegal behaviour. However, the contract does not 
specify that the franchisor has to compensate the franchisee s loss if the franchisor 
damages the franchisee s benefits. So, basically, the contract is not equal. " (HB) 
(Franchisee 8) 
"Jes, the franchisor will monitor and assist the franchisee periodically. 
Franchisees are graded as being A, B and C levels and each of them receives 
different treatment. We are one of the A level stores, and as a result, thefrequency 
of monitoring is only once a season. The auditor will check the documented 
information to see whether the franchisee follows the normal operations and in 
addition, interactions are usually via the computer network After grading, the A 
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stores have a 16,000 points quota on annual purchasing. For Band C, they have 
12,000 and 8,000 points respectively. Aside from the auditing, there is another 
person who is called the store supervisor who visits franchisees more often to deal 
with any question or difficulty. This kind of monitoring is not related to the 
incompleteness of the contract but its purpose is to keep good mutual interaction 
with franchisees... As to the contract, I have never thought about it because 
provided your behaviour is legal, you don i need to care about what is specified on 
the contract. " (Rebar) (Franchisee 6) 
"No, I have never been monitored by the franchisor, but I would welcome some 
kind of monitoring. As to the contract, it is not equal since if the franchisee does 
something, which is different from what is specified in the contract, then the 
franchisor has the power to terminate the contract and the franchisee cannot get 
back the guarantee fee. But the question is what is "Different from the Contract ". 
There is no specification in the contract and as a result, the franchisor can give 
any reason to allege a breach. " (ChinaTrust) (Franchisee 6) 
"Now, the franchisor has difficulUes in monitoring and assisting franchisees 
because the franchisor faces loss owing to the outlet number not reaching an 
economic figure. All franchisors in Taiwan have difficulty in choosing good 
quality franchisees, and that leads to damage to the franchisor s brand The 
frequency of the visit by the franchisor to the franchisee is about every four months. 
The aim is to communicate each other s concept. It is difficult/or thefranchisor to 
monitor and check the contracts of the franchisees. As a result, the visit is just to 
keep up a basic relationship. " (Century 21) (Franchisee 6) 
From their comments, we can see that franchisees would normally welcome some kind 
of monitoring but franchisors may lack the manpower to provide it and as a result, the 
basic service quality is usually maintained by the formula contracts, computer networks 
and transactional procedures. This is quite different from the CVS industry, which is 
based on daily operations. Compared with CVS, franchisees in EA largely think the 
contract is fair. Another difference is that the purpose of monitoring within CVS is to 
monitor franchisees, whereas with EA, the main aim is to protect customers. However, 
both industries think that it should be called assistance rather than monitoring. Having 
examined monitoring methods, the following section will discuss another dimension 
highlighted in agency theory, the relationship between monitoring cost and other 
factors, such as service leveL royalty and brand value. 
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6.1.3 The Relationship between Monitoring Costs and Service Levels, Monitoring 
Frequency and Royalty Rate 
Agrawal and Lal (1995) found a negative and significant relationship between service 
level and monitoring costs, and a positive relationship between monitoring frequency 
and royalty rate. First of all, we start with one ofthe franchisors in the CVS industry: 
"In theory, the monitoring costs should be lower if the franchisee s service level is 
good, but in practice, we don ~ think so, because no matter how the service level it 
is, the store supervisor has to score the performance twice a week. So, both of 
them have no relationship, but for those problematic franchisees, we will pay more 
attention to them, then, this kind of saying is right. As to the relationship between 
monitoringfrequency and royalty rate, I think there is no relationship because we 
will do the same monitoringfor RC outlets even if there is no franchisee. Finally, 
regarding monitoring costs and monitoring frequency, I feel that there is no 
relationship, as I said, the treatments for RC and FC outlets is the same no matter 
where the outlet is, so, the monitoring cost andfrequency basically are the same. " 
(7-Eleven) (International) 
All the other franchisors had the same opinion as 7-Eleven. As a result, we can suggest 
that all the expected relationships are not applicable to the CVS. Now, let us see how 
franchisees viewed it: 
'The cost is negatively related to the franchisee s service level. If I need help, the 
store supervisor will come to assist me. As to the relationship with the royalty, I 
think it has none because the number of store supervisors is related to the number 
of total outlets, no matter whether RC or FC outlets. " (Niko Mart) (Franchisee 
3) 
"If the performance is good, then the frequency will be lower, so the monitoring 
cost is negatively related to service level. Monitoring frequency is positively 
related to the royalty; this is because the franchisor s revenue is directly related to 
the franchisee:SO sales. So, the franchisor will ask the store supervisor to solve 
problems. In the beginning, I was i"itated by the frequency of monitoring because 
I was criticised when they checked the store, but now, the relationship is better 
because I have become used to the operations. " (Hi-Life) (Franchisee 2) 
From these comments, we can see that the answers vary in respect to the relationship 
between the royalty and monitoring frequency. First, no matter how many franchised 
outlets the franchisor owns, store supervisors are also needed to monitor 
company-owned outlets. Second, ifmonitoring can raise the franchisees' sales, then it 
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is directly beneficial to the franchisor. So, both statements are applicable. 
In the EA sector, the leading franchisor has a similar monitoring mechanism as the CVS. 
One is for assistance and the other is to monitor the franchisees' service quality. 
However, the other franchisors do not have the resources to provide these services. The 
following are from the franchisors' view: 
"There is no relationship between the monitoring frequency and royalty, or 
monitoring cost and service level. This is because the franchisor has a fIXed 
annual budget to do monitoring. " (HB) (Local) 
"No, it has no relationship with the cost of monitoring. The service quality is 
related to frequent educational training. As to the royalty, it also has no 
relationship with monitoring frequency. This is because in an urban area, the 
royalty is higher than in a rural area but has the same monitoring frequency. On 
the other hand, travelling expenses are higher in the rural area. Therefore, there 
is no direct relationship with the royalty. ... Since the budgetfor monitoring isfued, 
if the quantity of the store outlet doesn t reach an economic scale, then the 
operation will not be efficient. In general, the break-even outlets for the 
franchisor to keep in profit are 140s. Under this condition, the franchisor can 
offer normal support to franchisees. " (Rebar) (Local) 
From these statements, we can understand that franchisees do not need to be monitored 
if they follow the franchisor's policy. In order to keep customer connections, 
franchisees should provide good services and therefore, only questionable franchisees 
should be monitored. No franchisor said that there is a relationship between monitoring 
frequency and royalty rate because the cost of monitoring has already been budgeted 
for no matter how many franchisees there are. Now, let us see how the franchisees 
perceive the same point: 
"What the franchisor cares about isjust whether franchisees pay the royalties on 
time or not rather than the service quality of franchisees. This is because the 
franchisor thinks that if you don t want to continue the contract, it doesn ~ matter, 
there are still many people waitingfor thefranchise right in this area. As a result, 
franchisees have to count on themselves rather than the franchisor." (HB) 
(Franchisee 4) 
"There is no relationship between the monitoring costs and the service level. The 
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service level is up to the franchisee s attitude. As to the monitoring frequency, it 
also has no relationship with the royalty. In jact, it should be called assistance 
rather than monitoring, especially in a recession market. Actually, the market now 
is a buyer s (franchisee) market rather than a seller s (franchisor) market. So, 
how to satisfy franchisees is more important than monitor them. " (Century 21) 
(Franchisee 5) 
From the above descriptions, we can see that both parties in the EA think there is no 
relationship between these variables. So, it is clear that this resuh is in conflict with 
previous research. In addition, from some other franchisees' statements, they believe 
that personal relationships are still more important than mere legalities. Thus, if 
conflicts arise, the remedy lies frrst in personal contact and interaction, then followed 
by rationality and then lastly law. Furthermore, since most franchisors in the EA 
industries do not monitor their franchisees, they cannot get up to the minute information 
about franchisees. Some franchisees may take advantage of this to cheat customers 
with consequent damage to the brand value. However, customers will complain about 
bad services to the franchisor and then the franchisor will intervene. Usually, the 
franchisor stands on the customer's side to protect the brand value but this stance leads 
to conflict between the franchisor and franchisees. 
Compared with the CVS industry, we can see only one point in common and that is the 
protection of the brand value. In order to protect the brand names, the franchisors have 
to monitor franchisees either proactively or reactively. Therefore, the brand power is 
the most important reason why a strong brand will get stronger and a weak one will 
become weaker or even disappear. 
6.1.4 The Costs of Monitoring Multi-unit Franchisees 
Kaufmann and Dant (1996) suggest that the costs of monitoring multi-unit franchisees 
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should be cheaper than for a single franchisee. However, according to the field study 
the answers were varied. In the CVS industry, this view conflicts with the statements 
gathered. On the other hand, in the EA industry, the conclusion is as suggested in the 
literature. In order to find out the reasons for this contrast, let us see what the 
franchisors said in the CVS sample: 
"[t should be the same, as a store supervisor has to supervise eight outlets no 
matter whether they are BC or FC outlets. In theory, the supervisor will spend 
more time on franchisees to exchange thoughts with each other. While, for Re 
outlets, the supervisor just tells them whatlhow to do it directly rather than using a 
personal communication style. But for both of them, the supervisor has to do the 
performance evaluationfour times a month, so as a result, the cost basically is the 
same even though it is a multi-unitfranchisee. "(7.Eleven) (International) 
All the other franchisors' comments are similar, therefore, we see that every outlet, 
whether company-owed or franchised is treated in the same way. Maybe this is because 
there are so many product lines and promotional activities that franchisors have to 
check to ensure a united impression is kept. However, in the EA sector, because 
business is based on personal interactions, the style of monitoring is very different from 
that in the CVS, for example, one EA franchisor said: 
"In theory, it should be the same, but for the multi-unit franchisee. there is an 
advantage on communication cost. This is because we just need to communicate 
with the owner of these franchised outlets rather than every store manager. 
Concerning how to monitor, it is based on the paperwork, customers 'free phone or 
the non-periodical checkoffranchisees. "(ChinaTrust) (Local) 
From the above statement, we get the impression that it is cheaper to monitor multi-unit 
franchisees. Basically, in the EA industry, the franchisors just set up the game plan, 
which is based on the transactional process and safety between franchisees and 
customers. If the franchisees follow the rules, and then there will be no problems. 
However, if the service quality of some franchisees is not good enough, the franchisor 
has to get busy fire fighting. Generally speaking, the most important role, during all the 
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transactions, is that played by the store manager. If she/he adequately checks all the 
details then the salesmen will not cheat customers. After all, the salesman is also an 
agent of the store outlet and hence agency problems take place not only between the 
franchisor and franchisee but also between the franchisee and salesman. 
In the case of the CVS industry, we can suggest that monitoring is related to ownership 
and transaction frequency. However, generally speaking, it is easier to manage a 
muhi-unit franchisee because if the franchisee's quality is not good enough, the 
franchisor will not give him the opportunity to damage the franchisor's brand name. 
Having examined the relative questions about monitoring, the following section will 
discuss another important agency problem: whether a franchisee could cheat the 
franchisor and mislead him into making wrong decisions. 
6.1.5 Tbe Potential for Francbisees to Cbeat on Performance 
Since franchisors and franchisees are both self-interested parties, the agent may be 
reluctant to share information with the principal and in that situation, information 
asymmetry will develop. In order to minimize this problem, franchisors design 
mechanisms to prevent this, but for their part, in order to get more profit from the sales 
or for themselves, franchisees usually know how to cheat franchisors. In the CVS, the 
franchisors said: 
"No, never, this is because that all the operatiolUll details are controlled by the 
computer system. Also, there are other staff in the store, so, it is difficult to have 
the opportunity to cheat. " (7-Eleven) (International) 
But another interviewee said: 
itA few franchisees will do so to protect their benefits, for example. they will cheat 
on performance details to prevent the franchisor opening another outlet nearby. 
For the franchisor, not all the information from franchisees is taken into 
consideration. " (7-Eleven) (International) 
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"As to cheating on performance, I think they will not do so because once it is found 
out, then the relationship will be terminated As a result, the franchisee faces a 
huge risk doing this . .. (Hi-Life) (Local) 
It is evident that franchisors may use computer systems to prevent cheating, but data 
input is by people, giving the opportunity to cheat. However. the potential cost of 
cheating is huge since discovery would most likely lead to termination of the 
relationship. Now, let us see how franchisees perceived cheating: 
"No, I don t think so. The franchisor already knows how to prevent this kind of 
cheating before franchising and all transactions are recorded by computer 
network. JJ (7-Eleven) (Franchisee 4) 
"Jes, of course, take the invoice for example. The franchisor says that if 
customers do not take away the invoices, you have to tear it up. But we think it is 
waste because we may win the lottery from the invoice number. From the 
franchisor s perspective, he will think the franchisee wants to cheat the franchisor; 
but if the franchisee really wants to cheat, he can do so, and he just explains that 
this is a sales return and then the franchisee puts the illegal money in his pocket. " 
(Circle K) (Franchisee 3) 
Aside from the above ways of cheating, some franchisees mentioned other kinds of 
cheating. For example, the delivery companies sometimes do not check the quantity of 
products with franchisees so then franchisees can say there are shortages of products, 
although the franchisor will say this is impossible, because they also received a copy 
the delivery invoice. The final decision is made from the franchisor's computer system 
rather than franchisees'. Another franchisee said: "1 may sell products to my friends or 
relatives without giving them invoices, and then the items will be recorded as inventory 
loss." The reason why this is done is that both parties share the loss of inventory. 
However, in some systems, this kind of loss is absorbed by the franchisee so that they 
will not engage in that kind of cheating. These examples illustrate why the frequency 
of monitoring is so high. 
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In the EA industry, from the previous sections, we have established that there are many 
franchisees complaining about the franchisor's services. Hence, franchisees do not like 
to give the franchisor all the information that they possess. Let us see what were the 
franchisors' reactions to this: 
":fus, this is possible, franchisees may hide sales and market information. This is 
because they are afraid that the franchisor would raise the royalty or give another 
franchise right within the exclusive trading territory. " (HB) (Local) 
".Ies, but this kind of cheating will not influence the franchisor s benefits, 
otherwise, franchisees may ally together to cheat the franchisor. Also, the 
franchisor can get the relative information from the public media, so, it is difficult 
to mislead the franchisor s decision. " (CbinaTrust) (Local) 
From their opinions, we can see that franchisors believe that what franchisees care 
about are royalties and exclusive trading territories. As to whether franchisees think so, 
some of them said: 
"Yes, such as sales information and information on corif/icts with customers. The 
sales information is related to self-respect and competitions. Also, if you tell the 
truth, the government servant may trouble you on tax. if the franchisor knows the 
franchisee s performance is good, then he may give another franchise right to 
another person or raise the royalty. " (DB) (Francbisee 1) 
"Yes, such as the house iriformation and sales iriformation. This is because as the 
franchise system is a plural system, the franchisor stands on the RC side and may 
offer franchisees' information to RC outlets to the harm of franchisees. Also, 
franchisees prefer selling the Apple cases by them than sharing with other 
franchisees. As a result, wrong information would be put on the computer network. 
As to other cases, franchisees sometimes would share it with other brands' 
franchisees rather than the same system s franchisees. Hence, the same brand s 
franchisees do not mean they must co-operate together. Basically, it is based on 
the personal relationship rather than the brand relationship." (Rebar) 
(Francbisee 1) 
".Yes, but I think it is based on the mutual trust. If the franchisor s behaviour 
cannot be trusted by franchisees, then, why should franchisees want to offer 
correct iriformation to the franchisor?" (Cbina1i"ust) (Francbisee 8) 
From the franchisee's statements, we see that franchisors have always known where the 
problems are but they do not want to tackle them. This may be the reason wby the 
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degree of franchisee loyalty is so low. So, even if there are computer systems, 
franchisees can still input the wrong information. One franchisee said: "mutual trust 
and reliance are quite low andfranchisees just use the brand at most". These conflicts 
between the franchisors and franchisees lower the collective power of franchising. No 
wonder the leading brand in the market is a regular chain brand rather than a franchise 
brand. Comparatively, it therefore seems that the powers offranchisors are stronger in 
the CVS than in the EA industry. This is because franchisors can positive1y intervene 
rather than just take the royalty and do nothing. This explains why the 
brand-transferring rate is so high in the EA industry. 
6.1.6 Attention to Risk 
One of the considerations of agency theory is 'the risk of environment factors', such as 
economic and technical conditions in the market. However, such kinds of risk are 
difficult to forecast and measure. In general, franchisors tend to be more risk-neutral 
because they have more resources than franchisees. But does this differ across the 
industries? The foHowing section compares how both franchisors and franchisees 
perceive such kinds of risk. Let us see what the CVS franchisors said: 
"The risk should be the same, the franchisor even bear a higher risk than 
franchisees. For example, if one franchised outlet is closed down, the loss for the 
franchisee is just to terminate the relationship. But for the franchisor, the public 
will have a negative impression of the brand to wonder whether the brand has 
financial problems or not. It is harmful to the brand value." (Circle K) 
(International) 
"Both parties stand on the same side, so, the risk should be the same. The 
franchisor gives franchisees an annual guaranteed gross margin. lf they cannot 
meet that level, the franchisor will pay them the difference. " (Hi-Life) (Local) 
From the franchisors' descriptions, we see that franchisors not only have to face the risk 
of the stability of the franchisee but also of external changes. For franchisees, their loss 
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is just part ofa guaranteed fee if they do not want to run the outlet anymore. But some 
franchisees think the risk is similar, this is because franchisors have to face competition 
from other brands, and franchisees have to face the potential inventory Joss and the risk 
of theft at night. Compared with the loss of the franchisor, this is quite tiny, as most of 
the products in the store belong to the franchisor. As a result, we can infer that the 
franchisor is more risk-neutral than franchisees. Concerning the EA industry, as the 
ownership pattern is different; the result may be also different. Two franchisors in the 
EAsaid: 
"The franchisor has a higher resisting ability than franchisees. The risk of the 
franchisor is that the franchisee offers inadequate service to customers so that it 
damages the franchisor s brand value. Usually, customers will ask the franchisor 
/0 intervene in such a conflict. ... The franchisee s risk is whether the brand will 
last or not. If the franchisor disappears someday, then franchisees will have to 
face this kind of loss. So, franchisees can avoid this kind of loss before signing the 
contract. The other riskfranchisee has toface is the store manager himself Jfhe 
cannot adapt to the external change, then it is very easy to fail the business. " (HB) 
(Local) 
"What the franchisor can dodge is the daily operations under the recession. In 
other words, the franchisor gets the same royalty per month, even though 
franchisees don t have any income. If the franchisee closes down, there are still 
many people waiting to enter the market. So, the franchisor on the one hand has 
more resources to resist the external risk, on the other hand, the franchisor can 
dodge the operational risk. Hence, the franchisor should be more risk-neutral 
than franchisees. " (Rebar) (Local) 
From the above statements, the franchisors claimed that they were more risk-neutral; 
this is because they have more resources and their view is wider than that of franchisees, 
so, franchisors must be in charge of prevention. One franchisee stated that a source of 
risk for the franchisor is the stability of franchisees; this is because they may transfer to 
another brand, so, the franchisor's revenue will be reduced. However, if there are many 
people waiting to become franchisees, then the impact on the franchisor will be low. 
Another said there are some other risks for franchisees such as the legal funds required 
for being a franchisee, and the quality of salesmen. As a result, we can see that the risks 
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franchisees face are more related to the store operations, rather than the whole system 
and external changes, which franchisors have to face. Hence, as far as the resistance to 
external risk is concerned, the franchisor is more risk-neutral than franchisees, as is 
specified in agency theory. Both parties have different types of risk, which were not 
specified, and sometimes, such risk cannot be measured to say which one is more 
important than another. 
In comparison to the CVS, we can see a common point in that franchisors in both 
industries emphasise the risk to brand value. One difference between the sectors is in 
the ownership pattern, the CVS is characterised by combined ownership, whilst and the 
EA is independent. So, franchisees in the EA will face a higher risk than those in the 
CVS. 
6.1.7 The Relationship between the Initial Investment and Company Ownership 
In the CVS industry, due to the fact that most franchisees do not need any industrial 
experience and, as what the franchisors need is basically just a human resource, two 
different franchise packages are designed to attract franchisees: FC} and FC2. As 
mentioned earlier, the difference is mainly in the ownership of the store outlet. In FC!, 
the store is the franchisee's own property; whereas, the property is owned by the 
franchisor for FC2. As a result, the fmal share 0 f sales is different. FC 1 can negotiate a 
higher sales percentage than FC2. Thus, in the CVS industry, the theoretical statement 
that higher initial investment leads to greater company ownership is true. One 
franchisor expressed it this way: 
"Jes, it has a relationship with the initial investment. If the initial investment is 
large and the franchisor cannot guarantee how much the franchisee can earn per 
month, then it is diffiCUlt tofranchise. Also, it is related to the recovery time of the 
197 
franchisees' capita/. In the beginning, we started with Fe2, because the 
franchisees' burden would not be so high. She/he just has to pay about £10 000 to 
join the system. It also helps the franchisor expand quickly. But m;w, the 
franchisor focuses on FeI because it has some advantages for him. such as 
expansion speed and capital investment. As franchisees have to pay more initial 
fees it leads to the stability of the franchisees. Also, the more he earns, the more he 
gets from the profits. If a Fe2 wants to transfer to be Fel. the franchisee has 10 
give up the company-owned store outlet and find a new one because Fe2 s outlets 
are part of the franchisors' asset. " (7-Eleven) (International) 
From the franchisor's statements, we can see that the system is quite flexible both for 
franchisors and franchisees. By having different kinds of franchise packages, both 
parties can get what they want to maximise their benefits. However, the EA industry is 
not so flexible because franchisees do not believe that franchisors give equally fair 
treatment to both regular chain and franchised outlets, as mentioned before. As a result, 
in the Taiwanese EA market, there are only pure regular and franchise systems, and no 
plural systems. As for the concept that a higher initial investment leads to greater 
company ownership, that is not always the case in this industry. This is because the EA 
needs a higher initial investment compared with CVS; however, that does not mean that 
it leads to higher company ownership. Rather, all of them are franchised outlets. The 
following are franchisors' opinions on this: 
"Ths, in general, a franchisee s initial fee is about £60,000. For company-owned 
outlet, it depends on the scale of the retail outlet. Most franchisees have their 
experience in running an outlet. so, they know how much they should invest in a 
new store. " (HB) (Local) 
"No, it depends on the franchisor s vision and policy. No matter it is a 
company-owned or franchised format, both of them have their advantages and 
disadvantages. " (ChioaTrust) (Local) 
Compared with CVS, if the theory is applicable, EA should be run by the RC system 
rather than by the franchise system because the initial investment is higher than in the 
CVS. But why does it conflict with the theory? Two reasons may be possible. The first 
that is ownership is related to the franchisor's vision and policy. Second, the capital 
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required for both of the CVS and EA industries are not excessive and can be found by 
individuals. 
Viewing the differences between industries, it seems that the concept - that higher 
initial investment leads to greater company ownership - is not always true because there 
is no clear defmition of how much investment is high enough to 'trigger' this trend and 
it does not take other variables into consideration, such as the company's vision and 
policy. 
6.1.8 Summary 
From this analysis of agency theory concepts, we can see how the theory is applied to 
franchising in Taiwan. In the research questions, many issues were explored and some 
interesting results were found. First, on the selection of franchisor/franchisee, both 
parties used different criteria. The franchisors adopted both active and passive 
qualifications to sort out the best franchisees. In contrast, franchisees mainly 
considered the percentage share, brand power and so on. For the selection of multi-unit 
franchisees, basically, it was no different to choosing other new franchisees. Second, 
concerning the relationship between monitoring costs and the incompleteness of the 
contract, almost every interviewee said the activity should be called assistance rather 
than monitoring and the cost of it is not related to the incompleteness of the contract. 
Monitoring is just a mechanism, which can make the franchise system run more 
smoothly and create a win-win-win situation among franchisors, franchisees and 
customers. Third, concerning the relationship between monitoring costs and other 
factors, such as service levels, royalty and brand value, neither CVS nor EA thought 
there was a relationship between monitoring cost and royalty. In addition, EA did not 
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think monitoring was reJated to the service level. Only brand value was seen to be 
related to monitoring by most of the franchisors and franchisees. Fourth, agency theory 
specifies that monitoring costs should be cheaper with multi-unit franchisees, but in 
fact, this is not true. Within CVS, the cost is the same as monitoring a single franchisee. 
Fifth, both CVS and EA agreed that franchisees would cheat franchisors if they could 
and franchisees admitted that this was true. Sixth, on the point of risk-taking, all the 
franchisors thought that they were more risk-neutral than franchisees in relation to the 
external environment. A gap exists in the theory, since it does not take other factors into 
consideration, such as operational issues. In fact, many risks are very difficult to 
evaluate and they are quite subjective. As a result, we can say that only in some ways, 
are franchisors more risk-neutral. Seventh, concerning the idea that a higher initial 
investment leads to higher company ownership: the author would question this view 
because according to the research, this cannot be substantiated. Hence, the author 
would suggest that it should be clearly defmed how much investment is high enough 
and whether such cost varies with each industry. Reviewing the above, the statements 
generated by this research show there are many question marks over the application of 
agency theory in this specific context. 
6.2 Resource Constraint 
A second explanation for franchising is found in resource constraint theory. As far as 
resource constraints are concerned, four are identified for franchisors; financial capital, 
human resource, managerial talent and local knowledge. In practice, for both the 
convenience store and estate agency industries, franchisors and franchisees agreed with 
the constraints on human resource and local knowledge. Both parties believe that 
franchising can speed business expansion through those who know the local market 
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well, although the degree of importance placed upon this particular constraint is 
different. For the CVS, local knowledge is not as important as it is for EA. This is 
because most of the goods are the same in each shop and the shop is reactive to the 
customer, rather than in EA where salesmen have to locate customers and get access to 
them. For the CVS, the most important consideration of all is location, whereas the 
personal network is the most important factor for the EA industry. Consequently the 
franchisors had different views on this point: 
"We don't need to pay the personnel costs and variable costs qf the store. 
Therefore, the franchisor can easily see the profit level and then focus on the 
operations. For a company-owned outlet, the franchisor has to pave the wayfor 
his future development. " (7-Eleven) (International) 
"It is easy to raise the capital to open 100 outlets but it is very difficult to have 100 
qualified store managers. Also, one of the advantages of franchising is the 
cultivation of a trading area. For company-owned employees, they may be rotated 
at a regular time, so as a result, it is more difficult to build relationships with local 
residents as franchisees. " (Rebar) (Local) 
In order to reduce the franchisor's costs, most franchisors in the CVS have tried their 
best to lower the proportion of company-owned outlets. According to the franchisors' 
statements, the ideal percentage is 80-91 % Franchise Chain: 9-20% Regular Chain. 
The main reason for keeping some company-owned outlets is to provide for training 
and product testing. Take 7-Eleven Taiwan for example, its fmaJ objective is to keep 
9% company-owned outlets. As to how to best utilise company employees, the 
franchisor encouraged them to become franchisees or to transfer to other reJated 
businesses in the group. 
Regarding the other two issues, financial capital and managerial talent, each industry 
has a different viewpoint; so, these issues will be examined separately. 
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6.2.1 Financial Capital Constraints 
Most franchisors in CVS do not think franchisees are the main source of financial 
capital since if that were true, they would have owned the outlets in the beginning. 
Furthermore, each CVS has a strong financial background, i.e., they do not need this 
capital injection from franchisees to expand, because it just takes a tiny part of their 
business capital. One franchisor said: 
H{f the brand is not strong enough, it is difficult to expand even though you have 
enough capital. So, it is related to brand reputation rather than capital scarcity. 
This is because that even if you can get capital from franchisees, the amount is 
limited Even if you can get the capital from financial institutions, you still cannot 
be sure that franchisees want to join your system. Therefore, the capital scarcity is 
not so important, what is most important of all is whether the brand is strong 
enough to attract potential franchisees. "(7-Eleven) (International) 
From this comment, we can see that the key issue is whether the brand is strong enough 
to attract franchisees rather than whether the franchisor has enough fmancial capita1. In 
other words, if the brand is strong enough, the other potential resource constraints 
should disappear. For instance, if there were many people wanting to be franchisees, 
then the fmancial institutions would be very happy to lend money. Other than the 
franchisor and franchisee's capital, one franchisor said that another source of capital is 
product manufacturers who pay display costs to the franchisor. 
However, for the EA cases, some franchisors and most franchisees thought that the 
franchisees' initial fee and royalties provided a certain proportion of the franchisor's 
revenue. As a result, if the franchised outlets are below the break-even point, the 
franchisor has a financial deficit. If this is true, most of the franchisors should have 
already gone bankrupt, because one franchisor in EA said that the break-even point for 
the number of outlets should be 140. This means that other than the franchisees' initial 
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fee and royalties, the franchisor must have other sources of capital, otherwise he cannot 
survive. Consequently, we can say that fmancial capital from franchisees may be 
important but is not the most important factor of all. The main capital sources should be 
stockholders and financial institutions, as one franchisor said: 
Franchisees can supply financial resource, hut you have to bear in mind 
'water that hears the boat is the same that swallows it '. In other word'!, the 
franchise !.ystem can help the franchisor expanding quickly but it can also lead to 
failure as well. " (Rebar) (Local) 
This implies that if the franchisor only cares about the number of outlets rather than the 
quality of franchisees, then the risk of failure will be very high. For example, 
franchisees may damage the brand and that kind of fmancial loss is far greater than 
income lost from franchisees' initial fee and royalties. It also means that franchisors 
should do extensive screening work before awarding the franchise. 
6.2.2 Managerial Talent Constraints 
As far as managerial talent is concerned, the CVS did not think that potential 
franchisees needed skills initially. What they preferred were those without previous 
related working experience, like a blank sheet of paper, which the franchisor can 
influence through training. In general, training takes one month before producing a 
qualified franchisee. Since all the operations are the same for all franchisees, it is easier 
for the franchisor to apply managerial standardisation and keep a uniform service 
quality by training from scratch. The premise is that the franchisors can give 
franchisees a guarantee ofannual gross margins. Taking 7-Eleven Taiwan for example, 
the guaranteed annual gross margin is NT$ 2 million dollars (£40,000). In theory, what 
franchisees need to do is just follow the franchisor's policy without any personal input 
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in terms of creative thinking. However, it does not always work out that way because 
once a franchisee has become a multi-unit franchisee, he must have developed some 
level of manageriaJ talent. As one franchisee said: 
"As far as managerial talent is concerned, it varies with experience and lime as a 
franchisee. In the beginning, when you joined the system, you did not need to have 
any experience. However, when you have become familiar with the operations and 
want to be a multi-unit franchisee, you must have acquired that kind of talent in 
order to manage different stores. " (7-Eleven) (Franchisee 5) 
This indicates that from the franchisors' viewpoint, what they need is simply a person 
who can manage a store rather than one with his own ideas on store operations. 
However, franchisees are inclined to think that ifthey have developed managerial talent, 
then they would like to apply to be a multi-unit franchisee after a period of time. 
During this period of time, both parties will evaluate each other. Ifthe franchisor fmds 
the franchisee's performance is not good enough, then such an application will be 
rejected; in contrast, franchisees will be evaluating the franchisors' perfonnance to see 
whether it is worth being there or to become a multi-unit franchisee. 
In the EA industry, knowledge is more professional; as a result, franchisors like to hire 
those with practical experience so that they do not need to closely supervise franchisees. 
In fact, only those with experience show the willingness to become franchisees. A 
franchisor stated: 
..... We will never consider those without industrial experience to be franchisees. 
This is because if he didn t have experience, we dare to say he must have a lot of 
money ready to be burned, and likely, the outlet will be closed within a very short 
time. " (ChinaTrust) (Local) 
Another franchisee also said: 
"If the franchisee joins the system when the market is good, then ~e can. survi~e 
and gain the experience. However, if the market is not good, the franchisee Will 
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find it difficult to survive unless he has a rich personal network. In other word,', if 
somebody without industrial experience wants to be a franchisee in a recessio~, 
the failure rate is 99.9%. " (HB) (Franchisee 6) 
From both viewpoints, we can see that managerial talent is considered necessary to run 
an estate agency. However, there was one exception among the interviews. One 
franchisee did not have any relevant experience before becoming a franchisee, but the 
economy was good at that time and he ran the store via 'learning on the job' to 
accumulate experience and knowledge. He now owns four units and also the brand has 
become the leading brand in that area This conftrms that aside from managerial talent, 
the external environment plays an important role as well. 
Apart from fmancial capital, human resource, managerial talent and local knowledge, 
there is another important issue highlighted in resource constraint theory, concerning 
the buying back of franchisees as the franchisor gets enough resources. This kind of 
statement is related to the retail life cycle. The following section will explore whether 
this is applicable to the Taiwanese retail market. 
6.2.3 Franchisor Buying Back Franchisees 
Resource constraint theory argues that as the firm grows, the firm may buy back 
franchisees in accordance with the franchising contract. The reasons for this action 
may include the release of scarce resources, maintenance of service quality and 
quiCk/flexible response to meeting changing circumstances. Such repurchases provide 
the flrm with additional control and by repurchasing the largest and most profitable 
franchisees fIrst, the fum captures additional rents previously allocated to the 
franchisee. Therefore, the large, profitable franchisees and those outlets in urban or 
higher population densities will be transformed into company-owned outlets. The 
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franchisees remaining are then those in less profitable or rural areas. However, in the 
Taiwanese retail market, this does not appear to work. Rather the franchisor switches 
the profitable outlets to franchisees. In the CVS industry, franchisors said: 
"We will not buy back the profitable franchisees; rather, we will leI profitable 
company-owned outlets to be franchised outlets. When.franchisees are profilable, 
it means that the franchisor also get benefits from it. So, it is unnecessary to buy 
back the profitable franchisees. Also, it can save the franchisor~' energy with 
regard to the human resource and capital requirement." (7-Eleven) 
(International) 
"No, it is impossible in the Taiwanese CVS industry. This is because the cost (?f 
running a company-owned outlet is higher than a franchised outlet. The only 
reason to buy back the franchisee would be if the franchisee did not want to run it 
anymore or the franchisee broke the rules, then the franchisor will buy it back to 
be a RC outlet. " (Circle K) (International) 
Based on the above statements, it is very clear that franchisors would only buy back 
profitable outlets if the franchisee does not have the desire to run the store anymore. 
Also, this action is specified in the contract. As to the EA industry, as it is a purely 
franchised system, this option does not arise. During the interviews, franchisees were 
asked the same question and their reactions were all the same, i.e., that such a situation 
is impossible in Taiwan. If the franchisor started to buy back the profitable franchisees, 
then staff would leave the outlets and open another outlet nearby; the franchisor could 
then not guarantee that the outlets would be as profitable as before. Also, potential 
franchisees would not join the system because that they would not know when the 
franchisor wanted to buy them out. This reason is also related to an industrial 
characteristic, which is that the EA identity is based on personal interactions and 
networks, rather than in the CVS industry, which is concerned with the distribution of 
products. 
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As a result, the idea of buying back franchisees is not applicable to the Taiwanese 
market. As to why resource constraint theory specifies that the franchisor would like to 
buy back franchisees to become company-owned outlets, it may only see the visible 
profits of the store rather than other factors, such as the effect on a franchisee's efforts 
and his management aspirations. The theory does not specify whether the outlet would 
be as profitable as when franchisees ran it. So, there may be a risk in the franchisor 
buying back the profitable outlets. Particularly it would be difficult to keep an 
acceptable profit level if the industry is based on personal interaction, such as in the 
Estate Agency industry. 
6.2.4 Summary 
After this series of discussions on resource constraints, we learn why franchisors want 
to franchise their outlets. Both the CVS and EA industries have some points in 
common especially regarding the criteria of constraints in human resources and local 
knowledge. However, owing to particular industrial characteristics and the franchisors' 
fmancial backgrounds, there are differences of opinion on the subjects of capital 
constraints and managerial talent. This research has another important finding 
concerning the idea of buying back franchisees. In the Taiwanese retail market, this is 
not applicable for many reasons. The idea of buying back franchises is questionable 
and it should be tested out to see if the outlet could be just as profitable after the 
franchisor buys it back. Finally, from the interviews, it is suggested that a potential 
conflict arises between the franchisors and franchisees in the EA industry, i.e., although 
most franchisees have the necessary industrial experience before becoming franchisees, 
it does not follow that these franchisees are also good at running businesses. Therefore, 
some franchisees complain about the franchisor's training courses and services. This 
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kind of dissatisfaction could lead to conflict once one party begins to think 'give and 
take'is not equal. 
6.3 Transaction Cost Analysis (TeA) 
Finally, transaction cost analysis has also been used to explain the development of 
franchising. Transaction cost analysis suggests that any problem that can be formulated, 
directly, or indirectly, as a contracting problem can be investigated in transaction cost 
terms. As franchising is a relationship based on a contract between the franchisor and 
franchisee; it can therefore be tested by transaction cost analysis. Transaction cost 
analysis suggests that the principal specific asset in franchising is the shared Trademark 
or the Brand Name. In the following section, some questions on the brand value were 
asked of both parties to examine the relationship from a transaction cost perspective. 
6.3.1 The Cost of Running a Franchised Outlet Compared to a Private Brand 
Transaction cost analysis proposes that under certain conditions, the cost of conducting 
economic exchange in a market may exceed the costs of organising the exchange within 
a firm. Also, this theory suggests that transaction costs include both the direct costs of 
managing relationships and the possible opportunity costs of making inferior 
governance decisions. In theory, for franchising to be preferred, the transaction costs 
must be cheaper than through the market mechanism. From the franchisees' viewpoint, 
we can learn whether it is in practice cheaper or not, or whether there are other reasons. 
Let us see what the CVS franchisees said: 
"The initial fee is higher but the ongoing cost is lower than traditional stores. 
Because franchisees have to pay part of the revenue to the franchisor. compared 
with a private brand the franchisee has to pay more out. But on the other hand, the 
brand can attract more customers. " (7-Eleven) (Franchisee 5-FCl) 
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"The cost of franchising is higher than the traditional store on the mailers (?f 
decorations and employees salaries because the store is runfor 24 hours. But the 
franchisee does not bear the cost of the inventory and he can order everyday. " 
(Niko Mart) (Franchisee 2-FC1) 
"The traditional store will cost more than a franchised outlet, because a 
traditional store has to pay the suppliers the cost of products. As franchisees, we 
do not need to deal with that kind of work; it is done by the franchisor. What we 
earn is sent to us by the franchisor at the end of the month. "(Hi-Life) (Franchisee 
2-FC2) 
According to these comments, we learn that Fe1 thinks the initial fee is higher than 
when operating a traditional store, because he has to pay the initial fee and decoration 
fee. But all other Fe2 respondents think both costs are cheaper in a franchisee than 
operating a traditional store. The difference is mainly to do with the ownership and the 
sharing percentage, but generally speaking, franchising is believed to be cheaper and 
more efficient regarding merchandising, inventory and supplier management. 
As to the EA franchisees, let us see what they said: 
"The initial fee for a franchisee is higher than with a private brand This is 
because that aside from the initial fee and guarantee deposit, the franchisee has 10 
pay a royalty per month. The benefits of franchising are mainly Ihe brand 
advantage, which helps franchisees attract more customers and 
information/experience sharing with other franchisees. A private brand has more 
diffiCUlty being accepted by the public. Even so, the most importantfeature of all 
is whether the store manager and his staff can co-operate smoothly together with 
the same objective. If they can, then a private brand may outperform a franchised 
brand As to the ongoing cost, there is no definitive answer; because thaI depends 
on how you operate the store, such as the salary system, store format, advertising 
and so on and each kind of running format has its ownfocus. "(HB) (Franchisee 
8) 
"Being afranchisee, it is more expensive than being a private brand outlet in the 
short term. But for a long-term perspective, the franchised brand has a positive 
brand benefit. In other words, if a private brand wants to grow bigger, then the 
investment may be higher than with a franchised brand" (Century 21) 
(Franchisee 10) 
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The above statements are inclined to suggest that most single franchisees think that it is 
more expensive to be a franchisee, but there are advantages with regard to the brand, 
staff hiring, information sharing, merchandising and know-how. Some multi-unit 
franchisees, have different views, one franchisee said: "if 1 have jive outlets. why not 
remain a private brand and endeavour to become the leading brand in the local 
market". They could use the money (initial fee, guarantee deposit and royalty) to 
promote their private brand. Out of the four company cases, one became a multi-unit 
franchisee. This led him in turn to initiating his own private brand. Multi-unit 
franchisees in CVS find it impossible to create their own branded stores because 
ownership is linked to the franchisor and they do not have experience in negotiating 
with suppliers. 
From the perspective of transaction cost analysis, the franchise system makes 
franchisees invest more in the outlet. Does this mean that it is more difficult to transfer 
to an alternative brand? This is an interesting question and will be discussed later. 
6.3.2 Tbe Importance of tbe Brand 
Aside from the cost of running a franchised outlet, another important consideration is 
whether the brand is worthy of being franchised compared to a traditional shop. All 
franchisees think that brand identity is a very important factor indeed in customers' 
consumption patterns. The franchisees of CVS said: 
"Yes, it is. For instance. the typical customer told me that he usually shops in 
7-Eleven, and he wouldfeel quite strange ifhe went to shop in other chain brands 
stores because the internal layout and atmosphere was always a little different" 
('-Eleven) (Manager 2) 
"No, 1 do not think so, I feel that there are two main factors influencing customers' 
decision. First, they will identify a preferred chain brand and then decide which 
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~ne is closer to it. This is because one of the important characteristics ~(the evs 
IS to offer 'convenience. " (Niko Mart) (Franchisee 5) 
"Jes, it will be. For example, we are a subgroup q( a milk company so that tr 
customers want to drink that brand milk, they prefer buying at our out leIs. " 
(Hi-Life) (Manager 1) 
These views suggest that based on convenience, the first consumer priority is distance, 
followed by the brand. The brand is strongly influenced by the amount of advertising, 
but some customers still have preferences in their choice of brands. Traditional stores 
have already found it difficult to survive because the product lines, internal cleanness, 
and customer services cannot compete with the chain brands. For the EA, the 
franchisees had a different viewpoint: 
"The brand name is an important criterion when customers choose the store outlet. 
People prefer those with high exposure on the TV or other media. As a result, 
franchised brands find it difficult to compete with the RC system where the 
advertising is much extensive than in franchised systems. However, from the 
perspective of competition between a RC and FC outlet, the FC outlet must 
outperform the RC outlet. This is because the high flexibility and long-term 
cultivation of the trading area. " (HB) (Franchisee 4) 
".Jes, it is, especially in the urban areas. However, if you cultivate your trading 
area for a long time, it makes no difference whether it is a RC or FC outlet. A Iso, 
with the RC, employees need to be rotated periodically,· this is to their 
disadvantage because they cannot cultivate the area intensely and further, mos! 
staff of the RC are very young people who have just graduated from university. 
With franchisees, most of the staff are experienced salesmen and as a result, if the 
brand factor is not, customers will count on the characteristics of the salesman 
rather than the brand The reason why the RC brand is the leading brand in the 
market is its TV advertising, which is much more than the franchised brands. 
Customers were impressed by the media presentation." (ChinaTrust) 
(Franchisee 4) 
"The brand accounts for about 70% of the customers' decision. The other 30% is 
up to the salesman s ability. There are two special phenomena in the industry. 
One is professional knowledge and the other is selling skill. Generally speaking, 
most franchisors offer this kind of professional training, but in practice, what 
customers care about is whether the salesman is very zealous about their cases. 
As a result, the selling skill seems to be more important than professional 
knowledge. " (Century 21) (Franchisee 5) 
We note, therefore, that the brand is quite important to gain the customers' trust in the 
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fIrst instance. Once a customer has identified the brand, then the following key issues 
are the skills and attitudes of the salesman. Also, the power of the brand is stronger in 
the urban areas. In the rural areas, personal networks seem more powerful than the 
brand name. In addition, some franchisees said that easy access to the store is an 
important choice factor, but then nearly all the important areas in the urban areas are 
occupied by chain brands. Franchisees also recognised that customers are not so 
familiar with the differences between the RC and FC systems. They just know whether 
it is a chain brand or not. A separate but important issue about the brand in the EA is 
that sellers care more about the brand than buyers. In other words, all agencies have to 
make efforts to gain the customers' trust so that they can sell their houses. 
Overall, compared with the CVS, the franchisees felt that customers in the EA care 
more about the brand because of the value of transactional safety. While for CVS, what 
customers emphasise is convenience. Another difference is that in EA, the local brands 
can still survive in all rural areas, but with CVS, all towns have already been invaded by 
chain brands, including the isolated islands. Hence, transaction cost analysis would 
seem to be more useful in those areas with higher competition. In other words, in rural 
areas, hierarchy or market mechanism may be more likely to develop than a hybrid 
organisation such as franchising. 
6.3.3 The Transference from One Brand to the Another 
Transaction cost analysis suggests that franchisors have made franchisees undertake 
some specific investments in the transaction in order to keep a more stable relationship 
and to make it difficult to transfer. However, if the franchisor damages the relationship 
in some way or another franchise system offers a better package to the franchisee. then 
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the original franchisee may transfer to another brand. In the CVS industry, franchisees 
said: 
"It is very dttJicult to transfer the brand because the store belongs to thefranchisor. 
Also, the contract regulates that the franchisee cannot run another brand within a 
period of time after leaving the company" (7-Eleven) (Franchisee 9) 
''This will not arise because I would have to pay a further amount of money to the 
new franchisor and get used to the other system s management. In the present 
system, if the contract period is expired, J do not need to pay anything, 1 just 
continue to be the franchisee." (Circle K) (Franchisee 9) 
"It is very easy, although the contract regulates that the franchisee cannot run 
another brand within one year, many people do so and nothing happens. If the 
franchisee terminates the contract in the middle, the initial fee and guaranJeefee 
will be expropriated by the franchisor. " (Niko Mart) (Franchisee 4) 
From the above, we see it is not difficult to transfer from one brand to another, but the 
premise is that the original contract must have expired. Otherwise, franchisees wi] I 
loose out financially. Some franchisees pointed out that they are with a leading brand, 
so, it would senseless to transfer to an inferior brand. In the case where FC2 's property 
belongs to the franchisor, it makes the franchisees believe it is too difficult to transfer. 
In the case of FC 1, franchisees have already paid the decoration fee for the store; as a 
result, the willingness of franchisees to transfer was very low. Many franchisees 
believe that all systems are similar, so it would be pointless to transfer. 
For the EA industry, because ownership is independent, it is easier for them to transfer 
and the cost is relatively low compared with the CVS. This is illustrated by the 
following views: 
"Now, it is very easy to transfer, but it has its cost. This is because J have used the 
brand for a long time and J have got a kind of identification with the brand 
although the franchisor is not perfect. For afranchisee, a new brand would be a 
challenge for employees and old customers, and you have to adapt to another kind 
of managing style. " (HB) (Franchisee 1) 
II Jes, it is very easy, some franchisors even give transferred franchisees the use of 
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its brandfreely for two years without paying royalties to attract olherfranchisees. 
So, there is vicious competition in the industry and what franchisors want is just 
money, nothing else. " (Rebar) (Francbisee 3) 
"It is very easy to change to another brand if you do not have a bad record in the 
industry. As to the old customers' doubts, 1 just say that the service of Brand A is 
not as good as Brand B. " (Century 21) (Francbisee 5) 
Most of the franchisees in the interviewees thought that it would be very easy to transfer 
the brand if they were not satisfied, and, from the above statements, we can identify 
some benefits and costs if they did so. One benefit is that the franchisee can usually get 
a discounted initial fee or free royalty for a period of time. One cost would be that you 
have to explain to your customers and employees why you have made the change, and 
also, all the outlet's hardware would have to be changed with the loss of your original 
cases. Even so, there were still many franchisees willing to transfer brands. According 
to the interviews, many of the franchisees now in the China Trust and Century 21 
networks were originally from HB or other RC systems. This is because they were not 
satisfied with the original franchisor, or those who worked for the RC wanted to be 
bosses and realise their vision. 
Compared with the CVS, it is obvious that it is easier to transfer the brand in the EA 
industry because it is mainly related to personal interactions. However, such a high 
transfer rate also leads to conflicts between franchisors and the original franchisees, for 
instance, the original franchisee will ask why the new franchisors royalty is lower than 
the one he originally paid. The franchisor's answer will be because now the industry is 
in recession so that they can negotiate special treatment. But old franchisees will 
combine together to protest about such treatment. This is typical of the vicious 
competition in the industry. As a result, transaction cost analysis could not be applied 
to such kind of case. 
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6.3.4 The Protection of the Franchisor's Brand 
The brand is the most valuable asset of the franchisor; as a result, franchisors have to 
make efforts to protect the brand name and to promote it, rather than allowing it to 
become devalued by franchisees. Hence, let us see what the franchisors said: 
"Brand protection can be from two perspectives; the selection (~f qual!fied 
franchisees and ongoing monitoring mechanisms, based on store supervisors' 
periodical visits. In addition, we will choose some stores to test the quality 
non-periodically if afranchisee is not qualified by the test, then he has to attend 
re-training courses, otherwise, the parties' relationship will he terminated 
Between the franchisor and .franchisees, there are regular meetings 10 
communicate with each other. "(7-Eleven) (International) 
All the other franchisors protect their brands from being damaged through regular 
supervision, and indicate that the followers do what the leading brand-7-Eleven does. 
What they do not all include is a mutual communication session. The franchisees of the 
leading brand can go to the head office to talk with the management but that is not so 
with non-leading brands. As a result, the level of franchisees' satisfaction is highest 
within 7-Eleven. 
As to the EA industry, two franchisors said: 
"Protection is based on the franchisor s operational rules and norms. For 
example, the franchisor has got the acknowledgement of ISO 9002 andfranchisees 
have to use the formula documents. In addition, before giving the franchise right, 
the franchisor has carried out a basic investigation of the franchisee. After those 
considerations, the interaction between the franchisor and franchisees is the next 
important factor of the relationship. " (HB) (Local) 
"Infact, the key point in protecting the brand is to deal satisfactorily with cO,?/licts 
between franchisees and customers. This is because customers I sati~faction 
derives from good service, and brand power from the satisfaction Qf franchisees. 
So, if conflicts arise between franchisees and customers, we will oblige 
franchisees to settle it as a service issue, but if conflicts arise from .franchisees, 
then the franchisee s area representatives will do the arbitrator. If there is a 
serious dispute, we will terminate the relationship. " (Rebar) (Local) 
From the above statements, we deduce that most franchisors use operational norms or 
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contracts to regulate franchisees' behaviour. Only the franchisor of Rebar undertook 
mOnitoring similar to CVS but the frequency was not so high. The main reason for a 
lack of monitoring is that most EA franchisors do not have enough energy to do it. The 
result is that their particular brand power is not so strong as Rebar and this results in a 
high transfer rate. 
From a comparison of both industries, the common point is that both industries 
undertake pre-contractual and post-contractual checks to protect their brands. The 
difference is that the CVS companies carry out the franchisors' policies thoroughly 
because the franchisors have carried out their duties, but the EA companies do not. This 
difference results in most EA franchisees being dissatisfied with their franchisors. 
6.3.5 Summary 
The use of transaction cost analysis reveals that brand and know-how are still the core 
values in transactions. If franchisees did not find value in franchising, then the hybrid 
organisation would disappear and be replaced by a hierarchy or market mechanism. In 
this research, most franchisees in the CVS industry thought that the cost of being a 
franchisee was lower than developing a private brand. In contrast, multi-unit 
franchisees in the EA did not think so. They preferred to create their own brands 
because they had the know-how and a management department, which served the same 
functions as the franchisor. So, to save costs and with a long-term perspective, they 
preferred to invest their money in promoting their own brand with the aim of becoming 
the market leader in the local area. Concerning the brand efficiency argument, both 
industries said it is very important but for different reasons. The CVS said 'distance' to 
the store is the main consideration, but in the EA, franchisees believed that 'personal 
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network' is the most important factor of all. This latter view leads to a high 
brand-transferring rate when franchisees are not satisfied with the original franchisor. 
Another pull factor is that other franchisors lure franchisees by lowering the cost of 
transferring and franchisees are happy to take up these inducements. Finally, from this 
section, we can suggest that transaction cost analysis can be applied in a market 
characterised by fair competition, but where the market is subject to vicious 
competition, the benefit may be very low. FinaUy, franchisors in both industries agreed 
that brand protection could be enforced by pre-contractual and post-contractual 
preventative action. 
6.4 Conclusion 
To examine the relationships and conflicts between franchisors and franchisees, we 
started by exploring the motivations for franchising. Three key approaches were used 
based on existing perspectives; namely, the role of agency theory; resource constraint; 
and transaction cost analysis. From the case analyses, some of the views expressed 
were the same as those specified in established theories, but others were in conflict, 
such as the relationship between monitoring frequency and loyalty rate; the expectation 
that a higher initial investment would lead to higher company ownership; the motive for 
buying back franchisees and the transaction costs of being a multi-unit franchisee. 
From a comparative perspective, the CVS and EA had some points in common, such as 
the scarcity of human resources and local knowledge, but they exhibited different 
perspectives on issues such as monitoring cost, transfer rate and so on. The most 
important rmding of all is that different types of relationships and conflicts can be 
observed. For the CVS, because ownership is linked between franchisors and 
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franchisees by stores and product ownership, the franchisors paid more attention to 
franchisees. However, such attention can be perceived to be excessive and becomes a 
burden to franchisees, e.g., the frequency of monitoring. For the EA, due to the parties' 
ownership being independent of each other, the relationship is just built on the 
exchange of royalty and brand name. Hence, the relationship is not so close as in the 
CVS and as a result, the relationship is more fragile. In other words, what EA 
franchisees need is just the brand name. Once these franchisees are dissatisfied with the 
franchisor or the brand name, then the transferring rate rises rapidly. Turning to the 
CVS, we can see the main source of conflict is the interaction between store supervisors 
and franchisees. By contrast, in the EA, conflicts mainly result from any service failure 
of the franchisors. Of course, there remain other factors affecting these relationships, 
and some of them will be discussed in the following chapter. Finally, the Table 6.1 
provides a summary of the comparisons highlighted in this chapter, and highlights the 
differences. 
Table 6.1 The Summary of the Motivational Comparisons 
CVS (Franchisee) EA (Franchisee) 
Item Variables 
RC FC FC (S) I E S M 0 (M) 
The monitoring is from the incompleteness of N/A X X X X X X X 
the contract 
The contract is unequal N/A 
" " " " " " " The monitoring cost is negatively related to the 
" " " service level " " 
X X X 
The monitoring frequency is positively related N/A X X X X X X X Arr to the royalty 
Monitoring multi-unit franchisee is cheaper N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
than single unit 
The potential for franchisees to cheat on 
" " " " " " " " performance 
Franchisors are more risk-neutral than 
" " " franchisees " " " " " 
Higher initial investment leads to greater N/A 
" " " " " " " company ownership_ 
Resource constraints on human resource and N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
local knowledge 
RIC Resource constraint on financial capital N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Resource constraint on managerial talent N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Franchisor buying back franchisees N/A X X X X X X X 
It is cheaper to run a franchised outlet than a v v v v 
private outlet N/A FC2 FC2 FC2 FC2 X X X X X X X 
TCA FCI FCI FCI FCI 
Brand is an important factor when customers 
" " " " " " " " choose the store 
It is very easy to transfer brands X X X X X 
" " " - -: agree or the ml\iority agrees X: it depends, the same, has no relationship, disagree or the majority dIsagrees 
N/A: it means the case is not suitable for the party 
CVS (Franchisor) 
7-EI Circle Niko Hi-T K Mart Life even 
X X X X X 
" " " " " 
X X X X X 
X X X X X 
N/A X X X X 
" " " " " 
" " " " " 
" " " " " 
N/A 
" " " " 
N/A X X X X 
N/A X X X X 
X X X X X 
X N/A N/A N/A N/A 
" 
N/A N/A N/A N/A 
" 
N/A N/A N/A N/A 
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EA (Franchisor) 
China Centu HB Rebar Trust ry 21 
X X X X 
X X X X 
X X 
" " 
X X X X 
" " " " 
" " " " 
" " " " 
" " 
X 
" 
" " " " 
" " " " 
" " " " X X X X 
N/A N/A N/A N/A 
N/A N/A N/A N/A 
N/A N/A N/A N/A 
RC: Regular Chain (company-owned outlet), FC(S): Single-unit franchisee, FC(M): Multi-unit franchisee, I: Internal franchisee, E: External franchisee, S: Single-unit franchisee, M: Multi-unit 
franchisee, 0: Original franchisee, T: Transferred franchisee 
CHAPTER SEVEN: ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS-II 
(RELATIONSHIP AND CONFLCIT) 
7.0 Introduction 
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In the previous chapter, the motivations for franchising were analysed in relation to 
existing theories. This uncovered not only the motivations but also potentia] conflicts 
between franchisors and franchisees. In this chapter, two topics will be analysed in 
order to explore further the relationships and conflicts between both parties. First, the 
roles and characteristics of the decision-makers will be considered: because the 
decision-maker usually influences the direction of corporate strategy, and the 
interactions with the fIrst line franchisees. Related issues such as leadership, power, 
entrepreneurship and experience will be discussed. After that, concepts developed in 
relational exchange theory will be explored in order to fmd out how both parties rely on 
each other, how both parties would react to each other if the relationships became unfair 
and how the relationship could be improved. 
7.1 The Roles and Characteristics of Decision Makers 
7.1.1 The Relationship between Leadership and Franchisee Satisfaction 
Generally speaking, there is a close relationship between interaction and satisfaction. 
In theory, three kinds of leadership: supportive; participative; and achievement are 
specifIed. In franchising, interaction is based on either the franchisor's policy or the 
store supervisor's characteristics. Hence, how to satisfy the other party is an important 
issue in maintaining the relationship. As in the previous chapter, we start with the CVS 
industry and CVS franchisors: 
"We usually adopt a mixed leadership, which includes supportive, participative 
and achievement styles. In general, such leadership is closely related to the 
supervisor s characteristics. Sometimes, the supervisor has to play the role of 
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policeman or even a doctor. It depends on the situation (if the inleraction and the 
ability of the franchisee. " (7 -Eleven) (International) 
"The leadership should be the same for every store supervisor, as this means that 
being a supervisor, the franchisor will evaluate whether he is qualified to the 
work" (Niko Mart) (International) 
From the above two different expressions, we can see that the franchisor has two 
distinct concerns, one is related to the store supervisor's characteristics, and the other is 
to ensure that the franchisor's policy is followed thoroughly. However, in practice, the 
quality of interaction is related to three factors: the store supervisors' characteristics, 
their ability and the franchisees' reactions. No matter what kind of leadership style is 
used, the fmal objective is to maximise the store's profit. Usually, if the store 
supervisor's leadership is not accepted by franchisees then, conflicts occur. According 
to CVS franchisees: 
"The leadership is a kind of achievement style, however, I am not satisfied with it. 
I had hoped the leadership would be like a kind of supportive style. Now, my 
feeling is that I spent so much money joining the system but just act like a RC store 
manager. In other words, the franchisor treatsfranchisees as RC outlets. "(Circle 
K) (Franchisee 4) 
Although this franchisee is not satisfied with the store supervisors' leadership, most 
franchisees said they could accept it and that this kind of leadership is quite flexible. 
After all, the store supervisor is the communication bridge between the franchisors and 
franchisees. Aside from the interaction with the store supervisor, some franchisees can 
use the Internet to express their opinions. Even so, dissatisfaction stilI occurs, primarily 
from the one-way communication style or inadequate leadership. As stated, the most 
common point of conflict is that store supervisors always deem franchisees as 
company-owned managers and therefore they usually use coercive powers to interact 
with franchisees. 
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In the EA industry, the franchisors said: 
"Th~ .leadership is composed of three different kind of styles, supportive, 
p~rtlclpative and achievement. So, for those follow the franchisor s policy, we will 
give them more resources than those who disobey the policy. " (HB) (Local) 
"As to the leadership, it is related to the leader of the franchisor. In fact, most of 
the regulations have become standardised because of ISO 9002. So, th~ 
leadership is ju.t;t an intangible power to franchisees and it is not clear if 
franchisees follow the contract. " (Rebar) (Local) . 
"We adopt a mixed leadership and it is related to the issue itself On the execution 
of the franchisor s policy, we take a coercive leadership approach, however, for 
daily affairs, we adopt a supportive leadership. The leadership is closely related 
to the franchisor s corporate culture and the person who manages the business. " 
(China Trust) (Local) 
From the above expressions, it is very clear that franchisors use different kinds of 
leadership in different situations. The leadership style is detennined by the franchisee's 
attitude, the senior manager's attitude, the corporate culture and the issue itself After 
al~ the franchisor has more resources than the franchisees. Nevertheless, not all 
franchisors like to assist their franchisees; some may dodge the responsibility and do 
nothing. Conflicts come about in the EA example, and the frequency is far more 
common than in the CVS. Some EA franchisees said: 
"There is no, so called, satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the franchisor s service, 
as this means that both party s objective is to co-operate together in order to 
promote the brand reaching a win-win status. The leadership should be related to 
the stage of the franchisee and the franchisor s characteristics. Now, the 
franchisor adopts a supportive leadership, it means that if franchisees need help, 
they will come and give an aid" (HB) (Franchisee 6) 
"The leadership is related to the corporate culture. Now, it is not too strong and is 
directly related to characteristics of the leader. The franchisor adopts a mixed 
leadership to franchisees. For example, there is an award of Top 100 
(achievement style), and the support of advertising (supportive style). " (Rebar) 
(Franchisee 6) 
"The franchisor s leadership is like a kind of laisser-faire or achievement style, 
because its power is quite weak In general, franchisees do not welcome the 
franchisor s assistance on the store operations, because they do not know the 
consumer behaviour in the local market, so, it is diffiCUlt for them to develop an 
appropriate strategy. Hence, even if the supenJisor stays at the outletfor 2 months, 
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it is still useless. The most important factor of all is based on people', it means 
what customers identify with is the salesman rather than others. " (Century 21) 
(Franchisee 2) 
From the other franchisees' comments, we realise that only the Rebar Company has 
good interaction with franchisees. The others pointed out that if they pay their royalties 
on time, the franchisor would not fmd fault with them. Some franchisees even said that 
the franchisor had never visited the store, in other words, leadership means nothing for 
some franchisees. 
From the comparison between CVS and EA, it seems that most of the communication 
between franchisors and franchisees in the CVS are via the store supervisor rather than 
the head office like in the EA industry. Further, it is forbidden to organise an 
association in the CVS industry. However, in the EA industry, every system has this 
kind of association. The other difference in leadership is that the CVS usually adopts a 
mixed leadership. Instead, the EA franchisors seldom adopt participative leadership, 
because franchisees do not want franchisors to intervene in their operations. The fmal 
difference is in the communication channels; franchisees in the CVS cannot reflect their 
opinions to higher-level managers, however, within the EA, franchisees can reflect it to 
anybody even the managing director. 
7.1.2 The Preference for an Entrepreneur 
Regarding the issue of entrepreneurship, previous researchers have different opinions 
on whether franchisors and franchisees are entrepreneurs. In this research, there are 
different results between the CVS and EA industry. First of all, we start with a 
discussion of which kind of franchisees the franchisors prefer. Some franchisors 
commented that: 
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"It would be better to choose an entrepreneur. Their characteristics should he not 
too clever but with the spirit of innovation. One senior manager pointed out that 
the franchisor has to be very clever and the franchisee should be very stupid. This 
kind of argument has its advantage and disadvantage. The advantage is that 
policies can be carried out thoroughly. however, the disadvantage is that 
franchisees cannot response to local market quickly. Asfar as my experience is 
concerned, I prefer an entrepreneur. " (7-Eleven) (International) 
"I prefer a franchisee who is a mix of two different kinds of characteristics. From 
the franchisor s viewpoint. the reason why this is comes from consideration ~r 
loyalty to the corporate policy. The disadvantage is on the effort (~f store 
management. For an entrepreneur, he may have his own ideas on store 
management; nevertheless. the franchisor does not allow him to do so. Hence. I 
prefer a mixed style . .. (Circle K) (International) 
From the franchisors' comments, we can see that they are quite contradictory. On the 
one hand, they hope that franchisees follow the franchisor's policy without any 
argument. On the other hand, they also want franchisees to try their best to maximise 
the store's performance. Hence, conflicts may occur because franchisees think that the 
franchisors intervene too much in store operations. However, within the EA industry, 
franchisors may have a different view, they stated that: 
"In theory, franchisees should be highly self-motivated and with the ~pirit of 
creation. However, we prefer afranchisee who does not have too many arguments 
about the franchisor s policy and just does what the franchisor asks. " (HB) 
(Local) 
"We prefer entrepreneurs because of the changeable environment. It is useless to 
choose one who always follows the franchisor s instructions without any 
creation. " (ChinaTrust) (Local) 
From the above comments, there is more evidence that the EA franchisors prefer those 
franchisees with entrepreneurial skills. This can be explained from the perspectives of 
quick expansion and self-motivation. Comparatively, there is a clear difference from 
the franchisor's viewpoint concerning the preference for an entrepreneur. Within the 
CVS, since the franchisors are powerful enough, they do not need or want strong 
franchisees. However, the EA franchisees have to face the external changes by 
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themselves, hence, the franchisors prefer choosing those with entrepreneurship. 
7.1.3 Franchisors are Entrepreneurs 
According to the '2001 World Competencies Yearbook', Taiwan was ranked the t h 
among the 49 countries selected on the item of entrepreneurship. This implies that the 
Taiwanese have a quite high level of competence in entrepreneurship. Nevertheless, 
could this be applied to franchising? In theory, most researchers suggest that 
franchisors are entrepreneurs because of risk-taking, leadership and so on. In practice, 
this seems true because one CVS franchisor said that: 
"Ths, the reason why the franchisor wants to franchise is because that it can 
minimize the cost of thinking about the know-how for franchisees and they just do 
what the franchisor says. Therefore, the franchisor should serve the functions of 
innovation, marketing and logistics. What franchisees need to do is to reflect 
whether policies could be carried out in practice, and then the franchisor knows 
how to amend it. "(Hi-Life) (Local) 
All the other :franchisors thought that they were entrepreneurs because of the 
characteristics of risk-taking, leadership, motivation and the ability to solve crises. As 
for the EA industry, they said: 
"Ths, of course, because the franchisor has to evolve the vision and strategies in 
order to be followed by franchisees. So, the franchisor should be the head to guide 
franchisees. If the franchisor is very weak, then franchisees will not gather 
together for the same objective and it will be like dispersed sands. Further, as 
franchisees cannot get somethingfrom the franchisor, franchisees will not treasure 
the franchisor s brand " (Rebar) (Local) 
From this comment, it is very clear that alI :franchisors in both industries VIew 
themselves as entrepreneurs. All of them have the spirit of risk taking and innovation. 
With this kind of thinking, franchisees can follow the :franchisors' policy and direction 
without missing the collective power of franchising. 
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7.1.4 Franchisees are Entrepreneurs 
Many arguments occur over whether franchisees are entrepreneurs. In this research, 
franchisees in CVS expressed different kinds of ideas, some agreed and others 
disagreed. For those that agreed, they expressed that this kind of entrepreneurship is 
limited. According to the CVS franchisees: 
"Just some parts of the operations can be decided by myself, because most of the 
operations have to follow the franchisor s policy. What I believe is that once you 
join the system, you will not fail. " (7-Eleven) (Franchisee 5) 
"No, I do not think so, because all the operations have to follow the franchisor s 
instructions. " (Niko Mart) (Franchisee 2) 
According to their views, some franchisees believe it is possible to be creative in some 
areas however, others do not. In this research, most of them believed that they had 
some leeway to be creative but not too much. One multi-unit franchisee even said it is 
necessary to have the particular entrepreneurial spirit when you run different stores. So, 
such spirit is dependent on the characteristics of the franchisee and the stage of a store. 
As for the EA franchisees, they said: 
"Jes, it should be. The reasonfor becoming afranchisee is because that the owner 
has his own mission to realise. So, the owner of a franchisee is an entrepreneur. 
Basically, the operation of a franchised outlet is composed of the franchisor ~, 
know-how and the franchisee s strategy. " (Rebar) (Franchisee 5) 
"Ies, it should be. For example, I invested so much money on the store decoration 
to be a franchisee. If J am not an entrepreneur, I can invest the money in other 
aspects. So, I believe that the franchisee has the characteristic of risk running. " 
(ChinaTrust) (Franchisee 1) 
The majority agreed that franchisees are entrepreneurs, those who disagreed thought 
that the trading territory and operations were still confmed by the contract. However, 
generally speaking, franchisees have 100% independence in store management. 
Comparatively, the franchisees in the EA industry would seem to have a higher 
flexibility on creation. 
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7.1.5 Franchisor's ~xperience is Directly Related to Franchisees' Satisfaction 
In theory, franchisee satisfaction is positively related to the franchisor's experience, 
because of the franchisor's learning curve. This means that the more experience the 
franchisor has, the more efficient it should be. In response to this the CVS franchisors 
said: 
"YE?s, the higher ability of the store supervisor~' maturity and communicative 
ability. The higher satisfaction franchisees will have." (7-Eleven) 
(International) 
"YE?s, the franchisor should be experienced in the logistics and iriformation 
gathering. Moreover, the franchisor should organise different promotional 
activities according to different festivals. What franchisees care most about is the 
product mix, i. e., whether new products or services can be served quicker than 
competitors. " (Circle K) (International) 
AU franchisors agreed that franchisors should be more experienced, and in particular in 
product management, information systems, logistics and store supervisor's ability. As 
to what franchisees think about the franchisor's ability, two franchisees said: 
"The franchisor should be more creative rather than so conservative on product 
lines. Moreover, the franchisor should be good at advertising in order to promote 
its brand" (Circle K) (Franchisee 5) (Internal) 
"The franchisor should be good at product development. In addition, they should 
have a good vision and insight. For example, another franchisor is doing 
e-commerce, although the result is not sure nevertheless, it gives franchisees 
positive inspiration. " (Niko Mart) (Franchisee 5) 
Generally speaking, franchisee satisfaction comes from two perspectives, product 
management and the quality of interactions. Therefore, franchisees felt that franchisors 
should be good at leadership, product management, computer systems, advertising and 
so on. Some franchisees pointed out that the franchisor should give some authority to 
franchisees, allowing some changes in the product mix according to local difference. 
Besides, the attitude of staff in the head office should be improved, because franchisees 
felt that they were being treated as company-owned employees. On the whole, most 
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franchisees agreed that the more experience the franchisor has, the higher their 
satisfaction would be. 
When EA franchisors were asked such a question, their answers were: 
"Ths, they are related and Ihe satisfaction is directly related to the franchisor s 
know-how and innovation. Take the army for example, the franchisor is just like 
the back-up department, which gives support rather than fighting in the front line. 
Therefore, the satisfaction of franchisees is related to the franchisor s know-how. " 
(HB) (Local) 
"No, I do not believe that there is a positive effect. It means that a successful 
franchisor does not need good industrial experience, whereas, the franchisor has 
to equip the franchisee with know-how on its operations and management. Like a 
coach, he does not need to be a very good player before being a coach; 
nevertheless, he knows how to guide a group and how to motivate them. This is 
more important than the experience. "(CbinaTrust) (Local) 
Although one franchisor said that there is no relationship with the franchisor's 
experience, the views expressed still indicate the importance of franchisor know-how 
and experience. Both party's role is different; the role of a franchisor is to drive the 
business in the right direction and make franchisees satisfied with their policy. Aside 
from the know-how, the interaction between both parties seems more important. As for 
how franchisees perceive this kind of relationship, they said: 
"Yes, nevertheless, the most important factor of all is their attitude, i. e., if they are 
not zealous to franchisees, all experience is worthless. In practice, some persons 
may know a lot, however, they give less support to franchisees." (Rebar) 
(Franchisee 2) 
"Yes, 1 believe the franchisor staff should be more alert to the market tendency, 
however, they do not have that particular sense. Hence, they do not know how to 
help franchisees or may even develop improper marketing activities, which cause 
franchisees 'trouble and complaints. " (CbinaTrust) (FraDchisee 4) 
Most EA franchisees agreed with the view, nevertheless, most of them felt that 
franchisors did not do what they should do, in particular regarding brand promotion and 
educational training. They also thought that franchisor experience was more usefuJ to a 
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new franchisee. Experienced franchisees felt that what they need is just the exposure of 
the brand. 
In Summary, EA franchisees are more independent; they can survive even without any 
support from the franchisor. However, in the CVS industry because they are reactive to 
customers, they have to count on the franchisor's support and service. Hence, the 
ability and experience of the franchisor becomes more important in establishing 
franchisee satisfaction. 
7.1.6 Franchisors Should Run Company Owned Outlets before Franchising 
The franchisees were asked about whether franchisors need to run company owned 
outlets before franchising. The answers varied between the CVS and EA franchisees. 
Franchisees in the CVS answered that this was necessary, however, EA franchisees did 
not think that it was necessary. Let us see what the CVS franchisee said: 
"1es, it should be, otherwise, franchisees will be treated as the white mice. " 
(7-Eleven) (Franchisee 4) 
Almost all CVS franchisees agreed that franchisors should run company-owned outlets 
before franchising, and this seems to be true in practice. The reason could be the 
complexity 0 f retail store operations. If the franchisor does not know how to deal with 
daily operations, complaints will arise from franchisees. So, all franchisors started by 
setting up the know-how of store operations, purchasing and logistics. After the 
successful operation of company-owned outlets, they started to franchise. Within EA, 
since franchisees do not need to count on franchisors so much, their answers were 
different. The following are typical: 
"No, J do not think so. From the perJpective of standardisation, the franchisor 
needs some experimental outlets. So, in the beginning, the franchisor may just 
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choose some good franchisees learning from them, and set it as an example to 
other franchisees. In fact, the owner of the franchisor has got the experience on 
how to run a store before. Hence, the franchisor does not need to raise an ox jor 
the purpose of drinking a cup of milk. " (HB) (Franchisee 9) 
"1 do not think that it is necessary. 1 just believe that if the franchisor ~'flexibility 
is good enough to support franchisees, then it will be fine. " (Rebar) (Franchisee 
5) 
From the EA franchisees' comments, they do not think the franchisor has to run 
company-owned outlets in the beginning. However, most of interviewees believe that 
staff in the head office should have industrial experience so then they can help the 
franchisees. Comparatively, the difference is quite clear because in the EA, franchisees 
can count on themselves even if the franchisor disappears but with CVS franchisees, if 
they do not have the franchisor, the sourcing of products is an immediate problem. In 
other words, they would have to face thousands of suppliers rather than just the 
franchisor. In short, whether franchisors have to run RC outlets before franchising is 
related to the supply chain and franchisees' profession in this case. 
7.1.7 Summary 
From this section, we get the impression that the decision-makers can be either the 
franchisor leaders or the store supervisors. In the CVS sample, leadership is directly 
related to the store supervisor, which is different from the EA franchisees' interaction 
with the franchisor's office. No matter which industry, 'attitude' and 'professionalism' 
are the two key issues in the quality of interaction. In this research, EA franchisees do 
not believe that leadership plays an important role in interaction because the 
franchisor's power is quite weak. Further, participative leadership is not welcome in 
the EA industry. Concerning entrepreneurship, there is an implicit difference between 
both industries. The CVS franchisors hope that the franchisees are not entrepreneurs, 
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but EA franchisors hope that they are. As to whether franchisors and franchisees are 
entrepreneurs per se, all franchisors and franchisees agreed that they were. However, 
disagreements and conflicts occur as franchisors and franchisees have different 
opinions, and in particular in the CVS industry. On the relationship between the 
franchisor's experience and franchisee satisfaction, although all respondents agreed 
with this view, differences still exist between industries. Within CVS, experience is 
focused on the logistics and product development. In the EA industry, it is more related 
to invisible know-how. However, both agreed that the respondent's attitude is very 
important. Finally, both industries have different viewpoints on whether franchisors 
need to run company owned outlets before franchising. The CVS franchisees deem that 
it is necessary so that they can minimize franchisee risk. For EA franchisees, they do 
not think so, because almost all franchisees have got industrial experience and what 
they need is just the power of the franchisor's brand. 
7.2 Relational Exchange Theory 
Relational exchange theory assesses the attitude of parties to transactions between 
entities. Transactions, aside from the price, also include emotional and belief exchange. 
Therefore, economic and non-economic satisfaction wiIJ be achieved by a transaction. 
Kaufmann and Stem (1988) view franchising as the prototype relational exchange. In 
franchising, the alliance between the franchisor and franchisee is established in order to 
maintain and promote the trademark. If the franchisee perceives the relationship as 
inadequate and therefore values of trademark as not having the long-term potential to 
fulfil their requirements, then the franchisees will have a short-term view of the 
relationship. In the following section, issues arising from relational exchange will be 
explored in order to uncover how both franchisors and franchisees perceive and 
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preserve this particular relationship. In addition, the section considers how, if conflicts 
occur, both parties react to each other from the perspective of relationship maintenance. 
7.2.1 The Way to Maintain Good Relationships 
In the franchise organisation, since the franchisor holds the dominant position, the 
franchisor has to think how to maintain good relationships with franchisees in order to 
maximise franchising efficiency. In the CVS, the franchisors said: 
"First, the franchisor has to make franchisees satisfied with their revenues. We 
give a guarantee to franchisees on the annual gross margin, if they do not make so 
much money, the franchisor will pay them the difference. As to the management of 
relationship, the store supervisor usually does this work. ... In addition, the 
franchisor will give awards to those franchisees with good performance to set a 
good example to other franchisees. Finally, the stronger the logistics, the higher 
satisjactionfranchisees will have. "(7-Eleven) (International) 
"The relationship can be managed before being a partner, the franchisor has to 
make franchisees clear about the contract and the operations. Once the contract 
is signed, the training and communications become more important. Honesty is 
the best policy, the franchisor should not cheat franchisees at any time and let 
franchisees know which policy will be carried out before it is executed" (Hi-Life) 
(Local) 
Aside from store supervision, strong logistics, rich product lines and guaranteed gross 
margin, the franchisors also suggest that senior managers should sometimes visit stores 
to listen to the franchisees' voice. In addition, staff attitudes in the franchisor office are 
very important for mutual communications. After all, the purpose of relationship 
maintenance is not just between the store supervisor and franchisees. It should be 
everybody's responsibility in the head office. As to how franchisees seek to keep a 
good relationship with their franchisors, they said: 
"Follow the franchisor S policy and a good relationship will be maintained In the 
beginning, 1 will negotiate with the supervisor if 1 am not satisfied with operations. 
If he cannot agree with me, then what 1 can do is to follow policy. " (7-Eleven) 
(Franchisee 4) 
"1 believe that a good communication channel is the best policy. Now, customers 
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sometimes come to the store to buy some promotional products, however, we do 
not know about this particular policy. Therefore, customer will complain about 
our service. I think the franchisor should let franchisees know first before 
carrying out any policy. "(Circle K) (Franchisee 6) 
"Following the franchisor s policy is the best policy" is the most common viewpoint. 
This implies that the franchisor wiU use coercive power on franchisees if they do not 
follow the policy. So, no matter what franchisees think, they have ultimately to follow 
the franchisor's policy. However, if the franchisor's policy is not good and franchisees 
are forced to follow it, interaction will become passive. However in the EA industry, 
some franchisors said: 
"The franchisor should care about franchisees and manage the relationship by the 
contract. Under the accepted dimension, informal relationship should be taken 
into consifi.eration. In other words, a good relationship is elastic rather than just 
does what the contract specifies. So, q/fection takes a standfirst, thenfollowed by 
rationality and law. " (HB) (Local) 
"Take franchisees as partners of your business rather than employees of the 
franchisor. " (China Trust) (Local) 
From these statements, we can see that flexibility is higher than for the CVS in respect 
of the maintenance of the relationship. Besides, a difference between the two industries 
is also reflected in their attitudes towards communication. Within the CVS, the policy 
is enforced by law ifthere is a difficulty, and then followed by rationality and affection. 
This is a quite different approach that found in the EA. This is the reason why the EA 
franchisors' policy is sometimes not carried out thoroughly by franchisees. Only if the 
franchisor's power is great will franchisees carry policy out; otherwise, different 
franchisees will have different policies. The other difference is m what is 
communicated. The EA franchisors communicate 'managing spirit' rather than 
'operational issues', which is the case in the CVS. As to how the franchisees view the 
maintenance of relationships, they said: 
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"Follow the franchisor S policy and attend the routine meetings. However, the 
franchisor always ignores franchisees' suggestions and it results that franchisees 
do not want to waste time communicating with the franchisor. Finally, franchisees 
just use the brand and sharing iriformation with other franchisees at most. " (HB) 
(Franchisee 7) 
"Pay the royalty on time; basically, franchisees will not proactively interact with 
the franchisor because our targets are customers rather than the franchisor. By 
contrast, the franchisor should be proactive to franchisees because we are his 
customers. " (Rebar) (Franchisee 1) 
"/ do not care about the relationship with the franchisor, what I need to do is to 
pay the royalty on time and the franchisor does not come to bother me. " (Century 
21) (Franchisee 1) 
Reviewing these comments, we can see that the relationship between franchisors and 
franchisees are quite unstable. Although the franchisor offers some kind of 
communication channels and meetings, the franchisees still think that it is pointless to 
attend these meetings because their opinions are ignored. Most franchisees choose to 
behave themselves and hope that the franchisors will not bother them. For those with 
good relationships with franchisors, they said that the franchisee should sometimes be 
more proactive towards the franchisor because if you are in trouble, the franchisor will 
help you more if the relationship is good. Hence, the franchisees' opinions are quite 
diverse, some care about the relationship but the others do not. One franchisee pointed 
out that the ideal relationship should be like a Chinese proverb, ''fish helps water and 
water helps fish"; this means that one party cannot survive without the other. 
In comparison, most franchisees in the CVS said they do not have the opportunity to 
communicate with senior managers. They also commented that the franchisors always 
ignore the franchisees' opinions. This leads to the same result; namely, the franchisees 
just care about themselves and are passive towards the franchisor'S policy. In order to 
maintain a good relationship, each party must have some expectation from the other; 
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the following section will explore what their expectations are. 
7.2.2 Expectations from the Other Party 
Expectation is the desire for something. In the franchise relationship, expectation 
relates to how one party behaves to make the other feel more comfortable. First, let us 
see what the franchisors' expectations are from franchisees in the CVS. They said: 
"I hope that franchisees can cultivate their trading area well and build a good 
relationship with customers. In addition, their pe1':iormance had better outperform 
last year standardisation. Finally, we hope they can offer some constructive 
suggestions. " (7-Eleven) (International) 
"J hope that franchisees' attitude can be more positive. They always stand only 
from their viewpoints to see why the operation is done by this way rather than see 
the whole view to see the franchise system. Therefore, the gap has to be minimised 
by the communication with store supervisor. " (Hi-Life) (Local) 
The franchisors stated that they hoped that franchisees would be more proactive on 
store operations and customer service. The aim is to maximise profit. Beside these 
store issues, some franchisors expressed the view that if franchisees have any questions, 
they can inform the store supervisor, however, sometimes, the store supervisor cannot 
reflect franchisees' opinions to the franchisor. Therefore, dissatisfaction will occur 
between both parties. Some franchisees said: 
"I hope that the franchisor canfasten the expansion ~peed; otherwise the RC store 
managers have to be rotated to other places. Further, the expansion speed is too 
slow for those who want to befranchisees. "(Circle K) (Manager 1) 
"I hope that the franchisor can offer correct product selling information and offer 
hot products in time. Now, since we do not the POS computer system, franchisees 
cannot get the latest information and must be informed reactively by the franchisor. 
Therefore, I cannot give the instant response to customers and it will lead to 
potential losses. " (Niko Mart) (Franchisee 5) 
"I wish that the franchisor would offer the opportunity to communicate with the 
senior managers directly. Now, the store supervisors just preach the franchisor s 
policy but they do not have the authority and ability to solve the franchisee s 
complaints. The communication is done by paper work, it takes time and cannot 
solve the related problems. " (Hi-Life) (Franchisee 4) 
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Aside from the above expectations, some franchisees felt that the sharing percentage 
could be higher, brand advertisement could be more frequent and logistics could be 
stronger. From the above expressions, we can also see that the RC manager's 
expectation is different from the franchisees. Returning to the franchisor's expectations, 
this reveals that both parties want to know how the other party thinks. However, the 
communication channel, the store supervisors, seem unqualified to do this. We can 
suggest that complaints and misunderstanding sometimes arise from the ability and 
characteristics of the store supervisor. 
Regarding the expectations from EA franchisees, the franchisors said: 
"Aside from following the franchisor s policy, 1 hope that franchisees can 
understand that the franchisor also has difficulties. So, if both parties can think 
more about each other, the relationship will be better and longer. " (HB) (Local) 
"1 hope franchisees have positive feedback and correct managing concepts on the 
store operation. " (Century 21) (International) 
From these comments, we can see that the franchisors hope that the franchisees can be 
loyal to the franchisors' policy and contract; in addition, they also hope that franchisees 
will get along with one another and perform good store management. Therefore, 
franchisors hope a good relationship can be built from the store level (point) to the 
franchisee level (line and surface) and fmal1y to a system level (franchisee, franchisor 
and the brand). If this kind of relationship can be built like a network, the franchise 
power will be very strong, even stronger than RC systems. However, different entities 
have different objectives, hence, it is difficult to any together and this is one of the 
reasons why the reputation of franchised brands is not as strong as RC brands. For 
franchisees, let us see what they said: 
"1 hope that the franchisor can inform the franchisee when its decision is related 
to the benefit of the franchisee, like setting up a new franchisee nearby Now, the 
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franchisor just sets it up and without noticing neighbouring franchisees till they 
complain about it. However, it is too late, and both parties' relationship will 
become worse. In a short time, the franchisor may get the benefit from the new 
franchisee, nevertheless, from the long-term perspective, thefranchisor will lose 
more because the original franchisees now distrust the franchisor. In addition, I 
hope the franchisor can give an aid to franchisees, as they need help. For me, I 
have never encountered difficulty in growth; however, I got nothing from the 
franchisor ~. assistance. (BB) (Franchisee 1) 
"I hope that the franchisor can give a response to franchisees' questions rather 
than dodge it. Otherwise, the franchisees will do the same thing by ignoring the 
franchisor:S policy It is the same rule if we do not offer instant response to 
customers; they will choose another store. So, if the franchisor still ignores 
franchisees' opinion, 1 will consider transferring to the another brand. " (Rebar) 
(Francbisee 2) 
"1 hope that the franchisor has a long-term perspective rather than just offering 
the brand only. Hence, I hope thefranchisor can pay more attention to the brand 
promotion. After all, the word of mouth of the brand is built on the franchisees' 
service. So, if both parties can ally together to strengthen the brand value, it will 
be good to both parties. However, it has its difficulties, because every franchisee s 
objective is different. " (Century 21) (Franchisee 5) 
Summarising the franchisees' opinions, they believed that franchisors should try their 
best on brand promotion, information sharing and educational training. In other words, 
the ideal situation is that the franchisor should provide what a single franchisee cannot 
do himself and give up those activities which franchisees can manage by themselves. 
Another interesting point is that many franchisees thought about transferring the brand. 
Nevertheless, in this research, the transferred franchisees were still not satisfied with 
their current franchisor. For these, we can say that no franchisor is good enough. 
Moreover, from the franchisees' opinions, we can see that the potential conflicts 
between the franchisor and franchisees arise from many perspectives. Final1y, 
franchisees will treat the franchisor as the franchisor treats the franchisees. Returning 
to the CVS, there is a common point and a different point. The common point is that 
franchisees in both industries have communication problems with franchisors. The 
difference is that the CVS franchisors at least keep the daily operations smooth, with 
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EA franchisees, the basic service from the franchisor sometimes looks like 'fish in the 
. , 
rur . 
Both the franchisors and franchisees have expectations from the other party, and this 
means that they are not so satisfied with the current relationship. As to how to face the 
conflicts, the following section will provide a discussion. 
7.2.3 Attitude to Conflicts 
From the previous comments, we can see that there are some visible and invisible 
conflicts between both parties. As they face the conflicts, how will both parties react? 
The CVS franchisors said: 
"It depends on the issue of conflicts. Usually, coriflicts will be deflected to senior 
managers if it cannot be solved at the supervisor s level. With .franchisees, 
communication will be tried first, and followed by coercive actions. The RC 
managers have to follow the franchisor s policy without doubt." (7-Eleven) 
(International) 
"Coercive actions will be taken for either RC or FC outlets." (Niko Mart) 
(International) 
From the franchisors' comments, we can see that there are two different attitudes to 
dealing with conflicts. One is using coercive powers to force franchisees to follow the 
franchisors' policy; this is the reason why many franchisees complain that there is no 
difference between being RC managers and franchisees. The other is that the 
franchisors use different ways to deal with RC and Fe questions. Therefore, the 
satisfaction of their franchisees is higher. Do franchisees have the same viewpoint? 
They stated: 
"It depends on what kind of question. If the issue has been regulated in the 
contract, then coercive action will be done. Ifit is about the conceptual gap, it will 
be solved through communication. " (7-Elven) (Franchisee 8) 
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"The franchisor usually adopts a coercive attitude to askfranchisees rather than 
using a communicative attitude to ask franchisees and clearly, many complaints 
will occur. In addition, franchisees cannot ally together to protest against the 
franchisor, otherwise, all of them will be terminating the relationship. "(Circle K) 
(Franchisee 5) 
Returning to the franchisors' comments, we can see that some franchisors have a 
problem of mutual communication because most franchisees did not like the 
communication style. For RC managers, they have to follow the franchisor's policy; 
otherwise, their performance will be discounted by the store supervisor. Therefore, the 
attitude of the store supervisor depends on two factors, one is his own characteristics 
and the other is the franchisor's policy. Regarding the EA industry, the franchisor said: 
"It depends on what kind of problem. !fit is related to the whole system or other 
franchisees' benefits, thefranchisor will use coercive power to do with it. However, 
if it is not related to other franchisees, we will communicate with each other to 
solve his problem. " (HB) (Local) 
All other franchisors have the same perception, hence, from this view; the franchisee's 
status in the EA is higher than in the CVS. However, if conflicts take place, it is more 
serious and harmful to EA franchisors. Usually, both parties will resort to the courts. 
This will indirectly damage the franchisor's brand value. The franchisees said: 
"Few conflicts will occur because offew interaction. Thefranchisor doesn t want 
the franchisees to terminate the relationship so then the franchisor usually takes 
non-coercive action during conflicts. " (HB) (Franchisee 10) 
"It depends, if it is about customer s complaint, coercive action will be taken by 
the franchisor. " (Rebar) (Franchisee 8) 
"Now, it is more coercive because of the leader s characteristics in the franchisor 
office. However, generally speaking, it is based on affection rather than law. Ifeel 
the franchisor takes a stand on the dominant position during the communication. " 
(China Trust) (Franchisee 2) 
"Non-coercive action will be taken by the franchisor because the franchisor 
cannot and will not use coercive action, otherwise, .franchisees will terminate the 
relationship. It will be harmful to the franchisor :s finance because this is a buyer ~, 
(franchisee) market rather than a seller s (franchisor) market. " (Century 21) 
(Franchisee 2) 
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Comparing the attitude of the EA franchisor with that of the franchisees, the latter 
seems comparatively softer. This could be explained by the ability of the franchisor. If 
the franchisor is very weak, franchisees will ignore him. Franchisees also stated that 
the attitude is also related to the leader's characteristics or how familiar they are with 
the franchisor. If you are a new franchisee, the franchisor may have a more coercive 
attitude to you. Therefore, it seems that there is no rule for dealing with relationships 
and conflict; it varies with individuals. 
7.2.4 The Development of Conflict 
From the above section, we observe that there are many sources of conflict between 
franchisors and franchisees. When conflict occurs, how did it develop and how was it 
resolved? A leading CVS franchisor said: 
"Generally speaking, the coriflicts go through stages andfinally there will be two 
possible results. One is that the coriflict is reflected in many franchisees, then the 
franchisor will correct the operational issues. The other is that if the problem is 
just issued by one franchisee, then the store supervisor will communicate with him 
and solve the problem as soon as possible because there are too many policies, 
there is no time for franchisees to stay complaining. In practice, the marketing 
promotion activities are renewed every two weeks. Hence, if franchisees cannot 
throwaway their complaints, it will influence the following operations. Finally, tf 
both parties cannot negotiate with each other, the relationship will be terminated 
or resort to the court. " (7.Eleven) (International) 
All franchisors pointed out that they would be proactive in solving the problems, 
however, in practice; this kind of interaction is still handled by the store supervisor. In 
order to prevent potential conflict between store supervisors and franchisees, store 
supervisors will usuaIIy be rotated every six months. In addition, from the franchisors' 
comments, we can see that they take a stand on the dominant positions to deal with 
conflicts to keep the system operating nonnally. Regarding the franchisees' reactions to 
contlict, their attitudes were: 
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"Thejinal relationship will become no relationship or even worse. fjust do what f 
should do and the franchisor just gives me what I should get. As to the interaction, 
no one will be proactive because f had been proactive in reflecting problems; 
nevertheless, the store supenJisor pointed out that f should wait and see and the 
final responses were always nothing. Hence, f have become reactive to this kind of 
reflection. The worse result is to terminate the relationship." (Circle K) 
(Franchisee 10) 
"The relationship will be worse and no party will be proactive. Now, f have been 
lazy to reflect problems because it takes time and the result is not satisfying. f 
haven i encountered any problem which cannot be solved. " (Hi-Life) (Franchisee 
4) 
Summarising the franchisees' comments, we find that there are three kinds of reflection 
for franchisees. Franchisees may ignore it, take it, or co-operate with the franchisor to 
solve it. Most franchisees said that the relationship will be worse once conflict occurs 
because they are usually proactive on the problems, however, the responses from store 
supervisors or franchisors are time consuming or do not exist. Consequently, 
franchisees will become reactive to the franchisor policies. Returning to the 
franchisors' comments, we can learn that both parties said they would be proactive. 
The difference may be that franchisors are more proactive in asking franchisees to 
follow the policy and franchisees are more proactive in reflecting the difficulties of 
operations, because it causes them inconvenience and disrupts their benefits. With EA 
franchisors, their expressions were: 
"The relationship is dependent on the final solution and usually, the franchisor is 
more proactive because it is related to the brand value. Once the conflict cannot 
be solved, both parties will terminate the relationship or even resort to the 
courts. " (Rebar) (Local) 
All the other franchisors said they would be more proactive, this may be because ofthe 
brand value, and they said that if conflicts cannot be solved, then both parties would 
resort to the law. In fact, conflicts will at first be negotiated by the area representatives 
and store supervisors. If the problem cannot be solved, it must be a serious case and 
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most franchisees will complain about it. For example, HB had developed a second 
brand name without informing franchisees in advance; this aroused a lot of resistance. 
Some franchisees even allied together to sue the franchisor and the result was that the 
franchisees defeated the franchisor. Even so, these franchisees exited the brand and 
transferred to other brands. Therefore, nobody won from the conflict. As to how 
franchisees perceived the development of conflicts, their viewpoints were: 
"Conflicts will lead to no interaction with each other, like a cold war. Franchisees 
will reflect the problem proactively and throw it to the meeting between the 
franchisor andfranchisees. If the situation is worse, the franchisor will terminate 
the relationship. " (ChinaTrust) (Franchisee J) 
"Generally speaking, the franchisor is quite friendly, they deem franchisees are 
customers. As to which party will be proactive, it depends, ((the issue is related to 
the transaction itself, the franchisor will be more proactively solving the problem. 
However, if it is about the store issues, the .franchisee will be more proactive to 
reflect problems. Once the conflict cannot be solved, then both parties' 
relationship will be terminated, and then transfered to another brand name, it is 
quite easy. " (Century 21) (Franchisee 5) 
From the above comments, we can see that the franchisor will be more proactive if the 
problem is related to its brand value, otherwise, he will ignore it until many franchisees 
complaint about it. Even so, after the meeting with the franchisors, some franchisors 
still ignore the franchisees' complaints. In this case, the interaction between both 
parties will get even worse. Comparatively, the main obstacle between the franchisor 
and franchisees in the CVS is the store supervisor, however, within the EA, the 
characteristics of leaders in the head office are the main factor. 
7.2.5 Evaluation of the Other Party's Performance 
The performance of one party is sometimes directly related to the satisfaction of the 
other party. In other words, if franchisees show a good performance on revenue or 
loyalty, then the franchisors will be satisfied. With the franchisees, they also hope that 
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the franchisor perfonns well on the logistics or brand management. Hence, this section 
will discuss how one party evaluates the other party's performance. First, the CVS 
franchisors said: 
"The performance could be evaluated from two perspectives, which are 
managerial and operational performance. The managerial performance is 
measured by his effort on the store management such as product and personnel 
management. Regarding operational performance, it is related to non-store issues, 
such as the competition. The franchisor usually helps franchisees solve these 
problems. However, if the managerial performance is not good enough, the 
franchisor will resort to the contract, or even terminate the relationship." 
(7-Eleven) (International) 
"The performance is mainly from three per~pectives, they are sales, store 
management and customer service. The score of the performance is directed 
related to the application to be a multi-unit franchisee." (Circle K) 
(International) 
From the above comments, we learn that the performance evaluations of franchisees are 
mainly from two perspectives: daily sales and store management. However, this kind 
of evaluation is sometimes not welcomed by the franchisees themselves because the 
franchisees will think that the franchisors try to find fault as mentioned before. With 
franchisees, their evaluations are based on: 
"The performance is evaluatedfrom the number of store outlets and the expansion 
speed" (7-Eleven) (Franchisee 4) 
"I think the performance is evaluated from the advertisement and the 
communication channel. Now, there is no advertisement for the brand name and 
the communication channel is quite closed and passive. Hence, it let me feel there 
is no difference between an RC manager and a franchisee." (Circle K) 
(Franchisee 5) 
From these views, we can see that franchisees' expectations ofthe franchisor are varied, 
however, the fmal expectations are mainly of monetary revenue and the quality of 
interactions. Compared with franchisees, RC managers have a different kind of 
thinking: they question if the franchisor is good enough to let them stay in the business 
forever. From their expectations, only one point is the same as the franchisor's 
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expectations, namely, the maximisation of the store profit. The difference is between 
the store management and interactions. Therefore, this kind of gap may be a source of 
conflict. The EA franchisors said: 
"The performance can be evaluatedfrom the computer information. In addition, 
we organise many competitions among franchisees to see which ones are good 
performers. The store supervisor can also offer franchisees' performance and 
relative information. So, the franchisor is very clear about all the iriformation. " 
(Rebar) (Local) 
"The peiformance is evaluated from the difference between the cost and 
performance. Usually, franchisees do not want the franchisor to know about this 
kind of iriformation. However, from it, the franchisor can give franchisees some 
constructive suggestions. " (China Trust) (Local) 
From the above comments, we can see that performance is evaluated from the sales and 
computer system. However, as mentioned before, the information on the computer can 
be false. Hence, the visit to the store becomes more important, however, this kind of 
interaction seems difficult for franchisors. Finally, the franchisor sometimes cannot get 
the latest information from franchisees until something happens. With franchisees, 
their viewpoints were: 
"It can be evaluated from three perspectives, which are the number offranchisees, 
the ranking of the brand name and the professional support when you need it. " 
(BB) (Franchisee 8) 
"It is based on the interaction, if the interaction is good, then the relationship will 
be good" (ChinaTrust) (Francbisee 1) 
Basically, what franchisees focus on are educational training, brand name 
advertisements, market share and the quality of interaction. However, from the 
previous sections, we can see that most franchisors are not good at brand name 
advertisement and interaction. Therefore, some franchisees take a passive attitude to 
the franchisor's performance; they just ask themselves rather than seek out the 
franchisor's help. Returning to CVS franchisees, their requirements are the same, 
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which are the monetary revenue and interaction. However, the focus is different, CVS 
franchisees want to have a better interaction with franchisors and EA franchisees hope 
that the brand exposure can be higher. From this phenomenon, we can suggest that the 
relationship in CVS between the franchisor and franchisees is more stable than in EA. 
7.2.6 Co-ordination of Both Party's Objectives 
The franchise organisation is not like general organisations whose objectives are 
carried out from top to bottom. In the franchise organisation, every franchisor and 
franchisee have their own objectives, which may differ. Hence, co-ordinating these 
objectives to create the maximum efficiency is very important. Otherwise, it wi11 be 
like dispersed sands, which cannot compete with the RC system. Within the CVS, one 
franchisor said: 
"The final objective for the franchisor is to create profit for both the franchisor 
andfranchisees. "(CircJe K) (International) 
From the above comment, we can confer that the franchisors' objectives are the 
maximisation of profits and store outlets. However, some conflicts exist between both 
parties such as the sharing percentage and exclusive trading territory because of 
self-interest. Some franchisees highlighted their objectives as: 
"The final objective is to make the store profitable enough to be franchised. In 
other words, when a new franchisee comes running the store, its performance can 
be at least the same as before. Therefore, being a RC store manager, my objective 
is to let the RC outlet become a FC outlet. " (Circle K) (Manager1) 
"There are two objectives, one is to make money and the other is gain some 
experience on how to run a store. " (Circle K) (Franchisee 4) 
"Making money and being a multi-unit franchisee are my objectives. " (Niko 
Mart) (Franchisee 1) 
From the franchisees' expressions, we can see that beside money, there are other 
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objectives such as self-growth or being a multi-unit franchisee. Hence, the franchisors 
have to know how to design a better management mechanism from the perspectives of 
monetary and non-monetary angles. With EA, some franchisors said that their 
objectives were: 
"The objectives are to manage the brand well and attract more franchisees. The 
retail channel is not only a positive impression of the business group but also an 
advantage Jar future products or services. We hope we can be the leading brand 
name in China in the Juture. ,. (Rebar) (Local) 
"The final objective is to copy the successful model and then make profit. " 
(Century 21) (International) 
From the franchisors' expressions, we can see that franchisors cannot survive without 
franchisees; hence, franchisors tend to have a positive attitude to franchisees. However, 
maybe this is just an ideal situation, in fact, how franchisees perceived the objectives is 
reflected here: 
"Being the leading brand in this area is my objective. " (Rebar) (Franchisee 5) 
"The final objectives are considered on the perspectives of making money, staff 
stability and organisational development. " (ChinaTrust) (Franchisee 1) 
A comparison between the objectives of franchisors and franchisees shows a clear 
conflict regarding the exclusive trading territory mentioned in the previous section. 
Before, franchisors used the line distance for this criterion, but now some change to use 
the number of households. Even so, when the economic situation is good, this kind of 
conflict will still exist. Comparatively, franchisees in the EA do not have the desire to 
be multi-unit franchisees now because of the recession; the number ofEA store outlets 
is decreasing. However, with CVS, many franchisees want to be multi-unit franchisees, 
this kind of phenomenon has been mentioned before. 
7.2.7 The Relationship Between tbe Franchisor's Performance and the 
Franchisee's Performance 
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Little and Pride (1985) suggest that the overall franchisee satisfaction is intensified 
when the member perceives a strong association between performance and channel 
related rewards. From the previous discussions, we know that the franchisors' 
performance can be evaluated from logistics, supervision, communication, educational 
training, brand name and so on. Ifthe franchisees believe that the relationship between 
both parties is important and treasure it, then there will be a positive effect; otherwise, 
there is no relationship between both parties' performance. Some CVS franchisees 
said that: 
"Yes, because we are in the store everyday and sometimes we cannot see our 
defects, the supervisor can remind us and improve it. " (7-Eleven) (Franchisee 
10) 
"The performance is mainly based on the franchisee:S effort. As to the 
relationship with the franchisor :s performance, it is limited ff the franchisor s 
performance on advertising and product mix management can be better, it would 
be helpful. " (Circle K) (Franchisee 4) 
From the franchisees' comments, we can learn that that the franchisor's performance is 
mainly judged from the supervisor's assistance, advertising, product mix and the 
logistics. However, some franchisees highlighted that location, interaction with 
employees and customers are the most important factors of all for a store's success. 
Therefore, we can suggest that there are three critical success factors, which are the 
franchisor's ability, the franchisee's effort and the location. Comparatively, franchisees 
in the EA pointed out that: 
"No, there is no relationship because of three reasons, they are the experience of 
the supervisor, the franchisees' attitude to the franchisor and the franchisor :s 
response. Regarding the final point, the franchisor always ignores franchisees' 
opinions; so, it is useless to argue with the franchisor. Therefore, the leader in the 
franchisor becomes very important because he can influence the organisational 
atmosphere. " (HB) (Franchisee 10) 
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"It depends on how you take advantage of the franchisor s resources. {f you know, 
then the percentage will be higher, otherwise, there is no relationship. " (Century 
21) (Franchisee 10) 
Most of the EA franchisees said that the brand name is the first impression for 
customers, after that, the ability of salesmen is the most important feature of aB. 
However, as far as brand name promotion is concerned, they are not satisfied with the 
franchisor'S efforts. Instead, the franchisees promote the brand name for the franchisor. 
Hence, improper interactions and conflicts occur quite often. Returning to CVS, the 
difference is quite clear that most franchisees in EA do not think that performance is 
related to the franchisor's performance, what they use is just the brand name at most. 
7.2.8 The Relationship Between 'give and take' 
From the perspective of relational exchange theory, the attitude of both parties to the 
transactions between entities can be uncovered. During a transaction, aside from the 
price factor, there are also emotional exchanges and other non-price exchanges. 
Therefore, economic and non-economic satisfaction will be achieved by the transaction. 
In franchising, the price factor means the royalty and emotional exchange typifies the 
quality of interactions. In this section, both parties will comment on whether there is a 
fair "give and take". This kind of feeling will influence the development of both 
parties' relationships. One franchisor stated that: 
"I believe that the franchisor gives more than what is got from franchisees. Now, 
the franchisor is releasing more and more resources to franchisees and we believe 
that franchisees' income is good enough, nevertheless, why can they not make 
more effort to create more profit. " (7-Eleven) (International) 
From this comment, the franchisor believes that the balance is either fair or that the 
franchisor is paying more. Nobody says that he gets more in return. This may be 
because the franchisor has to create a good operating environment for franchisees and 
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this task is costly, and the cost is far more than the royalties. With franchisees, their 
opinions are: 
"It depends, if the comparison is between the revenue and the effort. 1 believe that J pay 
more. However, aside from the revenue, ] believe that] can gain the intangible reward, 
such as achievement. " (7-Eleven) (Manager 3) 
"] think that it is quite fair, so ] am satisfied with the relationship so far. " (Circle K) 
(Franchisee 3-interoaJ) 
"] believe that I pay more than] get from the franchisor. " (Niko Mart) (Franchisee 
4-externaJ) 
From their comments, we can observe an interesting phenomenon, that is internal 
franchisees tend to be satisfied with this kind of relationship. However, external 
franchisees felt that they pay more than they can get from the franchisor. Hence, the 
relationship between the franchisors and internal franchisees seems better than external 
franchisees. In addition, the satisfaction of multi-unit franchisees is higher than single 
franchisees; this suggests that multi-unit franchisees are more loyal to the franchisor's 
policy. Regarding the RC managers, most of them think that they pay more than they 
get from the monetary income. However, they also get the achievement from the store 
management. From the respondents' answers, the franchisor could design different 
rewarding system for each group to make the relationship better. One EA franchisor 
highlighted that: 
"I believe that the franchisor pays more than the franchisor gets from the royalties 
because there are too many competitors in the market so then the franchisor has to 
lower the royalty. " (HB) (Local) 
All the other franchisors pointed out that they pay more than they get from franchisees. 
Two reasons may explain this; one is that in a competitive market, in order to attract 
new customers, the franchisor has to lower the royalties. Second, during the recession, 
franchisees asked to pay a lower royalty; some franchisors agreed to keep the original 
franchisees. As to what are the franchisees' opinions, they said: 
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"It is difficult to evaluate, it should be said, how much you can create from the 
franchisor s support. In addition, it is closely related to the franchisee s ability. " 
(HB) (Franchisee 2) 
"It depends, in a booming market, I believe that it is worthy, nOl1! in the recession 
market, 1 believe that / pay more than I can get. " (Rebar) (Franchisee 9) 
"It should be evaluated from two per~pectives. The first is with regard to the 
investment of the brand name and the second is whether the brand name is 
powerful enough to attract new employees. " (Century 21) (Franchisee 5) 
From this analysis, we can see that most franchisees in Rebar and Century 21 felt that it 
is quite fair; nevertheless, the reasons may be varied. With Rebar, the brand is the 
leading franchise brand and the franchisor's ability is higher than the others. However, 
with Centwy 2 I, most of the franchisees are transferred; therefore, they already have a 
view on what the quality will be and will not ask too much from the franchisor. In the 
analysis, many franchisees pointed out that it is very difficult to evaluate whether it is 
equal in the exchange because it depends on the stage, market and so on. So, there is a 
gap between franchisors and franchisees. Most franchisees felt they paid more and if 
this kind of dissatisfaction grows, they may transfer to another brand name. 
7.2.9 Summary 
In this section, relational exchange theory provided a framework to explore the 
perspectives of relationship maintenance and conflict development. Concerning the 
maintenance of relationships, they should be managed from the pre-contractual stage 
rather than wait till conflicts occur. The CVS franchisors tended to resort to the 
contract, if franchisees are not loyal to the franchisors' policy. However, in the EA, the 
franchisors were inclined to use non-coercive power to communicate with franchisees 
frrst. This results in a bad situation, in that there are many different treatments and grey 
areas. Even so, both industries agree that having a good communication channel is the 
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way to maintain relationships. With regard to this point, the EA seems to outperform 
the CVS; however, the result is the same because franchisors in both industries seem to 
always ignore the franchisee's opinions. The relationship between EA franchisors and 
franchisees is just built on the exchange of royalty and brand name. The relationship 
becomes very volatile and franchisees can transfer the brand name at any time. By 
contrast, in the case of CVS, franchisors have provided the basic service to keep the 
business running, hence, what franchisees are dissatisfied with, are issues related to 
details of operations and communication mechanisms. This is the reason why CVS 
franchisors are more powerful than EA franchisors. 
Concerning the development of conflict, in the beginning, franchisees tend to influence 
the franchisors but fmally, they fmd that they cannot, all they can do is to folJow the 
franchisor's policy passively (CVS) or ignore the policy (EA). As to the perfonnance 
evaluation, CVS franchisees think that the quality of interactions is the most important 
factor of all, while EA franchisees believe that brand power is the key criteria. 
Regarding the relationship between the franchisor'S performance and franchisee's 
performance, the CVS franchisees think that franchisors should be good at logistics, 
product management, supervision, computerisation, expansion and so on. The EA 
franchisees still think that the performance of brand management is the critical success 
factor. After all, EA franchisees can survive without the franchisors' assistance. Fina1Jy, 
in the relationship between 'give and take', internal franchisees and multi-unit 
franchisees in the CVS seem most satisfied with the franchisors and thought that they 
got more from the franchisors. Within EA, the franchisees suggested that it is related to 
how you utilise the franchisor's resources. If you know how to use these resources, you 
will feel that it is worthy; otherwise, you will feel unfairly treated because you just use 
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the brand name. 
From the examinations of relationships and conflicts in chapters 6 and 7, we found that 
the relationship between franchisors and franchisees is influenced by many variables. 
Minimising the gaps between both parties is important; hence, communication takes an 
important role in the interactions. Only by good and effective communications, can 
both parties ally together to maximise the brand value. 
The following Table 7.1 summarises the comparisons between franchisors and 
franchisees from the perspectives of decision-makers and relational exchange theory. 
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Table 7.1 The Summary of Decision-Maker and Relational Exchange Theory 
CVS (Franchisee) EA (Franchisee) CVS (Franchisor) EA (Franchisor) 
Item Variables FC FC 7-£1 Cire! Niko Hi-L China Centu RC (S) (M) I E S M 0 T HB Rebar Trust ry 21 even eK Mart ife 
There is a close relationship 
It! It! It! It! It! X X X X It! It! It! It! It! It! between leadership and It! It! 
franchisee's satisfaction 
Preference of an entrepreneur N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A NI A X X X X X 
It! It! It! 
Deci Franchisor is an entrepreneur NI NI NI NI NI NI NI NI NI It! It! It! It! It! It! It! It! 
Slon A A A A A A A A A 
Mak Franchisee is an entrepreneur NI It! It! It! It! It! It! It! It! N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
er A 
Franchisor's experience is 
It! It! It! It! It! It! It! It! It! It! It! It! It! It! It! positively related to franchisees' It! It! 
satisfaction 
Franchisor has to run 
company-owned outlets before It! It! It! It! It! X X X X N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
franchising 
Satisfaction of the relationship X X It! It! X X X X X It! X X X It! It! It! It! 
RIE 
Give more than take ." I:i X X v ." ." ." X V v I:i I:i v v It! It! 
-
It! : Means the majority agree I:i: Means no firm option X: it means it depends, the same, has no relationship or the majority disagrees 
N/A: it means the case is not suitable for the party; RC: Regular Chain (company-owned outlet), FC(S): Single-unit franchisee, FC(M): Multi-unit franchisee, I: Internal 
franchisee, E: External franchisee, S: Single: Single-unit franchisee, M: Multi-unit franchisee, 0: Original franchisee, T: Transferred franchisee 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSION 
8.0 Introduction 
From the discussions and analysis presented in chapters 6 and 7, we have a view of 
what the franchisors' and franchisees' viewpoints are concerning specific issues. In this 
section, those fmdings, which are in conflict with existing theories wiU be presented. 
The purpose of this chapter is to elaborate, extend and test theories. Hence, the 
following discussion is based on the theoretical concepts used to deduce [mdings rather 
than the sequence of research questions. From the previous chapters, it is evident that 
the industrial characteristics for both convenience store (product based) and estate 
agency (service based) are different. As a result, the interactions between the 
franchisors and franchisees are also different. The following section will discuss and 
compare the differences between existing theories and practices. This section is 
divided into two parts, general issues and management issues. 
8.1 General issues 
In this section, issues relating to franchising in general will be discussed to explore 
differences between the research findings and the existing theories. 
8.1.1 Failure Rates 
Stanworth, Purdy, Price and Safrris (1998) confirmed Shane's (1996) finding and 
believed that, although franchise business failure rates are similar to conventional small 
businesses, franchising may be more risky during the frrst four to five years of a 
system's life. Bates (1990) has demonstrated that franchised outlets can both 
under-perform and out-perform comparable independent businesses, not only in the 
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same sector but also in the very same franchise system, depending on factors such as 
whether franchisees are newcomers or entrenched, multi-establishment franchisees 
taking on additional outlets. After comparing US and UK data, Storey (1994) 
concluded that the broad pattern which emerges is that the young are more likely to fail 
than the old, the very small are more likely to fail than their larger counterparts, and that, 
for young fIrms, probably the most powerful influence on their survival is whether or 
not they grow within a short period after start-up. Therefore, we can suggest that the 
failure rate is closely linked with the age and the scale of the franchise system. 
Based on Bates' argument, the author draws the same conclusion that there is no 
defmite answer about the failure rate between franchised and conventional outlets. 
According to the comparison between US and UK data, Storey concludes that the 
failure rate is closely linked with the age and the scale of the franchise system. In this 
research, the researcher fmds something that the previous researchers have not 
mentioned, for example, the critical success factors are the internal management and 
the store manager's style in both industries. Besides, in the EA industry, if your 
personal network is wide enough, then a private brand may outperform a franchised 
outlet. During the economic recession, the failure rate for franchisees may higher than 
private brands, because they still have to pay royalties every month, even if they do not 
have any sales for that month. Therefore, the author suggests that the failure rate in the 
EA industry is not only related to whether this is a franchise brand or not but also 
internal management, managers' ability, personal networks and external changes, such 
as economic cycles. 
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8.1.2 Franchising as an Organisational Form 
• In theory, with this kind of organisational form, not only should the franchisor 
Co-operate with franchisees but also the franchisees should ally together to 
compete with other brands. 
The above statement is the ideal situation and this is not true in real life based on this 
research. Some franchisees said that their competitors are other franchisees with the 
same brand name rather than other brands' franchisees. This is because the exclusive 
trading distance is only 500 square meters in the case ofEA. If two franchisees fmd the 
same potential customers, they may speak i1l of each other to gain the customer. Hence, 
their relationships with other brands' franchisees may be better than that with 
franchisees from the same brand. This phenomenon is quite prevalent in the EA 
industry. Also, within the same brand, there are different kinds of operational norms 
and commission systems, which sometimes confuse customers; hence, the collective 
power of franchise brands cannot compete with RC brands in the EA industry. 
8.1.3 Multi-unit franchisees outperform single-unit franchisees 
• In the USA, it is not uncommon for 500/0 of a franchise company s outlets to be 
owned by less than 20% of its franchisees. A single large franchisee may own 
several hundred outlets (Bradach, 1995). Bradach (1995) suggests that multi-unit 
franchisees outperform single franchises in respects of unit growth. However, 
mUltiple ownership in UK appears less common and it is estimated that 82% of 
franchisees operate just a single unit (The NatWest Bank/British Franchise 
Association Franchise Survey 1993). 
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In this research, the author suggests that the prevalence of multi-unit franchising is 
related to the ownership patterns and nature of industry. With a combined ownership 
patterns in the CVS sector, franchisors can share the risk with franchisees even if the 
external environment is unstable and people need to go shopping in the CVS for daily 
necessaries. In contrast, in the EA sector, due to franchisees are totally independent 
from franchisors, therefore, as the external changes are over franchisees' abilities, they 
choose to close some outlets to dodge the risk. Therefore, under the same environment, 
two different industries have different development in the multi-unit franchising. As to 
the concept between multi-unit franchising and unit growth, unit growth is due to many 
factors, such as the ability of the store manager, location, brand reputation and 
competition. Therefore, the author suggests that a single unit franchisee becomes a 
multi-unit franchisee because of good performance, however, one established or a 
multi-unit franchisee, each store has a difference in location, manager's ability and 
customer preference. All of these variables will influence the overall performance of a 
multi-unit franchisee. As a result, although the overall performance is better than single 
franchisees, the unit growth for each outlet within the multi-unit franchisee may not 
outperfonn that of a single franchisee. This is the reason why many multi-unit 
franchisees in the EA closed their additional stores and just kept one, as the economic 
situation is not good. 
8.1.4 The preference of existing franchisees 
• Kaufmann (1992) suggests that franchisors interested in expansion often look to 
existing franchisees to reduce the risk associated with placing their concept in the 
hands of an unknown prospective franchisee. However, Felstead (1993) finds an 
interesting case involved a Prontaprint franchisee in the UK and suggests that 
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franchisor preference for franchisees without prior experience in the operational 
line of the franchise. 
So, there are different arguments on hiring a new prospective franchisee. In the 
research, within the EA, franchisors said that the opportunity is the same for both 
existing and potential franchisees. The main considerations are his former operating 
record, moral standard, and the acceptance of the franchisor's regUlations. As for CVS, 
franchisors used different kinds of criteria to evaluate new franchisees. Take 
7-ELEVEN for example; potential candidates have to pass eight tests before becoming 
franchisees whereas existing franchisees have to undergo performance evaluation for a 
period of time. So, the evaluation is different in both industries and cannot be 
compared. In addition, franchisors highlight that existing franchisees may have the 
OPportunity to cheat franchisors, in contrast, new franchisees are more loyal to 
franchisors' policy. Based on the above arguments, the author suggests the risks that 
franchisors face are different, one is the potential for cheating from existing franchisees 
and other is from new franchisees' unfamiliarity ofthe operations. 
8.2 Management issues 
The following section will discuss management issues. All of these issues are theory 
based drawn from agency theory, resource constraint, transaction cost analysis and 
relational exchange theory, the purpose is to help the researcher to see process variation, 
and to make connections among concepts. In addition, some fmdings can be evolved 
into a modeL especially with respect to the interactions between franchisors and 
franchisees. 
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8.2.1 Monitoring issues 
• Mathewson and Winter (1985) suggest that monitoring costs arise from incomplete 
contracts; so, the franchisor should give franchisees most of the profits from the 
operations to prevent agency problems. 
Regarding the contract, franchisors and franchisees within the EA thought that it was 
quite equa~ because if the contract was not equal, franchisees would not join the 
franchise system in a competitive market. As to the theoretical relationship between 
monitoring costs and the incompleteness of the contract, nobody agreed with this view. 
Within CVS, most interviewees suggested that monitoring is there to help franchisees 
perform well rather than find fault with them. Within EA, the purpose of monitoring is 
to communicate each party's concepts. Most of the EA franchisees also mentioned that 
the monitoring mechanism is closely related to the franchisor's ability. In addition, all 
the interviewees said that this should be called assistance rather than monitoring . 
• Brickley and Dark, (1987); and Carney and Gedajlovic (1991) suggest that 
franchiSing is cost effective when the marginal cost of monitoring company-owned 
units is higher than that associated with franchise contracts. These costs are 
viewed to be lower because the franchisee is seen as exhibiting a similar 
perspective to the franchisor: revenue growth. 
From the previous analysis, we fmd that in the case of CVS, the monitoring cost is the 
same for both company-owned and franchised outlets. There are two reasons for this: 
one is that the franchisor wants to keep a unified impression of the store, the other is 
based on ownership within this industry where the franchisor partly owns the store, the 
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franchisor has to check whether the store runs smoothly. . Hence, the author suggests 
that the main difference is based on the ownership pattern. 
• Kaufmann and Dan! (J 996) suggest that the costs of monitoring multi-unit 
franchisees should be cheaper, and the revenues accruing from them higher. 
Within CVS, the view that the revenues accruing from franchisees is higher but the 
costs of monitoring multi-unit franchisees is cheaper, is not correct. The reasons are 
that there are too many product lines (over 3000 items) and promotional activities 
(every two weeks). Hence, the franchisor has to monitor each outlet's operations for 
both company-owned and franchised outlets. Each store will be scored at a regular time 
no matter if it is a single or multi-unit franchise. The other purpose of monitoring is to 
keep a unified store image. 
• Theory suggests that with the improvement in telecommunications, the advantages 
of scale in monitoring will be reduced. Therefore, geographic distance will not be 
so important. 
In the EA, the monitoring frequency is low; hence, most of the interactions with the 
franchisor are by the Internet. However, based on self-interest, franchisees may input 
false information, for example, if the franchisee does not want to share a particular case 
with other franchisees, he will cheat on the price of the property. Hence, technology 
sometimes cannot solve problems, which are based on personal interaction. 
Technology based monitoring may not be accurate. 
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• Agrawal and Lal (1995) found a negative and significant relationship between 
service level and monitoring costs, and a positive relationship between monitoring 
frequency and royalty rate. Also, they suggested that monitoring costs are inversely 
affected by monitoring frequency. 
Respondents within the EA did not agree with the expected relationship between 
mOnitoring frequency and royalty rate. Most franchisors do not monitor franchisees 
because of resource constraints and the independent ownership of franchisees. Only 
after receiving complaints from customers, will questionable franchisees be monitored 
for most franchise brands. With CVS, the franchisor's monitoring frequency is the 
same for either company owned or franchised outlets. So, there is no relationship 
between monitoring frequency and royalty rate. Consequently, for both EA and CVS, 
the theory is not applicable to these cases. As for the relationship between monitoring 
cost and service level, both CVS and EA agreed with this point. If the service level is 
good, franchisors will pay less attention to franchisees. Regarding whether monitoring 
costs inversely affect monitoring frequency, those within the CVS did not agree 
because even if the franchisees are far away from the head office, the franchisor will 
still assign supervisors to monitor them. This means that even the cost of transportation 
is higher than the average; the frequency of monitoring is the same for the remote 
outlets. 
8.2.2 Screening issues 
• In theory, it is suggested that there are some screening skills, such as pen and paper 
tests, interviewing and so on before a franchise is issued. 
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In this research, both of the above skills were adopted by CVS, but for EA, the most 
useful screening method is 'word of mouth' because most potential franchisees have 
worked in the industry for a period of time. For those who want to be a franchisee, no 
matter if he/she is from other brands or just an employee for a store, the franchisor 
usually investigates his/her background from other people who know him in the 
industry. Existing theory just specifies screening for new franchisees rather than for 
those who are transferred franchisees. In addition, if the work is related to personal 
interactions, pen and paper tests sometimes cannot uncover the applicant's 
characteristics. In other words, the nature of industry gives the differences. 
8.2.3 Both parties are self-motivated 
• Theory suggests that once the contract has been signed by both parties; based on 
self-interest, both the franchisors and the franchisees should try their best to 
maximise their mutual interests, in other words, they will be highly motivated 
However, in the CVS, some franchisees did not think so, this is because of the reward 
system. The more they work, the less they get (in relative terms), hence, they will not 
try their best once the sales reach a specific level. With EA, franchisors also have this 
kind of problem, they do not try their best to maximise the brand value, just take the 
royalties and do nothing. This creates complaints from franchisees and the result is a 
high brand-transferring rate. This implies that the franchisor does not have enough 
resources to promote its brand because the number of store outlets is under the 
break-even point. 
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8.2.4 Higb initial investments lead to greater company ownership 
• Brickley and Dark (1987) suggests that all other things being equal, high initial 
investments will lead to a greater company ownership of retail outlets. 
Based on the comparative analysis of CVS and EA, we fmd that this point is 
questionable. If the theory is correct, EA should be run by company ownership rather 
than by franchising because its initial fee is higher than CVS. The author suggests that 
the owner's attitude and motivations are other important criteria because he can decide 
how to run the business based on his own viewpoint and vision. 
8.2.5 Buying back franchisees 
• Oxen/eldt and Kelly (1968-69), Hunt (1974) and Lillis, et al (1976) suggest that the 
advantage of rapid penetration will encourage franchising during the early life 
cycle stages. However as the firm grows, the firm may buy back franchisees in 
accordance with thefranchising contract. The reasonsfor this course of action may 
include the release of scarce resources, maintenance of service quality and quick 
response to the market. Therefore, the large, profitable franchisees and those 
outlets in urban or areas with higher population densities will be transformed into 
company owned outlets. The only franchisees remaining are those in less profitable 
or rural area. Thomas, O'Hara and Margrave (1990) also support this suggestion. 
Dant, Paswan, and Stanworth (1996) also suggest that despite well-documented 
buying back in particular franchises, no trend towards a general increase in direct 
ownership by franchisors appears possible to establish. Dant, Paswan and 
Stanworth (1996) use meta-analysis to test 17 US-based empirical studies on the 
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subject of ownership redirection phenomenon. They suggest that ownership 
redirection may not be universally valid across business sectors. 
From the above literature, we know that buying back franchisee is not a trend and 
cannot be applied to every industry. Actually, in the Taiwanese retail market, buying 
back does not seem to work. Within CVS, franchisors said that they would not buy 
back franchisees because franchising covers the resource constraint of human resources. 
Instead, only the profitable outlets will be franchised, because franchisors usually give 
the franchisees a guaranteed annual gross margin. Buying back franchisees only 
happens under two circumstances, one is when the franchisee does not want to run the 
store any more and the other is when the franchisee breaks the regulations, then 
franchisors will buy the store back. Within EA, they specified that this kind of situation 
would not happen in the Taiwanese market, if the franchisor buys back the profitable 
outlets, two things would happen. One is that nobody would join the system because 
they would not know when the franchisor would seek to buy back these outlets, the 
other is that once the franchisor buys the store back, the franchisee would set up another 
store next to the original one, and compete. Revenues of the original store would faU, 
as one of the most important characteristics in the EA industry is personal networks. In 
practice, what the franchisor does is to open another outlet nearby to share the market 
rather than buy back the profitable franchisee. However, this kind of action usually 
causes franchisees' complaints because of the exclusive trading territory. 
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8.2.6 Resource constraints of management talent 
• Resource constraint theory suggests that management talent is one of the 
constraints encouraging franchising. 
In practice, this view is not wholly applicable to CVS, because the franchisors prefer 
franchisees without any work experience so that a unified store impression and 
management can be kept. Hence, within CVS, this kind of constraint does not exist 
until the franchisee becomes a multi-unit franchisee. By definition, a multi-unit 
franchisee must have some ability to manage different stores; hence, some kind of 
management talent is required. For this reason, the author suggests that the theory may 
be suitable for some other industries, such as EA, or may be applied to a later stage in 
development. In addition, management talent is also related to whether franchisees can 
be regarded as entrepreneurs. The author suggests that this only applies to multi-unit 
franchisees because a multi-unit franchisee has to face more risk than a single 
franchisee. 
8.2.7 Resource constraints of financial capital 
• Oxenfeldt and Kelly (1968-69) suggest that capital scarcity should be considered as 
a potential explanation of the decision tofranchise. Lafontaine (1992) also points 
out thatfranchising might be a less expensive source of capital if there are incentive 
issues at the outlet level. In addition, Lafontaine and Kaufmann (1994) agree that 
capital may be more efficiently obtained from franchisees than from investors. 
With CVS, fmance is not a resource constraint for the franchisors because aIJ of them 
belong to big business groups. The franchisors said that the capital from franchisees is 
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just a tiny part of the business operations, so, the author argues that the resource 
constraint offinancial capital only applies to young or small businesses. Within the EA, 
franchisors offer another kind of thinking, they said that the most important issue of all 
is brand power rather than fmancial capital because once the brand is strong enough, 
not only will franchisees join, but banks will be happy to lend money. The other 
valuable point corning out of the interviews is that the franchisors cannot just look at the 
money; they also have to care about the selected franchisee. If the quality of the 
franchisee is poor, then he will damage the franchisor's brand, and this kind of loss is 
higher than the initial fee and royalty obtained from the franchisee. Hence, one 
franchisor cited a Chinese proverb: "water that bears the boat is the same that swallows 
if'. In this context, this means that franchisees are just like water and the franchisor 
typifies the boat. If the water (franchisees) is unstable, the boat has a high risk of 
sinking. 
8.2.8 The cost of brand transference 
• Williamson (1985) suggests that transaction cost analysis includes both the direct 
costs of managing relationships and the possible opportunity costs of making 
inferior governance decisions. His micro-analytical framework rests on the 
interplay between two main assumptions of human behaviour (i. e., bounded 
rationality and opportunism) and two key dimensions of transactions (i.e., asset 
specificity and uncertainty). The uncertainty arises from environmental and 
behavioural uncertainty. 
In Taiwan, due to vicious competition in the EA market, transaction costs do not arise. 
In other words, the asset specificity (brand value or store investment) is not as valuable 
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as expected. As mentioned before, the brand-transferring rate is quite high in the EA 
market. First, if the theory is applicable, EA franchisees should bear a high cost of 
transferring. However, this is not true in practice because the market now is a buyer's 
(franchisee) rather than se11er's (franchisor) market. Hence, as franchisees become 
dissatisfied with the original franchisor, or other franchisors use different incentives to 
attract franchisees, it is possible for them to transfer the brand. They believe transfer is 
worthwhile because the new franchisor usually offers is a royalty free deal for one or 
two years. Second, no EA franchisor can offer guaranteed sales like CVS, as a result, if 
the franchisees feel that the pay on offer from an alternative brand is more than that 
from the franchisors, they may be motivated to transfer the brand. Based on this point, 
the author suggests that if the market is under vicious competition, the theory may not 
be applicable. 
8.2.9 Transaction Cost Analysis 
Coase (1937) suggests that under certain conditions, the cost of conducting economic 
exchange in a market may exceed the costs of organising the exchange within a firm. 
From the previous review, we know that the franchise organisation is a kind of 
inter-organisational form. Hence, the costs of transaction between franchisors and 
franchisees should be lower. In the franchise system, one of the advantages is "mass 
purchasing power." However, instead of being able to purchase supplies less 
expensively through the franchisor, many franchisees found themselves paying 
exorbitant prices for supplies. One disillusioning study found that (1) the practice of 
requiring franchisees to purchase supplies from their franchisors is widespread; (2) 
franchisees believe they are being overcharged on their supplies; and (3) franchisees 
who must buy supplies from their franchisors suffer lower profits (Hunt and Nevin, 
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1975). From this point, one can doubt the cost of transaction within an organisation. 
In theory, it should he cheaper, hut actually, many franchisors overcharged on their 
supplies. 
In this research, the result is also conflict with Coase's argument. Generally speaking, 
the franchisor should have a stronger buying power than franchisees and pass on the 
benefits to them. However, in the CVS, the price offered by the franchisor is sometimes 
higher than outside the system Some franchisees said this arises because the franchisor 
gets too much commission from suppliers or the franchisor does not have the ability to 
fmd a good supplier. Hence, in this case, we cannot say that the cost of exchange within 
a firm (the franchise system) is definitely cheaper. 
8.2.10 The franchisor's experience is directly related to franchisees' satisfaction 
• Stanworth, Kaufmann and Purdy (1995) suggest that in the longer term, as 
franchisees find themselves paying ever increasing royalties in line with increasing 
sales, and as their level of reliance upon the expertise of the franchisor in 
day-to-day problem-solving tends to decline, then the franchisor s power-base 
relies increasingly upon (a) the marketingpower ofthefranchise tradename and (b) 
the fact that the franchisee has gained access to his/her knowledge and 
understanding of the field of operation exclusively via the franchisor. 
In this research, due the marketing power ofthe franchise tradename is not promoted by 
the franchisors but the franchisees. In addition, in the EA market, if the knowledge of 
the field of operation is not what the franchisees want, it is useless. Franchisees 
reflected that the most important of all are the attitude and ability of the franchisor 
269 
rather than the professional knowledge. The other situation, which arises in EA, is that 
there is often no interaction between the franchisor and franchisee. In this case, there is 
no support for this proposition because the franchisees only use the brand name. One 
franchisee argued that an experienced supervisor does not mean that hislher judgement 
is always correct, because some situations may arise which he/she has never 
encountered. 
8.2.11 The franchisor should run company owned outlets before franchising 
• likoo (1996) suggests that it is impossible for a firm to have a fully franchised 
system in the initial stage. This implies that the firm must start with 
company-owned outlets, as the operations and systems must be developed and 
tested successfully, then the franchisor can sell its company-owned outlets to 
franchisees and become fully franchised 
In practice, this is not true at least in the Taiwanese EA market. Some EA franchisors 
chose good franchisees, learning from them and using them as examples to other 
franchisees in the initial stage. The franchisees also said that franchisors do not need to 
raise an ox for the purpose of drinking a cup of milk, what they need to own is just the 
operational know-how and flexibility. 
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8.2.12 Relational exchange 
• Spinelli and Birley (1996) suggest that both franchisors and franchisees may 
discount observed behaviour to maintain the relationship, and to work towards 
developing high relational norms of solidarity and mutuality, with strong role 
integrity to benefit each other. 
In the general situation, this view is reasonable, however, if the market is under vicious 
competition or if the external incentives are higher than the cost of maintaining the 
relationship, the relationship will be very fragile. Taking EA for example, although 
conflicts between franchisors and franchisees are quite obvious, the degree is not high 
enough to terminate the relationship. If there is another franchise system offering 
higher incentives, and the relationship is just built on the exchange between trademark 
and royalty, rather than non-economic exchange, then the relationship may be 
terminated. This is because the franchisee will think that he has the operational 
know-how, and there is nothing special to be gained from staying with the original 
brand. Therefore, the franchisee just uses the brand name at most. In this circumstance, 
which brand to join is not the key point, the important thing is whether the other brand 
is also a chain brand and can give him a better franchise package. If this is true, then he 
will transfer to another brand and the original relationship will be terminated. This 
point is also linked to the previous point within transactional cost analysis. 
8.2.13 Summary 
From the above section, we know that there are many points, which are different from 
existing theories which, were developed from western countries like US and UK. This 
does not mean that the existing theories are not correct. The reason may come from the 
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difference of the nature of industry. In other words, some theories can be just applied to 
either CVS or EA industry, such as buying back franchisee is just applied to the CVS 
industry. In addition, the critical factors for either industry is different. For example, in 
the CVS, logistics is an important factor on the daily operations, whereas brand power 
is the key issue in the EA industry. Aside from the above conflict points, in the 
following section, the author tries to develop a couple of models to uncover the 
potential relationships and conflicts between franchisors and franchisees. 
8.3 Models of Relationships and Conflicts 
Aside from the above theoretical findings, the author attempted to build models from 
the perspective of practical implications. The models are developed gradually and are 
based on previous theories and fmdings; hence, the following models will help 
franchisors and franchisees to understand each party's needs and expectations. In order 
to explain how the models are evo Ived, the author built up the relationships between the 
different theoretical backgrounds, such as motivations, decision-makers and relational 
exchange theory. These backgrounds will help one understand how the story was 
organised. Figure 8.1 shows the development of the franchise relationship from the 
perspectives of key theories. 
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Figure 8.1 Interactions with key theories 
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The above figure starts with the ownership pattern because this is the main difference 
between CVS and EA aside from industrial characteristics. Then existing theories 
considering motivations, power, decision-maker characteristics and relational exchange 
were taken into consideration to understand the interactions between franchisors and 
franchisees. According to the previous discussion and analysis, we know that as gaps 
occur, there are five possible reactions from either party: ' win-win'; 'no interaction '; 
'worse'; ' termination' and ' legaJ action'. Each kind of situation arises in either 
industry. 
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In order to have a clearer perspective of the differences between the industries, Figures 
8.2 and 8.3 summarise the key statements from the perspectives of motivations, 
decision-makers and expectations showing how they interact with one another. 
Motivations I 
I . Franchising allows quick 
expansion 
2. Franchising overcomes 
resource constraints on 
local 
familiarity, management 
skills and hwnan resources 
3. Franchising can minimize 
the cost of inventory and 
defects 
4. Franchising can overcome 
the difficulty on hiring 
staff 
Combined Ownership 
I . Franchising offers me a stable 
job 
2. Franchisors offer guaranteed 
annual gross margins 
3. The economic situation now is 
in recession 
4. Be proud of being a member 
of the brand 
Organisational Objectives/ 
Decision Maker 
Characteristics 
I . To run the organisation for as 
long as possible 
2. To open more stores 
3. To maximise brand power 
I. Make money 
2. Self-realisation 
3. Gain experience in running a 
store 
4. The expectation to be 8 multi-
wut franchisee 
Figure 8 .2 The development of relationships and conflicts in the CVS 
Ideal situation (Expectation 
from the other party) 
I . Franchisors hope franchisees 
conunwlicate with them and 
follow the franchisors' policy 
2 . Franchisors hope franchisees 
have a good performance on 
the management of trading 
areas, customer relationship, 
store operations, professional 
knowledge and attitude 
3. Franchisors hope that 
franchisees offer constructive 
suggestions 
Franchisees hope that the 
franchisors can satisfy them on 
the following points: brand 
managemen~ logistics; staff 
attitude; market response; 
product management; policy 
stability, supervisors' ability and 
attitude; updated computer 
systems; expansion ~ 
conunmllcation; reasonable 
sharing percentage; innovation; 
educational training; information 
sharing; autonomy and precisely 
delivering time 
Store 
supervisor or 
senior 
manager 
Non-coercive 
and coercive 
power 
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EA 
Motivations --] 
1. Franchising allows 
franchisors 
to dodge the risk of recession 
2. Franchising overcomes 
resource constraints on local 
familiarity, management 
skills, finance and hwnan 
resources 
3. Franchising allows the brand 
to expand quickly 
4. Law issues on the working 
hours 
Independent ownership 
I . Franchising offers a package 
of successful know-how 
2. Franchising is a cheaper way 
to create a business compared 
with a private brand 
3. Franchising allows 
franchisees to share 
information with one another 
4. Brand power 
5. Realisation of own vision 
6. Franchising offers sound 
logistics and training 
Organisational Objectives/ 
Decision Maker 
Characteristics 
1. Make money 
2. Maximisation of store outlets 
and brand efficiency 
3. Create a SOWld environment 
for franchisees 
4. Innovation of the know-how 
Relational Exchange 
(Give and Take)'~ 
1. Make money 
2. Quick expansion 
3. Being a member oflocal 
leading brand 
4 . The stability ofstafT 
Figure 8.3 The development of relationships and conflicts in the EA 
Ideal situation (E>..'peCtation 
from the other party) 
Franchisors hope that franchisees 
can obey the following policies: 
attending the franchisor's 
meeting; paying the royalty on 
time; offering positive feedbacks 
to the franchisor, keeping a good 
relationship with other 
franchisees; legal operations and 
the understanding of the 
franchisor ' s difficulties 
Franchisees hope that the 
franchisor can satisfy them with 
the following points: 
brand promotion, promise 
keeping; innovation; positive 
communication; justice to every 
franchisee; taking the royalty and 
do something; being a neutral 
role in the conflicts between 
franchisees and customers; 
attitude; exclusive trading area; 
information sharing; educational 
training and taking franchisees 
suggestion 
Store 
supervisor or 
senior or 
franchisee 
representative 
Non-coercive 
and coercive 
power 
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From the above two figures, we have a view of how the relationship is developed from 
the very beginning (motivations) to the final stage (results) for each sector. During the 
process, based on the relational exchange, both parties get what they want to get. 
However, at times both parties will be dissatisfied with the balance of expectations. 
Hence, conflicts take place and the most common solution is through communication. 
Usually, senior managers or store supervisors act as the bridges between franchisors 
and franchisees. Therefore, their ability, attitude and power become important. After 
the communication stage. there are five possible results as mentioned previously. The 
differences between CVS and EA are on the 'ownership pattern' and the 'nature' of the 
sector. Therefore, different expectations come about from the either party in both 
industries. 
From the above Figures 8.2 and 8.3, we can see that there are some kinds of needs 
cannot be satisfied by either party. For example, within CVS, franchisees always think 
that they need more autonomy on the store operations, whereas franchisors feel that 
franchisees should make more effort. From this point, we know that one of the 
questions arises from 'communication'. As for EA, franchisees feel that franchisors 
always ignore their opinions and the relationship between each other becomes quite 
fragile. For franchisors, they always complain that their policies are not carried out 
thoroughly and both party's interactions become very passive. It is not difficult to see 
that the problem also arises from improper 'communication'. Therefore, the author wilI 
highlight the importance of communication in the following discussions. 
In the literature review, many researchers mentioned that one of the key success factors 
of a good relationship is good communication. For example, Carlson and Kusoffsky 
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(1969) classify conflicts from the perspectives of organisational goals, decisions, and 
communications. Achrol and Etzel (1990) suggest that the mutual 
franchisee- franchisor goals should include concepts of co-operation, communication, 
co-ordination and commitment. In addition, Guiltinan, Rejab and Rodgers (1980) also 
suggest that a good relationship is related to the effectiveness of channel 
communication, the degree of uncertainty reduction and the extent of participative 
decision making. AU researchers highlighted the importance of communication. In this 
research, the author also fmds that communication is the most important factor of all. 
The difference from previous research is that the author has compared two different 
sectors with different industrial characteristics within the franchise market in Taiwan. 
Generally speaking, good communication can minimize the perceptual gaps between 
franchisors and franchisees. However, in practice, the result shows that one ofthe most 
serious problems is the mutual mistrust of each other, especially in the EA industry. 
More even communication occurs in CVS; but some of the store supervisors' abilities 
and senior managers' attitudes are questioned- this may be seen as an issue of the 
communication channel. Therefore, communication is the common problem in both 
industries although the nature of industry is different. 
Communication, aside from attitudes and perceptions, requires the right people, right 
policy, right time and right place. Generally speaking, communication occurs to 
minimize both parties' perceptual gaps from the perspectives of the internal (store 
operations) and external environment (external competitions). In practice, in the EA 
market, because the ownership pattern is fully independent, there is a tendency for a 
kind of horizontal communication. In addition, what the franchisees care about most is 
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whether the brand power is strong enough to attract customers, hence, if the franchisor 
Cannot give franchisees a satisfYing answer at the right time with the right attitude and 
policy, then the relationship might break. Within the CVS, where there is combined 
ownership pattern, communication is more in a top-down style. Franchisees have to 
follow the franchisor's policies and therefore, franchisees sometimes feel that the 
franchisors intervene too much, and therefore they ask for a higher autonomy in the 
store operations. Usually, the communication is done inside the store through the store 
supervisor. However, if the store supervisor cannot solve the problem, he has to refer to 
. a senior level. As a result, the problems arise from the perspectives of right time, right 
place and right person. Based on the above arguments, another model is developed in 
Figure 8.4. 
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In the model, in order to highlight communication, the author tried to apply the Chinese 
words-'1£*'. '1£*' means 'Enterprise' in English. The philosophy of the two 
Chinese words suggests that a business cannot survive without people and operational 
know-how. In addition, for the purpose of making the business run smoothly, 
communication is necessary, and this should act as the interface between people and 
operational issues. Therefore, the author suggests that the core value in the business is 
a focus on effective mutual communication. This model also suggests that there is a 
positive relationship between abstract concepts and the importance of relationship 
maintenance. In other words, the more abstract, the more important it is for the 
relationship maintenance. In this case, communication is considered as an abstract 
concept. Aside from communication, franchisees in the CVS care more about 
autonomy whereas EA franchisees emphasise the importance of brand management. 
As for the operational issues themselves, none of the participants think they are as 
important as good interaction. 
When considering why communication fails in this study, two reasons exist in the CVS, 
one is a failure in the store supervisor's attitude and ability, and the other is the response 
of the franchisor. In other words, some franchisors treat franchisees as company-owned 
outlets. Within EA, the main reasons for communication failure originate from the 
attitudes and abilities of the franchisors because many franchisees believe that the 
franchisors always break their promises, so, they prefer not to attend this kind of 
meeting to waste their time. As a result, the author suggests that leadership in the 
franchise head office needs to be enhanced and improved. Based on the above 
arguments, the author developed another model, which is related to the previous 
concepts. The model, which is shown in Figure 8.5, specifies the interaction between 
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the franchise relationship and organisational development. 
Franchisors! Franchisees to Scale 
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Franchisee to Franchisor 
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• • 
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Brand value 
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In the model, the author suggests that both parties' relationship are built on three 
contributions: franchisor/franchisee to themselves, franchisor/see to franchisee/sor and 
franchisor/see to the system. In other words, the relationship is built up from an 
individual level to a system level. Within each level, both parties have different 
expectations for themselves and of the other party. For example, both parties highlight 
that one of their objectives is making money, in other words, when sales increase, their 
needs will be satisfied. In addition, they also expect something from the other party. 
Within both CVS and EA, what the franchisors ask for is consistency, in other words, 
they do not want to let franchisees damage their brand name. For the franchisees, those 
in the CVS want more autonomy, whereas those in EA emphasise is on the importance 
of brand management. F inaI1y, at the system level, the focus of both franchisors' and 
franchisees' is on the brand but the direction is different. This is because brand value is 
examined from the franchisor's perspective, whereas brand power (whether the brand 
can attract more customers) is the focus for franchisees. Therefore, how to co-ordinate 
with each other on these expectations is an important issue for organisational 
development. The author suggests that the best way is to have an effective 
communication. In practice, an effective communication is based on mutual 
understanding. In other words, if both party's relationship is good, the synergy of the 
brand power will outperform other brands and both franchisors and franchisees can get 
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what they want from the other party and the system. Finally, the ideal 
situation-win-win-win status among the franchisee, franchisor and brand can be 
achieved. 
Based on the above concepts, the following section will discuss another model , which 
is considered from the perspective of organi ational expansion. From the above 
research, the author finds that there are three different kinds of system for a retail chain, 
which are a pure franchising system, a pure RC system and a plural system. The 
difference between them is based on ownership. 1n this section, the author wants to 
compare these three different kinds of systems from the perspectives of ownership 
pattern and expansion speed. 
Pure Franchising 
r- Franchised 
~ outlets 
I I 
l' 
Pure company 
ownershIP 
Brand name 
Plu ral system 
Autonomy 0 Brand na m e ~ Company owned Franchised outlet \ l \ r J 0 0 olltl p. t<; C T 0 
Franchisor Franchisor Franchisor 
Figure 8.6 The Relationship Between Franchise Ownership and Expansion Speed 
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The above figure is divided into three groups based on differences in ownership. In 
order to visualise the difference among the three ownership types, the author highlights 
the relationship between franchise ownership and expansion speed from the perspective 
of autonomy and brand name. In this figure, we can see that within pure franchising, 
franchisees have higher autonomy than the other two, e.g., EA franchisees are linked to 
one another by sharing the same brand name. Growth of the network can be rapid 
(visualised by the height of the building blocks in the figure). However, if one 
franchisee offers poor service and the franchisor does not intervene in time, then the 
other franchisees will be damaged, and the relationship between either 
franchisor/franchisee or franchisee/franchisee will be fragile. Therefore, the franchisor 
has to monitor franchisees to make the system run smoothly. So, pure franchising is a 
kind of 'thought' industry; only when the franchisor and franchisees have a common 
purpose and consensus, will the synergy of brand power be maximised. Otherwise, this 
kind of organisational form will be corrupted quicker than the other two. The internal 
fragility of the structure, only held together by the brand name may fail, and the 
network of blocks in the figure may collapse. 
The opposite of pure franchising is pure company ownership, like a hierarchy 
organisation, its growth speed is slow. However, based on operational consistency, the 
286 
head office pays more attention to brand management designed to attract customers' 
attention. In contrast to the pure franchise system, the company managers have little 
space for creation because what they have to do is to follow the corporate policy. 
Therefore, we can say that this kind of organisation is a kind of 'management' industry 
and there is no autonomy. This centralised management approach and lack of 
autonomy; means that the network is very stable and built on 'strong foundations' 
(visualised in the figure). It is, in theory, less likely to collapse because of how this 
network is 'bound'together. 
As for the plural system, this stands between the previous two. In other words, 
franchisees have limited autonomy and the franchisor can enjoy the achievement of 
expansion. But, how to treat company owned managers and franchisees in different 
ways is the key issue in this kind of organisation. In this paper, CVS typifies this 
structure. The network is less rigidly 'bound' together than the pure company 
ownership model, but is more stable than the pure franchise network. 
To summarise, there is a Chinese proverb, which says, "water that bears the boat is the 
same that swallows it ". In this context, this means that if franchisors just think about 
how many resources can be gained from the franchisees, rather than developing strong 
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brand power, then franchising will speed up the corruption of the organisation. 
Therefore, once the organisation chooses franchising as an operational system, the 
franchisor has to be careful with the balance between expansion speed and 
organisational stability. 
8.4 Limitations of the Study 
In this research, limitations arose from several of perspectives. First, as far as the 
geographical dimension is concerned, the research was placed in the Taiwanese retail 
market rather than providing a comparison with other countries. In order to minimize 
this limitation, two different industrial sectors were compared to provide a deeper 
understanding of the franchise market in Taiwan. 
Second, in the methodology, Hoffman (1989) suggests that if the presentation or 
publication is in a country other than the one in which the data were collected (i.e., if the 
language is different), key passages and their codes can be translated. However, a 
possible situation may happen, which is that many valuable meanings can be lost in 
trying to translate all of one's material. Also, many of the original subtleties of meaning 
are lost in translation. This is true; especially when the author wants to cite a Chinese 
proverb, the meaning of translation may lose its original implication. 
288 
Third, due to the constraints of time, money and the author's experience, only 84 
interviews were conducted. Even so, from this information, the author still obtained 
sufficient information, because he found that the answers gained in the later interviews 
were similar to those observed previously. Therefore, the author chose to stop and 
started to do the analysis. As for the experience, if the author had had some training on 
how to do interviews, the research quality might be better. 
Finally, as an analyst, the author wanted to build concrete, grounded models; to do so 
requires sensitivity as to what the data are saying and the ability to recognise his own 
biases. The author knows he never can be completely free of biases; many are 
unconscious and part of his cultural inheritance. 
8.S Future Research 
Based on the previously presented research and findings, below are suggestions for 
future research. 
8.5.1 Initial Fee and Royalty 
Many franchisees in both CVS and EA industries said that the royalties are too high, 
especially as the market is in the recession. The CVS franchisees, said the sharing 
percentage is unreasonable and this lowers their motivation to work hard. Franchisees 
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in the EA specified that the franchisors still charge the same royalty even when the 
market is not so good, as a result, the payment of royalties sometimes became a source 
of conflict between parties. As a good franchise package is important for organisational 
development, future research may focus on incentives, other than initial fee and royalty, 
to explain the invisible factors behind the franchise relationship. 
8.5.2 Relationship and Conflict 
The research only explores the relationship and conflict between franchisors and 
franchisees. However, from the previous discussions, we know that there are some 
conflicts that happen within the channel members. Therefore, the author suggests that 
some franchisees just use the franchisor's brand name; they do not care about the other 
channel members. Ifsome of them damage the brand, conflicts will take place between 
franchisees especially within the same trading area. As a result, there is an interesting 
phenomenon in the estate agency industry that the interaction is mainly based on 
personal relationship rather than the brand. So, future research may focus on the quality 
of interactions among franchisees within the brand and its impact on brand power. 
8.5.3 Ownership Pattern 
In this research, only a franchise chain and a regular chain were investigated because of 
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their outstanding positions in the retail market. However, aside from them, there are the 
other two forms, the voluntary chain and the co-operate chain, which were not taken 
into consideration in this research. In other words, the results from them may be 
different from the franchise chain and regular chain. Therefore, future research could 
pay more attention to voluntary chains and co-operate chains. 
8.5.4 Brand Power 
In this research, we saw that both industries highlighted the importance of brand value 
or brand power. With a strong brand name, the interactions between both parties will be 
better; as a result, future research may pay more attention to how brand power is 
formulated and the relationship between brand power and initial fee or royalty. 
8.6 Summary of Key Contributions to Knowledge 
As far as the contributions of this thesis are concerned, this could be examined from 
both an academic and practical perspective. From the previous discussions, we know 
that there are many points, which are in conflict with the existing theories; therefore, 
the contributions to theories are that the author used different angles to see the 
marketing phenomenon in the franchise market for example culture and localisation. In 
addition, based on the author's personal insight, models were developed for the 
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practical implications. Hence, based on both academic and practical contributions, the 
fOllowing section will summarise the key points from the perspectives of general issues 
and management issues. The statements wiII be brief as all have been previously 
detailed in earlier chapters. 
8.6.1 General Issues in Franchising 
• Buying back franchisees 
Many researchers, such as Oxenfeldt and Kelly (1968-69), Hunt (1974) and Lillis, et a1 
(1976) suggest that as the firm grows, the firm may buy back franchisees in accordance 
with the franchising contract. The reasons for this course of action may include the 
release of scarce resources, maintenance of service quality and quick response to the 
market.· However, this is not true in the Taiwanese retail franchise market. The reasons 
have been specified in a previous section (8.2.5). 
8.6.2 Management Issues in Franchising 
• Agency theory 
Agency theory suggests that with the improvement in telecommunications, the 
advantages of scale in monitoring would be reduced, in other words, the constraints of 
geographic distance will be reduced. However, in practice, based on self-interest, 
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franchisees might put wrong information into an electronic system so that the 
franchisors might make the wrong decision and this will lead to an even higher cost, 
than the cost of monitoring. The author suggests that cheating stilI happens in both 
sectors. Hence, the design of a better monitoring and awarding mechanism is the key 
issue for franchise development. 
• Monitoring issues 
In the previous section, we have talked about the concept that the costs of monitoring 
multi-unit franchisees should be cheaper, and the revenues accruing from them higher, 
which was suggested by Kaufmann and Dant (1996). However, from this research, we 
found that due to the ownership pattern and promotional activities in the CVS, 
franchisors have to monitor each store no matter if this is a single or multi-unit 
franchisee. Hence, this kind of argument may be varied with ownership pattern and 
industrial sector. 
• Resource constraint 
Past research suggested that one of the key constraints for the franchisor is capital. 
However, from the research, the author found that the question which should be asked 
is whether the brand is strong enough to attract attention, rather than which kind of 
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Source of capital is cheaper. This is because once the franchise brand is very strong, not 
only will many potential franchisees join, but also financial institutions or stockholders 
are happy to invest money in the franchise organisation. By contrast, if the franchisor 
has enough capital, but the brand is too weak to attract new franchisees, then this is 
useless for the development of a franchise system. So, the author suggests that if the 
brand power is strong enough, then other variables will be minimised. 
• Transaction cost analysis 
Williamson (1985) suggests that transaction cost analysis includes both the direct costs 
of managing relationships and the possible opportunity costs of making inferior 
governance decisions. His micro-analytical framework rests on the interplay between 
two main assumptions of human behaviour (i.e., bounded rationality and opportunism) 
and two key dimensions of transactions (i.e., asset specificity and uncertainty). The 
uncertainty relies on environmental and behavioural uncertainty. As mentioned 
previously, in a highly competitive market, this kind of argwnent may not work because 
many franchisors just focus on the near future rather than a long-term perspective. 
• Entrepreneurship 
In the literature, Kaufmann and Dant (1998) give definitions of entrepreneurship and 
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most of the definitions are applied to franchisees. But in practice, especially in the CYS, 
due to the ownership pattern, the franchisees' potential to exhibit entrepreneurship is 
confined by the franchise contract. In other words. franchisors treat franchisees as 
company managers. So, the author suggests that whether franchisees are entrepreneurs, 
is concerned with ownership pattern and sector. In other words, if franchisees want to 
have higher autonomy, they should choose a voluntary chain rather than a franchise 
chain. 
• Relationship and conflict 
From the previous models, the author has made an effort to apply his insight and the 
background of Chinese culture to specify the importance of communication and how 
the organisational atmosphere influences organisational development. From these 
models, both franchisors and franchisees in practice can find out where there are gaps in 
their concepts; this wil1 help both parties understand each other's needs and to negotiate 
with each other to reach a win-win status. 
In Summary, this research has examined a series of general and management issues in 
franchising through a comparison of retail and service sectors. Most of the existing 
theories were developed in western industrialised countries, and as a result, when they 
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were applied to Taiwan, a newly industrialised country, many results are different from 
the previous research. This may be because of differences in sectors, culture and 
localisation. This research has not only uncovered some academic issues in franchising 
but also generates some useful models for practical applications between franchisors 
and franchisees. From these findings, future research can focus on surrounding issues 
of franchising like brand power to have a further understanding of franchising. 
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Appendix 1: The Advantages and Disadvantages of Franchise Chain 
1) From the Franchisors' Perspective 
Advantages: 
• Able to secure present and future market share due to buying restrictions within 
the agreement. 
• Lower unit costs of materials due to increased bargaining power over suppliers. 
• Wider brand awareness and dispersion permitting greater brand valuations. 
• Increased direct control over promotional take-up and own-label marketing than 
is possible with voluntary symbol groups. 
• Greater return on capital because the franchisee is required to invest in fixed 
assets. 
• Ownership advantages without the associated problems of staff, payroll and 
day-to-day administration. The opportunity cost of this is lower return, but higher 
return on capital. 
• Lower head office staff requirement (Churchill, 1991; Sanghavi, 1990). 
• Franchisees could be a good source of innovation and, hence, competitive 
advantage. 
• Franchisees will often shun UnIOnIsm and have knowledge of local labour 
markets (Jordans, 1988). 
• Increased flexibility in the management of labour through distancing. 
• Motivated management since income is related to profit. Empirical literature has 
generally been supportive of the idea that incentive ideas are important issues in 
terms of the extent to which firms rely on franchising as opposed to company 
ownership and the extent to which they rely on royalties. However, a franchisee 
has the incentive to free ride on the franchisor's trademark if the outlet is 
frequented by non-repeat customers and cheats by substituting low quality for 
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high quality in order to reduce costs (Klien, 1980; Minkler, 1990). 
• As franchisees pay a fee based on a percentage of their sales, franchisors should 
enjoy a positive cash flow (albeit possibly short-tem1) from the franchisees even 
if the franchisees are not making a profit. 
• Lowers risk of testing particular markets/products. However, there has been 
some suggestion that this option may be the preserve of large companies. For 
example, Marks & Spencer has seventy-four franchises in overseas markets but 
none in the UK. There is some suggestion that small companies tend to employ 
franchising as a vehicle to growth rather than market testing (Gourlay, 1994). 
• Franchising should enable the franchisor (depending on the costs of entry, the 
highest and nature of barriers to entry, and the 'saleability' of the franchise) to 
increase the number of distributive outlets, market coverage, market share and 
build brand equity with limited capital investment. 
• Business units more likely to be accepted as local, however, given the level of 
uniformity inherent to franchises there may equally be a perception that it is in 
fact not franchised. 
Disadvantages: 
• May be difficult to exercise tight control over the franchisee because the lack of 
a traditional employer-employee relationship. 
• Contrary to popular myth, the costs of entry and franchisee recruitment can be 
expensIve. 
• Franchising may be viewed as a fom1 of business restructuring since it alters the 
franchisor's capital structure, asset mix and organisation through the 
redeployment of assets (Rock and Rock, 1990). Whilst such restructuring 
potentially offers a rapid means of implementing a new product or concept 
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(Housden, 1984), it results in a more difficult and slower process in subsequently 
altering the system, than may occur in wholly owned business. This is due, in 
part, to the need to sell the benefits to, and persuade the franchisee and 
overcoming the expansion ofusurpationary power, to make the alterations. 
• Changes in corporate strategy may take longer to implement, perhaps allowing 
competitors to quickly negate or realize first mover advantages (Robinson, c/ ai, 
1992; Kerin et ai, 1992; Leiberman and Montgomery, 1988). 
• There is a necessary to develop an organisational culture and structure geared 
toward the management of franchisees (Forward and Fulop, 1993). 
• Activities of unscrupulous franchisors and franchisee demotivation can be 
damaging to brand equity. 
• Communication and motivation highly dependent upon trust between the two 
parties (Lewis and Lambert, 1991; Lusch, 1977; Meloan, 1988). 
• Franchisee motivation changes over time (Hall and Dixon, 1989), with distinct 
periods of disconfirmation and demotivation being evident. Given that 
franchisees join a system at different times and illustrate differing rates of 
maturity, such sentiment could have a mUltiple effect and 'colour' new 
franchisees' perceptions of the franchisor. 
• The franchisor may experience difficulties In recruiting franchisees with the 
necessary investment capability and who are risk averse but want to be 
self-employed. 
2) From the Franchisees' Perspective 
Advantages: 
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• The business concept is a proven, or should be. The Franchise Association have 
laid down guidelines as to what constitutes proven, as outlined above, which 
includes more than just one business outlet for a short period. 
• The way to operate the business has already been worked out and tested. Starting 
up should be easier and faster. 
• Training and support is given including technical training, business training, site 
selection and choice of suppliers. 
• Statistically, fewer franchises fail than other business start-up; therefore it can be 
easier to obtain finance for the franchise. 
• National branding will often have been established. 
• Research and development, and competitive analysis will usually be undertaken 
by the franchisor to keep abreast of environmental changes. 
• Economies of scale may apply, for example in nationally agreed terms with 
suppliers, which take account of the total franchised business. 
• Economies of experience should apply, for example in knowing the marketing 
techniques that have worked best for other franchisees 
Disadvantages: 
• Not your own creation. This IS someone else's idea; the franchisee IS 
implementing not creating. 
• Lack of independence. The franchisor makes the rules, which the franchisee has 
to follow. 
• The financial costs can be considerable with large up front fees and high 
royalties. Set up costs can also be higher as they have to follow a prescribed 
formula. 
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• The franchise may not be suited to your area. 
• The goodwill your business builds up is never all yours, as it is dependent on a 
continuing franchise agreement. This could cause problems when you decide to 
sell the business. 
• The franchisor needs to ensure regular disclosure of information by the 
franchisee to protect their royalties and the franchise agreement. This can 
become intrusive into the financial affairs of the franchisee. 
• The brand image of the franchisor can become a distinct liability if things go 
wrong. The franchisee is dependent on the stability of the franchisor; a national 
problem with the franchise can dramatically affect the franchisee that has no 
control over events. 
Source: Price (1997) 
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Appendix 2: Related Researches in Franchising 
Author(s) Method of Data Collection Sample Statistical Analysis 
Agrawal &Lal Personal Interviews and 43 Franchisees SUR Regression 
(1995) Secondary Data 
Franchisors charging higher royalty rates made greater brand name investments an d 
were involved in frequent supervision. Franchising systems with high monitoring cost 
were visited less frequently for monitoring by franchisors and were offered fewer 
service. 
99 Franchisees 
Anand (1987) Questionnaire of a single t-test 
Franchise 
The franchisee is more likely to relinquish control over decision making if the 
franchise attributes the success of the unit to franchisor. 
40 students, 140 Canonical 
Anand & Stem 
Lab study, Questionnaire Franchisees of a correlation analysis, 
(1985) 
single Franchise regression 
Franchisees were willing to relinquish decision control over unit operations when the 
franchisee's expectancy of success independent of the franchisor was low. 
U.S. Department of All Franchisees T, w statistic, 
Anderson (1 984) Commerce: Secondary in U.S. Roughly regression analysis 
Data 442000 establishments 
The percentage of units owned by franchisors has systematically increased over the 
period of ten years. It was unclear whether there was any difference in sales 
performance between company owned and franchisee owned unit. 
Ayal & Izraeli 
Conceptual 
(1990) 
The authors present a case for franchising of high tech products over other common 
forms of marketing, due to the inherent advantages involved. The advantages cited are 
1) higher value accrued to the product due to the services provided by the franchising 
system (e.g. Training), 2) scale advantages being a part of the franchising system, and 
3) higher commitment to the product. 
Aydin & Kacker I Nationwide mail survey I 70 Franchisors I Descriptive statistics 
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(1989) 1 I responses / 
Perception of ample growth opportunities in the U.S. lack of expertise, and limited 
financial resources were reasons for franchisors remaining domestic. Competition and 
lack of demand was not barrier to going international. All types and sizes of 
franchisors were interesting in internationalising. 
Ayling (1988) /Conceptual I 
Presents evidence that the chances of franchising business surviving over a period oj 
then years is eighty percent but the chances of survival of small business in five years 
is little over twenty percent in the U.K. Presents three types of formats for franchising. 
Baron & Schmidt 
(1991) 
Personnel Interviews 
Telephone interviews 
Convenience 
sample of four 
Franchisees, five 
Franchisors 
Qualitative Data 
Franchisees wanted to run their business independently, but felt that availability oj 
backup and help, proven concept and name, and reduced risks justified being a 
franchisee. 
Bacus & Human 
(1993) 
Sourcebook of Franchise 
opportunities; 
Entrepreneur: Annual 
Franchisee 500: Secondary 
Data 
278 Franchise 
contracts 
Correlation, 
Regression, Factor 
analysis 
Base fees and royalties were positively related and varied across industries, depending 
on the length of the franchisor's performance history, market representation, number of 
retail employees, the type of service offered to franchisees, and the franchisor's 
trademark value. 
20554 Franchises 
Owners 
and Small Logistic Regression Bates (1995) 
Characteristics of Business 
businesses 
Failure rate of franchises was higher than independent small firms during the period 
1984-1987. Differences in characteristics of unit owners were observed between 
franchised firms and independent small firms. Returns to franchising in the retailing 
sector of the industry are declining. 
Bernstein I Conceptual r I 
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(1968-69) I I I 
Risk of failure of the franchisee is reduced by franchisor providing training, a nd 
continuing management assistance. The personnel opportuni ti es and limitatio ns 
imposed by the franchising are also discussed. 
Blair & Kaserman 
(1982) Mathematical Modelling 
The following are recommenced to the franchisor for optimal franchising using 
discounting principles, 1) When demand is certain: fixed fees from the franchisee, 2) 
when demand is uncertain: fixed fees and output royalty. The franchisor is likely to 
earn less in case of demand uncertainty and the franchisee is better off 
265 
Bracker & Pearson Manova, Scheffe's Questionnaire Franchiseeslinde (1986) test 
pendent firms 
Franchised units in the dry-cleaning industry showed no performance difference from 
independent units in revenue, compensation & labour ratio growth. 
Brickley & Dark Franchise disclosure 36 Franchisee 
F tests, Spearman 
documents: (1987) Secondary Data listed in Siegel 
directories tests 
High employee monitoring costs, low initial investments cost per unit, and high 
frequency of repeat customers per unit favoured franchising over company owned 
units. 
10299 
Brickley, Dark & Franchising in the 
Franchisees of 
Regression, Stock 
Weisbach (1991) Economy: Secondary Data mar ket returns 
36 Franchisors 
The passage of 'franchise termination laws' leads to an increase in the number of 
company owned units in industries where the number of repeat customers is few. 
Stockholders of franchising firms are not benefited when termination laws are passed. 
Bush, Tatham, & 
Questi onnaire 12 Franchisors Descriptive statistics 
Hair (1976) 
According to franchisors, they often disagree with franchisees over location criteria for 
individual units. 
Carman & Klein 
(1986) 
Conceptual 
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A review and synthesis of literature on power and property rights and its implications 
to franchising system perfonnance if provided. 
Castrogiovanni, 
Bennett, & Combs 
Entrepreneur Survey: 
717 Franchisors 
Factor Analysis; 
(1995) Secondary Data Cluster Analysis 
This study unsuccessfully attempted to replicate the franchisor types reported by 
Carney and Gedajlovic (1991) with aU. S. based franchisor sample. 
Castrogiovanni, 
Uniform Franchise 
Justis, & Julian 
Offering Circulars 
103 Franchisors t-tests 
(1993) (UFOCs) from a mail 
survey 
Empirical support is provided for the commerce department's franchise failure rate 
estimate of 4%. Age of the franchisor affects the failure rate of a franchise unit. 
Carner (1986-87) Case study 3 banks Descriptive analysis 
Local banks benefit fonn joining franchise chains by being able to set themselves apart 
from independent operators through access to technology, extended product portfolios, 
cost savings, and on-going support, yet at the same time retain control. 
Carney & 
Secondary Data 128 Franchisors 
Regression, Factor 
Gedajlovic (1991) analysis 
Path model of franchise ownership patterns is specified. This model incorporates both 
the vertical integration and resource explanations. Four strategic types were identified: 
repaid growers, expensive conservatives, converters, mature franchisors, and 
unsuccessful. 
Caves & Murphy 
Conceptual Regression 
(1976) 
Franchising contract involves a sharing of intangible assets, especially trademarks and 
goodwill, between firms. Franchising is preferred for minimizing the costs 01 
coordination and production, providing entrepreneurial discretion and flexibility. 
Hence, franchising is also socially advantages even though franchising is a form of 
vertical integration. 
Chan & Justis 
(1992; 1993) 
Conceptual 
340 
Franchising opportunities in the European Community and Spain are discussed wi th 
various options and barriers. 
Chan & Justis 
(1990) Conceptual 
Properties that master franchising, joint venturing, licensing, direct investment, or 
governmental agreements could be starting strategies for franchises trying to enter the 
East Asian market. Information on relevant regulation and taxation is provided for the 
countries of East Asia. 
Combs & Entrepreneur. Annual 
Castrogiovanni Franchise 500: Secondary 558 Franchisors Regression 
(1994) Data 
Number of units franchised by a firm is determined by the SIze of the firm, 
geographical spread of units, investment needed per unit and royalty fee charged. 
Current & 
Storbeck (1994) Mathematical Modelling 
An econometric model for generating many alternative locations for franchisee outlets 
considering inherent conflicts between franchisor and franchisee objectives IS 
developed. 
Dewatripont & Mathematical 
Sekkat (1991) programmmg 
Franchise contract renegotiations could provide franchisees insurance in case of 
demand uncertainty or new opportunities even though contract renegotiations allows 
for possible franchisor opportunism. 
Dahlstom & 181 Norwegian 
Logic Regression Questionnaire 
Retailers Nygaard (1994) 
Company owned outlets had generally higher sales and were located near to freeways. 
Franchising is more likely in low population density areas. 
50 fast food 
Doutt (1984) Questionnaire, Interview 
retailers 
Regression t tests 
Franchised units have higher value added per year and higher service capacity than 
independent units. It was argued that franchised units are able to reach efficient scale 
quickly. 
Eroglu (1992) 1 Conceptual I I 
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A conceptual model is provided on the factors that influence a franchisor's decision to 
go international. Perceived risk and benefits are presented to be the major factors. 
Gal-Or (1991) I Mathematical Modelling I -, 
Delegation of the pricing to franchisees allows the franchisor to reduce pnce 
competition among firms, if franchisor lacks information about local demand. If the 
product is differentiated this may not be optimal for the franchisor as the increased 
profit is likely to be concerned by the franchisee. 
Gallini & Lutz 
(1992) 
Mathematical Modelling 
In case of newly introduced products, franchisors will be able to signal the availability 
of private information to potential franchisees by using a niix of company owned and 
franchised units along with royalty fees. 
154 Franchises 
Guiltinan, Rejab & 
Questionnaire form a single 
Rodgers (1980) 
Factor Analysis 
Franchisor 
Franchisee cooperation is more likely if the franchisees perceive 1) that they are part of 
the decision making structure, 2) that the individual unit uncertainty is reduced, and 3) 
that the communication channel is effective. 
Hackett (1976) I Nationwide mail survey I 85 Franchisors I Descriptive statistics 
Motives underlying international entry were desired to take advantage of market with 
great potential and establish a brand name. Majority of the firms entered overseas 
market without any change in their marketing strategy. Statistical profiles of U.S. firms 
with international operations are also presented. 
Mathematical 
Hadfield (1991) 
Programming 
Franchising is an superior organisational form due to franchising legal characteristics 
and the competitive incentives of franchisees 
Hadfield (1990) I Conceptual 
342 
The contract between a franchisor and franchisee is incomplete because it address the 
problem of quality control of the franchisor but fails to address the issue of franchisor 
opportunism. Courts use these franchise contracts as a guiding mechanism to resolve 
disputes. This may not be right always. Courts need to take to into account of the 
context of the relationship by taking into account the true relational structure of the 
relationship. 
Hall (1964) Conceptual Convenience 
sample of 5 firms 
Presents a classification of franchising firms: 1) Manufacturer-retailer, 
2)Manufacturer-wholesaler, 3) Service sponsor-Retailer, and 4)Wholesaler-retailer. 
Presents some conceptual ideas on how to run a wholesaler retailer operation 
successfully. Major problems faced by wholesalers were need to supply more than 
50% of the goods, and the independent behaviour of some of the franchisees. 
Hing (1995) Questionnaire 9 Franchisors; Factor analysis; P_M 
127 Franchisees Correlation 
A model of franchising buying behaviours is presented. It was found that franchisees 
trait (high need for achievement) and the type of support services offered by the 
franchisor influenced the satisfaction of the franchisee. 
Hunt (1973) Mail Questionnaire 
Random sample 
of 1000 Chi square, t tests, 
Franchisees, 146 descriptive statistics 
Franchisors 
Fast food franchising firms are moving towards company owned units. Older and 
larger systems were more likely to move towards company owned units. 
Hunt (1977) and 
Hunt & Jacobs Conceptual 
(1976) 
Franchising holds out the promise of 'making it big' with reduced risk but it has also 
been detrimental to social welfare in many ways. Analysis on the ]) benefits of 
franchising to society, franchisees, and franchisors; 2) misfortunes/ disadvantages 01 
franchising; 3) future of franchising. Advice on legal rights, and infonnation sources 
for a potential franchisee are provided. 
Hunt (1972) I Conceptual I I 
343 
Beneficial results of franchising were increased opportunities fur individual 
businessmen, lower failure rates, decreased economic concentration increased , 
opportunities for minorities, and encouragement of consumerism. Unfavourable 
impacts were anticompetitive systems of distribution, one-sided contracts favouring 
franchisors and unethical franchise selling tactics. 
Hunt & Nevin 
Mail survey, Franchisee 
(1974) 
opportunity handbook: 
Secondary Data 
102 Franchisees Descriptive statistics 
The passing of full disclosure benefited franchisees by 1) reducing the incidence of 
franchisors misleading prospective franchisees on the units potential profitability, and 
2) franchisee having increased legal remedies. 
Hunt & Nevin 
(1974,1975) 
Secondary Data 
815 nationwide 
responses from 
Franchisees 
Descriptive 
statistics, Multiple 
Classi fication 
Analysis 
Seventy percent of franchisees are expected to purchase at least fifty percent of their 
supplies form their respective franchisor. Legal implications, franchisee and franchisor 
perceptions are presented. Coercive sources of power were used by franchisors to 
achieve power over the franchisees. Franchisor who did not use coercive sources of 
power had higher satisfaction among franchisees. 
Huszagh, Huszagh Franchising in the 
367 Franchisors Chi-square 
& McIntyre (1992) Economy: Secondary Data 
Franchisors who are older, orland those who have a large number of units are more 
likely to be operating internationally. 
Inaba (1980) 1 Mathematical Modeling 
Econometric techniques are used to prove that royalty and tie in sales franchisors earns 
monopoly profits when demand is certain. To earn high profits in situations of high 
demand uncertainty, franchisors should use tie in sales rather then royalties. 
Castro giovanni 
Secondary 
Entrepreneur Data Survey: 
1005 Franchisors Regression, fTests 
Julian & 
(1995) 
344 
Franchisors expanding abroad are likely to be larger and generally seeking to grow 
domestically too. The degree of geographic expansion of a franchisor varies wi th 
industry. 
Justis & Judd 
(1986) Conceptual 
Master franchising is an alternative approach to traditional franchising because it offers 
increased speed of development, ability to address local competition, rapid cash flow, 
and utilizes little cash to start-up. The major disadvantages are long term contracts, 
delegation of power to master franchisee, and lower income per unit. 
Justis, Olsen & 
Chan (1993) Conceptual 
Marketing research's usefulness for franchising system management is provided. 
Katz & Owen 
(1992) Mathematical Modeling 
Franchisors may benefit by offering differing contacts to franchisees based on 
franchisee's willingness to take risk, expend effort and attitude towards effort. 
However such information on the franchisee is not available. Common 'non-linear' 
contracts currently used by franchisors is an option to attract desirable franchisees. 
Kaufmann & Mathematical 
Rangan (1990) Programming 
A mathematical model is developed by integrating elements of store choice, site 
allocation and a proactive management system in order to reduce conflict between the 
franchisee and the franchisor while adding new units. The model optimises the 
counteracting effects of spatial competition and relative system attractiveness. 
Kedia, Ackerman, 
Bush, & Justis Questionnaire 142 Franchisors T tests 
(1994) 
Tables comparing international franchisors and domestic franchisors with respect to 
factors constraining international expansion is provided. 
Kedia, Ackerman 
QuestiOlmaire 142 franchisors Wilks Lambda 
& Justis (1995) 
The attitude of franchisor management towards international franchising was more 
re lated to international expansion than firm size or firm age. 
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Klein (1980) I Conceptual I I 
Reasons for termination-at-will and exclusive-dealing contractual arrangement arc 
discussed. These are required because if the franchisee 'free rides', and if the contract 
is terminated by the franchisor, the franchisee will be inflicted with a loss. The loss 
would arise due to the difference between long term potential capital investment gains 
(which would be large) and short run wealth gain. Hence governmental regulation 
preventing any 'unfair' contractual arrangements may not be always appropriate. 
Klein & Leffler Mathematical 
(1981 ) Programming 
A mathematical model is developed to examine contract enforcement mechanism for 
difficult to measure product characteristics like 'taste' of hamburger. They received 
support for the notion that market prices above the competitive price and the presence 
of non-salvageable capital are means of enforcing quality contracts. 
Klein & Saft 
(1985) 
Conceptual 
Antitrust law implications of ties in sales are discussed. It is argued that tie in sales do 
not necessarily bring market power to the franchisor, and hence there is no need to be 
regulated by antitrust law: Moreover, tie in sales also do a social purpose by assuring 
quality to customers. 
National Institute for Work 7000 employees Regression, Chow 
tests, Probit 
modelling 
Krueger (1991) and Learning: Secondary of 273 fast food 
Data restaurants 
Employees of company owned and franchisee owned restaurants have similar 
demographic characteristics. In company owned units, wages were9 percent higher for 
lower level managers, 1 to 2% percent higher for crew workers, and tenure profiles 
were steeper. 
Knight (1986) Questionnaire 
Random sample 
of Interviews 48 
Descriptive statistics 
Franchisors, 105 
Franchisees 
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The benefit of a known trade name, higher independence and job satisfaction than a 
salaried employment, and ease of development was the primary advantages of 
franchising according to franchisees. Willingness to work hard and desire to succeed 
were viewed as important characteristics of successful franchisees. Recognized 
trademark, advice, information bulletins, and operating manuals were important 
variables which effected franchisee satisfaction with the relationship. 
Knight (1984) Questionnaire 
Random sample 
of 105 
Descriptive statistics 
Franchisees, 102 
entrepreneurs 
Independent entrepreneurs were perceived to be more self-reliant, experienced, 
independently minded and highly motivated than franchisees. The author also 
commented that franchisees could have a high failure risk. 
Sourcebook of franchise 
opportunities; 
Lafontaine (1992) Entrepreneur. Annual 548 Franchisors Regression 
Franchise 500: Secondary 
Data 
The incidence of franchising is prevalent when incentive problems exist for franchisors 
and franchisees. Firms use franchising to grow faster, even though the constraint may 
not be financial always. 
Lafontaine & 
Questionnaire 130 Franchisors Regression 
Kaufmann (1994) 
Franchisors use a combination of company owned and franchised units due to the 
advantages offered by franchising even when there are not resource constraints. 
However, resource constraints drive the need towards more franchisee owned units 
during the earlier stages of growth. 
Mathematical 
Lal (1990) 
programming 
Royalty payments provide the necessary incentives for franchisors to act in the best 
interest of the franchising system. Enforcement of contractual obligations through 
monitoring avoids free-riding by franchisees. 
Lewis & Lambert I Questionnaires I 107 Franchisee I Liseral analysis, 
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(1991) of a single Multiple group 
Franchisor Analysis 
Financial dependence by the franchisee on the franchisor lead to the franchisee 
performing according to franchisor expectations. Satisfaction of the franchisee was 
also dependant on the franchisee attributing unit success to the franchisor. 
Lillis, Narayana, & 
Gilman (1976) Questionnaire 
55 Franchisors 
U.S. Dept of 
Commerce 
H statistic 
Franchisors perceived that high franchisee motivation is the most important advantage 
offered by franchising no matter what stage of the life cycle. 
Markland & Furst Mathematical 
(1974) programmIl1g 
A two stage model is provided to produce on optimum number of units for a franchise. 
In the first stage of the model uncertainties involving cash flow are incorporated for 
each franchise. In the second stage, based upon information from the first stage and 
limited capital being available, integer programming techniques are used to optimise 
franchise performance. 
Martin (1988) 
Franchising in the 
Economy, 1985 
Franchising Annual, 
Source Book of 
Franchising Organisations: 
Secondary Data 
Logic modelling, t, f 
949 Franchisors tests, Regression 
models 
Capital needs, market competition, monitoring costs and the need/desire to reach the 
minimum efficient scale effect the decision of the franchisor to franchise or to have 
company owned units. Legal regulation would not be appropriate in such a case. 
Martin & Justis 
Entrepreneur Annual 
Survey 1980-89: 
Secondary Data 
521 Franchisors Regression 
Franchisor decision to franchise extensively positively influences system wide growth 
in size. Franchising is found to be an efficient form of organisation as takes care of 
monitoring problems and capital scarcity. 
Mathewson & I Conceptual I 
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Winter (1985) 
Based on the agency theory, dioceses various clauses in franchising contracts. 
Mathewson & Econometric 
Franchise Contracts 25 Franchisors 
Winter (1 994) Modelling 
An econometric model is developed and validated through 25 franchise contracts 
which argues for giving franchisees territorial guarantees which franchisees' effort is 
important for the success of the system. 
Morgan (1987) I Conceptual I I 
Franchisor are held liable in courts when consumers are hurt by products or services 
sold by franchisees. Past cases involving product liability are analysed and guidelines 
are provided. 
Industries listed 
U.S. Census of Retailing, 
on SIC code 
Norton (1988) Transportation, Statistical 
5812 (Eating 
Regression 
Abstract: Secondary Data 
Places) 
Franchising is more likely than company owned units when: 1 )units are physically 
dispersed, 2) there are high sales per employee, 3) sales are growing, and 4) the brand 
name is important. 
Oxenfelt & Kell y 
Conceptual 
(1968-69) 
Conceptual framework on the life cycle 0 franchising along with a push/pull model is 
provided. Presents a topology to explain the likelihood of a franchised unit being sold 
back to a franchisor. 
Oxenfelt & 
Thompson Conceptual 
(1968-69) 
Franchising is presented form a historical background. 
74 Franchisees 
Peterson & Dant 
of single 
Descriptive statistics 
Questionnaire 
Chi sq uare tests (1990) 
Franchisee 
Training, established name, independence, better profitability than a independent 
business, and lower development costs were the perceived advantages of the 
franchisees. The was little difference between various types of franchisees. 
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Pilling (1991) I Questionnaires 80 Franchisors IANOYA, MAN OVA 
Independent business owners who are currently competitive are not interested 111 
joining a franchising system (and vice versa). 
Pirkul, 
Mathematical 
Narasimham, & 
De (1987) 
Programming 
A mathematical model is provided to maximize the expected return while expanding a 
franchise system. The model leads the user to select between opening company owned 
or franchised units. The constraints built into the model are capital budgeting and 
distance between units. 
Preble (1992) Conceptual 
The international expansion of U.S. fast food franchisors are reviewed with illusions. 
Preble & Hoffman 
(1994) 
Conceptual 
Beneficial aspects of 'Mobile Franchising' are discussed. 
13 Directors of 
Preble & Hoffman 
Questionnaire Franchise 
(1995) 
Associations 
Descriptive information is provided on many factors relating to franchising across 
thirteen nations. 
Rothenberg (1967) Conceptual 
Presents the history of franchising and lists basic requirements of a business to 
franchise/technical knowledge, management techniques, commercial knowledge, 
financial instruction, accounting controls, and protective safeguards. 
Rubin (1978) 1 Conceptual -I 1 
Property rights, incentives and monitoring costs are used to explain the nature of a 
franchise contract. The explanation that franchising is a means to overcome a shortage 
of capital is rejected by arguing that the franchisor is able to reduce risk by investing in 
the entire system, and hence has a lower cost of capital than the franchise. 
349 Franchisees 
Schul, Little, & Questionnaire three 
of Canonical Factor Analysis 
Pride (1983, 1985) Franchisors Analysis 
350 
Franchise satisfaction was found to be positively correlated with franchisee s' 
perceptions of autonomy, clear franchise system objectives/policies/procedures, leader 
consideration, and perfonnance-reward relationship. Directive leadership by the 
franchisor was found to be appropriate to reduce perceived inter-channel conflict rather 
than supportive or participative leadership. 
The Source Book of Regression 
Sen (1993) Franchising in the 996 Franchisors Franchise 
Economy: Secondary Data Opportunities 
Franchisor characteristics determine the initial fees charged by a franchisor. Royalty 
rates are determined by franchisor characteristics, services offered by franchisor, and 
the risk of franchisee. New franchisors charge a higher initial fce than older 
franchisors. 
22 units of the 
Shelton (1967) Franchisor operational data 
Franchisor 
Descriptive Statistics 
Units owned by franchisee owners outperfom1ed units supervised by company 
managers in sales and profits, even thought the company managers were paid on the 
basis of incentive compensation. 
Random sample 
of140 
Sibley & Michie Correlation, 
Questionnaire Franchisees from (1982) 
a single 
Regression 
Franchisor 
Perceived channel cooperation was highly correlated with noncoercive sources of 
power. However, there was no relationship between coercive sources of power and 
channel cooperation. 
Stadfeild (1992) Conceptual 
Merits and implications of the Federal Franchise Disclosure and Consumer Protection 
(FFDCPA) and Federal Fair Franchise Practice Act (FFPA) are discussed. 
Stockstill (1985) Conceptual 
Multilevel franchising IS recommend to small business investors based on its 
availability, minimal capital requirements, and flexibility. 
Storholm & 
Scheuing (1994) 
Conceptual 
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Ethical and legal factors relating to business format franchising are discussed. 
Thomas, O'Hara, Time series, 
& Musgrave 
Franchising in the 
10 Franchisors Crossectional 
(1990) Economy: Secondary Data Analysis 
High unit sales cause the franchisor to convert a franchised unit into a company owned 
unit. The study also found no support for the life cycle theory of franchise 
development as proposed by OxenfeIt & Kelly (1968-69). 
U.S. Department of 
Thompson (1994) Commerce: Secondary 200 Franchisors Regression 
Data 
The life cycle effect of franchising could be due to both the lack of managerial 
capabilities and capital while the firm is in a growth stage. Limited evidence is offered 
in this regard. 
Thompson (1992) Franchising in the 547 Franchisors Regression, t tests 
Economy: Secondary Data 
Company ownership of units occurs in urban and/or high population density areas, and 
large unit size. Company ownership is less likely when there is need for high capital 
investment or when the franchisor is growing rapidly. Regulation of franchising does 
not affect the growth of franchising. 
Thompson 
Conceptual (1968-69) 
F our court cases on franchising antitrust law are analysed. Proof is required by 
franchisor of the reasonableness of their tie in sales and the absence of less restrictive 
means to achieve the same ends. 
Thompson 
Conceptual 
(1968-69) 
A classified bibliography of articles in franchising is provided. 
Walker & Etzel 
Descriptive statistics Questionnaire 149 Franchisors 
(1973) 
Internationalisation of U.S. franchise system is an emerging trend. Franchisors 
internationalising have had problems (mostly legal) but seem to have overcome them. 
Opinions of franchisors on a number of issues related to franchising are provided. 
Wattel (1968-69) I Conceptual ! I 
352 
Differences in managerial abilities required by a franchisee and an independe nt 
entrepreneur are discussed. The franchisee needs to be more of a conformist in order to 
function well in a franchising system. 
Weinrauch (1986) I Conceptual I I 
Prescriptive guidelines for franchising an existing business are offered. It is felt that 
high gross margin, in store value, secret processes, real estate profits, and easy 
implementation are necessary condition for successful franchising. 
Welch (1992) I Conceptual I I 
Reviews recent developments in international franchising using examples of both U.S 
and non-U.S franchisors. 
Welch (1989) I Conceptual I I 
The international spread of franchising has been in two stages. Initially, it spread to 
countries characterized by high per capita income and a developed retail service sector, 
and then to the second stage countries which were characterized by greater diversity in 
culture, income and political systems. 
Random sample 
Analysis of variance, 
Withane (1991) Questionnaire of 85 Canadian 
Sheffe tests 
Franchisees 
Franchisees' self reports were used to determine the impOliant of personnel 
characteristics for success. Risk taking, and ability to operate autonomously were 
considered important. 
Whitehead (1991) I Case Study 1 I 
International franchising provides an opportunity for companies to establish a presence 
in countries where population or per capita spending is not sufficient for a major 
expansion effort. 
Woll (1968-69) I Conceptual I I 
The major sources of revenue for franchisor are initial franchisee fee, royalties, rental 
of premises, sale or leasing of equipment, supplies and raw materials, sale of franchise 
products, and sale of territorial rights. A discussion of each of these options is 
provided. 
Zeller, Achabal, Mathematical 
Brown (1980) Programming 
353 
A mathematical model is developed to evaluate alternative scenarios and effects of 
various franchise policies. It was found that market penetration goals and location 
goals of the members of the franchising system do not coincide easily. The franchisor 
would like to maximize system revenue, the master franchisee maximizes revenue in 
its territory, and the individual franchisee maximizes unit sales. 
Source: Elango and Fried (1997) 
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Appendix 3: Growth Competitiveness Ranking 2002 
Country Growth Competitiveness Growth Competitiveness 
Ranking 2002 Ranking 2001 
United States 1 2 
Finland 2 1 
Taiwan 3 7 
Singapore 4 4 
Sweden 5 9 
Switzerland 6 15 
Australia 7 5 
Canada 8 3 
Norway 9 6 
Denmark 10 ]4 
United Kingdom 11 12 
Iceland 12 16 
Japan 13 2 1 
Germany 14 ]7 
Netherlands 15 8 
New Zealand 16 10 
Hong Kong SAR 17 13 
Austria 18 18 
Israel 19 24 
Chile 20 27 
Korea 2 ] 23 
SjJain 22 22 
Portugal 23 25 
Ireland 24 11 
Belgium 25 ]9 
Estonia 26 29 
Malaysia 27 30 
Slovenia 28 3 ] 
Hungry 29 28 
France 30 20 
Thailand 3] 33 
South Africa 32 34 
China 33 39 
Tunisia 34 
Mauritius 35 32 
Lithuania 36 43 
Trinidad and Tobago 37 38 
Greece 38 36 
Italy 39 26 
Czech Republic 40 37 
Botswana 41 
Uruguay 42 46 
Costa Rica 43 35 
Latvia 44 47 
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Mexico 45 42 
Brazil 46 44 
Jordan 47 45 
India 48 57 
Slovak Republic 49 40 
Panama 50 53 
Poland 51 41 
Dominican Republic 52 50 
Namibia 53 
Peru 54 55 
Morocco 55 
Colombia 56 65 
El Salvador 57 58 
Croatia 58 
Sri Lanka 59 61 
Jamaica 60 52 
Philippines 61 48 
Bulgaria 62 59 
Argentina 63 49 
Russian Federation 64 63 
Vietnam 65 60 
Romania 66 56 
Indonesia 67 64 
Venezuela 68 62 
Turkey 69 54 
Guatemala 70 66 
N~geria 71 74 
Paraguay 72 72 
Ecuador 73 68 
Bangladesh 74 71 
Nicaragua 75 73 
Honduras 76 70 
Ukraine 77 69 
Bolivia 78 67 
Zimbabwe 79 75 
Haiti 80 
Source: www.weforum.org 
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Appendix Four: Interview Questions for Franchisors and 
Franchisees 
1. To W1d r tand the d velopment of franchising in the Taiwanese retail 
Objective market. e p ciaJly in the con enience store and estate agency industries and 
to comprehend wh)' this kind of business fonnat is so popular. Questions Secondary Data 
2. To explor th relati i sues in franchising, such as regular and franchise 
Objective chain. single and multi-wlit franch isee, local and international franchisee, 
internal and external franchisee, original and transferred franchisee and so 
on. 
Franchisor Franchisee 
Being a franchi or ~ hich kind of Being a franchisee, do you wish to be 
retail outlet (compan owned or a multi-unit franchisee? 
franchi ed) rehabl e 'ecutes corporate 
-policy? 
Before franchising did you run What is the reason for being a 
compan -0\ ned outlet to test the franchisee rather than running your 
operational know-how? Ifnot, why own business? Questions not? 
Is multi-unit Franchi ing pre alent in What are the differences between a 
your s tern? Do ou encourage this company-owned brand and a franchise 
kind of format? Do au think that brand? 
multi-unit franchisees outperform 
single unit franchis e fro m the 
per pecti e of W1it growth. 
uniformity local respon i eness and 
system wide adaptation? 
As far a the percentage between Do you think the failure rate for a 
company-owned and franchised franchise brand is lower than a private 
outlets is conc rned, what ratio rate do brand? 
you think is mo t appropriate and what 
is the ratio for your company? 
Do you worry that a multi-unit Being a multi-wlit franchisee, do you 
franchi ee could create his own brand plan to create your own brand in the 
in the future? future? 
Do you think that the failure rate for a Do you think that the fa ilure rate for a 
franchised outlet is low r than a fi'anchi sed outlet is lower than a 
private brand? private brand? 
As far as organisational form is Being a multi-unit franchisee, do you 
concerned do you think a hybrid think multi-units outperform single 
organisational form is better than a units from the perspectives of unit 
hierarchy? growth, W1iformity, local 
responsiveness and system wide 
adaptation? 
3. To understand what was transferred dw-ing the process of 
Objective internationalisation for both convenience store and estate agency industries, 
and to identify any difference in international franchise path. 
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Franchisor Franchisee 
Which kind of international market Being a member of an international 
entry mode did your company choose brand, what do you think the 
and why? differences are between a local and an 
international brand? 
What was transferred in the process of 
internationalisation? 
Questions Being a master franchisee, how did 
you find the balance between 
internationalisation and localisation? 
Which kind of problems did you 
encounter in the process of 
internationali sati on? 
Which stage do you think your 
company is presently at (reluctance, 
caution and ambitious)? 
Objective 4. To explore the motivations for franchising fTom the perspectives of agency 
theory, resource constraints and transaction cost analysis. 
Questions Franchisor Franchi see 
What are the reasons for choosing 
franchising as a running format? 
What criteria do you use to choose a What criteria do you use to choose a 
qualified franchisee? qualified franchisor? 
When selecting a potential franchisee, 
which source do you prefer, a new 
franchisee or an original franchisee? 
Do you think that company-owned 
outlets are more reliable than 
franchised outlets? 
Do you think that the contract is equal Do you think that the contract is equal 
and monitoring arises from it? and monitoring arises from it? 
Do you think that there is a Do you think that there is a 
relationship between monitoring relationship between monitoring 
frequency and service level; frequency and serv ice level; 
monitoring cost and royalty; monitoring cost and royalty; 
monitoring cost and brand value? monitoring cost and brand value? 
Do you think the cost of monitoring a 
multi-unit franchisee is cheaper than a 
single-unit franchisee? 
Do you think that franchisees cheat on Do you think that franchisees cheat on 
performance? performance? 
Do you think that the franchisor is Do you think that the franchisor is 
more risk -neutral and the franchisee is more risk-neutral and the franchisee is 
more ri sk-averse? more risk-averse? 
Do you think that higher initial Do you think that higher initial 
investment leads to greater company investment leads to greater company 
ownership? ownership? 
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Do you think franchising is a quick Why do you think that the franchisor 
way to expand without sufficient wants to franchise his business? 
resources (financial capital human 
capital and local knowledge)? 
As far as capital scare is concerned, do Do you think that it is cheaper to be a 
you think that it is more efficient to franchisee than to run a private brand 
get it from franchisees rather than from the perspectives of initial and 
stockholders or lenders? ongoing fee? 
Why do company-owned outlets Do you think that the brand value is an 
transfer to franchised outlets as time important criterion when customers 
goes by? choose the store? 
Does the franchisor buy back profitable Does the franchisor buy back 
franchisees? profitable franchisees? 
How do franchisors protect their Do you think that it is very easy to 
brands from being damaged by transfer from one brand to the other if 
franchisees? you are not satisfied with the original 
brand? 
Do you think that the cost of 
purchasing from the franchisor is 
more expensive than from 
unauthorised suppl iers? If so, could 
you purchase from other suppliers? 
5. To evaluate the importance of the decision-maker on the interactions 
Objective between franchisors and franchisees, including the decision-maker's 
characteristics, leadership, attitude, and the role of entrepreneurshiQ. 
Franchisor Franchisee 
What kind of leadership (participative, What kind of leadership (participative, 
achievement or supportive) does the achievement or supportive) does the 
franchisor adopt toward franchisor adopt? 
Do you like it? 
company-owned and franchised 
outlets? 
What kind of power do the franchisor What kind of power do you feel from 
exert on franchisees? the franchisor? 
Questions 
Which kind of franchisees do you 
prefer, a manager or an entrepreneur? 
Do you think that the franchisor is a Do you think that the franchisee is a 
typical entrepreneur? typical entrepreneur? 
Do you think that the franchisor's Do 
you think that the franchisor's 
experience is positively related to the experience is positively related to the 
franchisee's satisfaction? franchisee 'S satisfaction? 
Do you think that the franchisor Do 
you think that the franchisor 
should run company-owned outlets should 
run company-owned outlets 
before franchising? before franchising? 
6. To explore what was excbanged between the franchisor and franchisee, an.d 
Objective 
how this kind of inter-organisational form was maintained to maximise both 
parties 
, benefits. If both parties 
, 
. exchange behaviour is not balanced, 
how will one party react to the other? 
Questions Franchisor I Franchisee 
359 
Being a franchisor, how do you keep a Being a franchisee, how do you keep a 
good relationship with franchisees and good relationship with the franchisor 
prevent the occurrence of conflict? and prevent the occurrence of contlict? 
From a franchisor's view, what do you From a franchisee's view, what do you 
expect from a franchisee in order to expect from a franchisor in order to 
keep a good relationship? keep a good relationship? 
Are you satisfied with both parties 
, 
Are you satisfied with both parties 
, 
relationship? Ifnot. why? relationship? Ifnot, why? 
I f conflicts occur, what approach If conflicts occur, what approach 
(coercive or non-coercive) do you take (coercive or non-coercive) do you take 
with your franchisee? Do you think with your franchisor? Do you think 
it is good for organisational it is good for organisational 
development? What about the development? What about the 
different role of the store manager in different role of store manager in the 
the conflict? conflict? 
What kind of situation is the most Which kind of situation is the most 
common for the occurrence of a common for the occurrence of a 
conflict? conflict? 
Generally speaking, how do conflicts Generally speaking, how do conflicts 
evolve? Does it have a positive or evolve? Does it have a positive or 
negative effect? negative effect? 
How do you evaluate the franchisee's How do you evaluate the franchisor's 
performance? Is it important to your performance? Is it important to your 
relationship? relationship? 
Which party is more proactive on Which party is more proactive on 
problem solving? problem solving? 
Do you think there is a positive Do you think there is a positive 
relationship between the franchisor's relationship between the franchisor's 
support and the franchisee's support and the franchisee's 
performance? performance? 
What is the franchisor's objective and What is the franchisee's objective and 
how do you co-ordinate with each how do you co-ordinate with each 
party's objective? party's objective? 
Being a franchisor, do you think it is Being a franchisee, do you think it is 
equal between give and take? equal between give and take? 
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Appendix 5: Interview Inquiry Letter 
IF, NO. Il,LANE lOLSECTION 1, WEN-WHARD, 
PAN-CHIAO CITY, TAIPEI, 220 
r;,-:r°F'" : UNIVERSITY OF ~~ ! STIRLING 
I 
TELEPHONE: 02-29656862 
MOBILE: 0912393378 
Dear 
I am a doctoral research in the University of Stirling, UK and I am undertaking 
research into the relationship and conflict between franchisors and franchisees. 
After careful consideration, your company was selected. This means that, with your 
participation, your company could help me to develop an understanding of the 
interactions between both parties. Therefore, if you could assist by allowing me to 
interview you, I would be very appreciative. The interview would last for 
approximately an hour. 
The aim of the research is to explore the relationship and conflict between franchisors 
and franchisees. The results wi1I help both parties find the perceptual gaps and 
evolve efficient solutions to reach a win-win status. 
Your assistance would be very important to my research and I can assure you that 
your treasured opinions would be not revealed to others and it would only be used for 
academic purposes. In addition, the interviewee's name will be revealed on the 
report. So, you can feel relieved on your answers responded. 
Finally, the list of interview questions is offered for a preview. After a couple of 
days, I will contact with you to inquire your willingness to be interviewed. Thank 
you for your treasured help. 
With Best Regards, 
Chen-I Huang 
Doctoral Research Student 
University of Stirling 
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Appendix 6: The Characteristics of Franchisees (Interviewees) in Both Convenience Store and Estate Agency 
Industries 
C St Indust 
7-Elcvcn Manager Manager Manager Franchisee Franchisee Franchisee Franchisee Franchisee Franchisee Franchisee 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Regular Chain , 
~~ .. ~ .. .~. 
-
, " 
FCl (Single-unit) -\0' .: , , I ,- '. ~ 
• FC 1 (Multi-unit) .~ - 't 
FC2 (Single-unit) . . ....... ~' 
FC2 (Multi-unit) . . -~ .!,,. 
- " k . 
Internal .. ~ '. ~ t, • . " , . 
I '~ ~. li • 
Franchisee .' We: .~} -~ 
External .1 . .."r;., """. 1~ ~ ; ~ ," r Tt' 
.' ~'"J • " ....... ,... ~f Franchisee ' , ;' . ,\:u 
-
!.-
.' 
Circle K Manager Manager Franchisee Franchisee Franchisee Franchisee Franchisee Franchisee Franchisee Franchisee 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Regular Chain . 
FC 1 (Single-unit) 
FC 1 (Multi-unit) 
FC2 (Single-unit) l-:-' .:t:"; • " , . • 'I" ?,~ 'I~' . ... '-=- ~ .' ...... l ... ~ .r .. ,,-' 
." ~ ~ yl ,"4'9' 
FC2 (Multi-unit) :,~l'; z .:_~'.i-~ '~_, 
Internal 'I, ~ " ,. " ,I . .-::. ., ~ " ~, . 
. 
, 
-J} 1..:.1 , ~"~' ~" Franchisee I .. ,,;. , . rY,~'1:' "t' .. . 1"~_ Jt~ -jt';~ - "L,"'I: 
_" 'l> • t .. ~ I _ 
External , . ' " ; ~F 
.' 
.. '''''1'1 lf~ r I· 
:J /-
Franchisee i,' ,"", ~ . ;1',' " ,!" '.. ~ .. 
--
(There is no FC 1 fornlat in Circle K) 
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Niko Mart Franchisee Franchisee Franchisee Franchisee Franchisee Franchisee 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Regular Chain 
FC I (Single-unit) 
FC 1 (Multi-unit) 
FC2 (Single-unit) " .. ~.~:~ ...... ~ .. ':' ~~ 11" ... ' f ... ... • "I' • c • ~if\" ',. " I:,~: • J , . 
FC2 (Multi-unit) ~ , 
Internal 
Franchisee 
External '-::,. - .. J;c _. ~ ~ .t :. -";;;' ! ~-' I '··,il;'. " •• ', It:., .:: ,I r ~ '~ . , .., ;" ..... ~t!,1_ . ~.; . • • r~ ~; ... : ...... "~I _'I 
Franchisee ",;t " •. :~;::I:~·:".~:.~ ~ 1 ; ~ ;. j.. ~Jo l", .to 
-
, 
r'··, I 
c- _ , 
--
(There is no FC I format in Niko Mart) 
Hi-Life Manager Franchisee Franchisee Franchisee Franchisee 1 2 3 4 5 
Regular Chain 
FC I (Single-unit) • j' ~."" 
FC 1 (Multi-unit) 
FC2 (Single-unit) .'( /f· ~::l _. "l ~... .,) 7i:" ~~::~~~ ... '~:: 
FC2 (Multi-unit) 
Internal 
Franchisee 
External , c .. ~..:>~ ;_ ~OII .. .~ /1- ~ ,-
· ~i'Dh; 
'" ~;~ -:-t- -.;o.L,':..J~r: Franchisee ~ ~., ".!:~. ...... ~ ~ •• ~ ! .. ~::. 
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